John Doe v. Zucker

JOHN DOE, Petitioner, v. HOWARD ZUCKER, M.D., in his official capacity as Commissioner of Health of the State of New York;and ANNE MARIE T. SULLIVAN, M.D., in her official capacityas Commissioner of Mental Health for the State of New York, Respondents,andRUTH RIVERA; GEORGE IWCZENKO; and ERIC SCOFF, Intervener-Respondents.

1:17-CV-1005 (GTS/CFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

O'CONNELL & ARONOWITZ PC

Counsel for Petitioner

54 State Street, 9th Floor

Albany, New York 12207-2501

CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP

Counsel for Respondents

336 Madison Avenue, 9th Floor

New York, New York 10017-4611

ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP

Counsel for Intervener-Respondents

250 West 55th Street

New York, New York 10019

OF COUNSEL:

JEFFREY J. SHERRIN, ESQ.

DANIELLE E. HOLLEY, ESQ

ROBERT LOUIS BEGLEITER, ESQ.

MATTHEW J. KOENIG, ESQ.

GLENN J. POGUST, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently pending before the Court, in this discrimination action filed by John Doe ("Petitioner") against Howard Zucker, M.D., and Anne Marie T. Sullivan ("Respondents") and Ruth Rivera, George Iwczenko, and Eric Scoff ("Intervener-Respondents") are the following two motions: (1) Petitioner's motion to dismiss the Intervener-Respondents from this action; and (2) Petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged regulations. (Dkt. Nos. 64, 65.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's motion to dismiss the Intervener-Respondents is denied and Petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Summary of Petitioner's Complaint

On July 20, 2018, this Court issued a Decision and Order granting Respondents' motion to dismiss Petitioner's Complaint in part and denying it in part. (Dkt. No. 51 [Decision and Order filed July 20, 2018].) As a result of that Decision and Order, Petitioner's Fourth and Fifth Claims were dismissed, while his First, Second, Third, and Sixth Claims were permitted to proceed. (Id.)

As to the First Claim, Petitioner alleges that the challenged regulations violate the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by (a) depriving persons of their choice to live in an adult home solely because of their disability, (b) forcing persons with mental disabilities to accept a residence other than the adult home of their choice, and (c) forcing persons with mental disabilities in hospitals, nursing homes, or other shelters to remain in living situations unsuited for them by reason of their mental disability. (Dkt. No. 2, at ¶¶ 51-57 [Pet'r's Compl.].)Petitioner alleges that he is being denied the benefits of living in housing of his choice and is being discriminated against solely on the basis of his mental disability, and that the regulations force transitional adult homes to discriminate against Petitioner and other similarly situated persons and deny them their choice of living accommodation. (Id. at ¶ 56-57.)

As to the Second and Third Claims, Petitioner alleges that the challenged regulations violate the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") for the same reasons that he alleges the ADA has been violated. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-62.)

As to the Sixth Claim, Petitioner alleges that the challenged regulations are arbitrary, capricious, and irrational because they (a) violate the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the FHA, (b) force transitional adult homes to discriminate against people with mental disabilities, (c) categorize all persons with mental illness alike and deprive them of rights they would otherwise enjoy without regard to their individual needs, circumstances, conditions or desires, and (d) fail to take into account individual needs and preferences. (Id. at ¶ 80.)

B. Parties' Briefing of Petitioner's Motions

1. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervener-Respondents as Parties

a. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law

Generally, in his memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss Intervener-Respondents from this action, Petitioner asserts three arguments. (Dkt. No. 64, Attach. 1, at 14-32 [Pet'r's Mem. of Law].) First, Petitioner argues that Intervener-Respondents do not have constitutional standing to participate in this case. (Id. at 14-22.) More specifically, Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court held in Town of Chester N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1652 (2017), that every litigant seeking to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 mustdemonstrate that it has Article III standing and that Intervener-Respondents cannot establish an injury-in-fact because, as current residents of a transitional adult home, the challenged regulations do not impact their ability to move to supported housing. (Id. at 17-18.) Petitioner argues specifically that the challenged regulations do not apply to Intervener-Respondent Rivera because she has already moved out of her adult home and that the challenged regulations would not prevent Intervener-Respondents Iwczeko and Scoff from applying for, or moving to, supported housing. (Id. at 18-19.) Petitioner therefore frames Intervener-Respondents' alleged injury-in-fact as being related to the ability to move from a transitional adult home to supported housing and argues that, because nothing (including the challenged regulations) prevents Intervener-Defendants from making such a move, they will not suffer an injury-in-fact if the challenged regulations are enjoined or declared unconstitutional. (Id. at 20-21.) Petitioner additionally argues that the finding of standing by the state court does not control this Court's determination of whether there is constitutional Article III standing. (Id. at 17.) Alternatively, Petitioner argues that an evidentiary hearing should be held if the Court cannot determine standing on the record. (Id. at 21-22.)

Second, Petitioner argues that Intervener-Respondents do not meet the requirements for intervention-as-of-right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 for the following four reasons: (a) the motion to intervene was untimely because Intervener-Respondents had been living in transitional adult homes (and therefore were aware of their interests/risks in this case) since 2013 or 2015; (b) the existing parties will be prejudiced by the intervention because it causes (and in fact already has caused, in the form of removal to this Court) delay; (c) Intervener-Respondents will not be prejudiced by being dismissed because the attorneys for Respondents can adequately representtheir interests and, in any event, their rights are not affected by the challenged regulations; and (d) Intervener-Respondents do not have a sufficient interest in the litigation given that the challenged regulations do not affect their right to move into supported housing. (Id. at 22-30.)

Third, Petitioner argues that Intervener-Respondents should also not be permitted to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) because they have already delayed the proceedings in this case and there is no common question between their interests and the subject of this lawsuit. (Id. at 31-32.)

b. Intervener-Respondents' Opposition Memorandum of Law

Generally, in opposition to Petitioner's motion to dismiss Intervener-Respondents, Intervener-Respondents assert four arguments. (Dkt. No. 75, at 13-32 [Intervener-Resp'ts' Opp'n Mem. of Law].) First, Intervener-Respondents argue that the issues raised in Petitioner's motion have been previously been decided by the state court and should not be relitigated. (Id. at 13-16.) More specifically, Intervener-Respondents argue that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to state court decisions made prior to removal, that there is no compelling reason to revisit the prior ruling that granted Intervener-Respondents' motion to intervene, and that applying the law-of-the-case doctrine would not produce an anomalous result because the test for determining intervention in New York is similar to the requirements for intervention under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.)

Second, Intervener-Respondents argue that there is no need to show Article III standing because the Supreme Court indicated in Town of Chester that such a showing was needed only where an intervener is seeking more relief than that sought by the original parties, and Intervener-Respondents are seeking the same relief as sought by Respondents: namely, a findingthat the challenged regulations are constitutional and should be upheld. (Id. at 16-18.) Nonetheless, Intervener-Respondents argue in the alternative that they have shown that they possess Article III standing. (Id. at 18-21.) More specifically, Intervener-Respondents argue that their alleged injury is not related to their right to move to supported housing, but rather to the de facto institutionalization of transitional adult homes that could occur if the challenged regulations were enjoined or found to be unconstitutional. (Id. at 19-21.) Intervener-Respondents argue that the Supreme Court has mandated that persons with serious mental illnesses be able to live in an integrated setting and that the challenged regulations further the mandate by limiting the number of people with serious mental illness who can live in a transitional adult home, which in turn prevents those homes from becoming de facto mental institutions. (Id.) Intervener-Respondents also argue that no evidentiary hearing is necessary on this issue. (Id. at 21.)

Third, Intervener-Respondents argue that they should be permitted to intervene as a matter of right. (Id. at 21-31.) More specifically, Intervener-Respondents argue that (a) the issue of timeliness of their intervention has already been decided by the state court and Petitioner cannot show prejudice by the timing of their intervention because little has occurred in this case other than the entry of the TRO, (b) the parties will not be prejudiced as a result of intervention and the motion to remove the case to this Court did not create a prejudicial delay, (c) Interv...