Case Law Johnson v. Am. Standard

Johnson v. Am. Standard

Document Cited Authorities (26) Cited in (42) Related

Steven J. Cooperstein, Brookman, Rosenberg, Brown & Sandler, Philadelphia,for Bruce Johnson, Dorothy Mauger and Dolores Stea.

Mathieu Jode Shapiro, Thomas A. Leonard, Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel, L.L.P., Philadelphia, Michael J. Stack, Barry Corrado Grassi & Gibson, PC, for Crown Cork & Seal Co.

Vincent Francis Reilly, Reilly, Janiczek & McDevitt, P.C., Philadelphia, for J.H. France Refractories Co.

Scott Robert Kipnis, Hofheimer Gartlir & Gross, L.L.P., for Rapid American Corp.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice BAER.

We granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether individual plaintiffs, who have suffered bodily injury or death due to exposure to asbestos, have standing to raise constitutional challenges under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution to a state statute, which limits the potential liability in asbestos litigation of certain Pennsylvania corporations. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the plaintiffs herein do have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, and thus reverse the order of the Superior Court, and remand this appeal to that court for further proceedings.

This consolidated appeal arises out of three separate actions brought by the estates of Thornton Johnson, Russell Mauger, and Joseph Stea (collectively, Plaintiffs), against several manufacturers of asbestos, as well as entities which, while never manufacturing asbestos, became successor corporations of former manufacturers. All defendants save one, Crown Cork & Seal, Inc. (Crown Cork), have settled and have been released from the litigation; this appeal centers upon the potential liability of Crown Cork to Plaintiffs.

Crown Cork, a Pennsylvania corporation, has been in existence for over 100 years, dealing primarily in the manufacture of bottle-caps and aluminum cans. In 1963, Crown Cork paid $7 million to purchase a majority of stock in rival bottle-cap manufacturer, Mundet Cork Corporation. Prior to Crown Cork's purchase of Mundet, a small division of Mundet had manufactured products containing asbestos. While the division had ceased manufacturing asbestos products prior to Crown Cork gaining majority control of Mundet, the division still existed at the time of purchase. Ninety days after Crown Cork's acquisition of Mundet, the prior asbestos producing division was sold. Subsequently, and for reasons immaterial to this appeal, Crown Cork merged Mundet into itself, thus creating a single corporate entity. As a result of the merger, and in accord with Pennsylvania's rules of successor liability of corporations, Crown Cork became named as a defendant in several asbestos cases, and has since spent hundreds of millions of dollars on asbestos-related defenses.1

On December 17, 2001, the General Assembly enacted Act 101 of 2001, entitled "Limitations on asbestos-related liabilities relating to certain mergers or consolidations." The Act, now codified at 15 Pa.C.S. § 1929.1, generally caps a successor corporation's asbestos-related liability at the fair market value of the succeeded company at the time of the merger or consolidation (here, $7 million). Section 1929.1 provides, in relevant part,

the cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities of a domestic business corporation that was incorporated in this Commonwealth prior to May 1, 2001, shall be limited to the fair market value of the total assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the merger or consolidation, and such corporation shall have no responsibility for successor asbestos-related liabilities in excess of such limitation.

15 Pa.C.S. § 1929.1(a)(1). At the time the statute was enacted, Crown Cork was embroiled in several asbestos-related cases before the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Complex Litigation Center (CLC). Upon passage of Act 101, which became effective immediately, Crown Cork filed a global summary judgment motion before the supervising judge of the CLC, in an effort to dismiss all pending cases.2 The supervising judge granted the global motion, finding that Crown Cork had already paid proceeds to asbestos-related plaintiffs in excess of the fair market value of the now-sold Mundet asbestos division; multiple plaintiffs aggrieved by that decision appealed to the Superior Court. Upon application by Crown Cork, this Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 726, and ultimately reversed the grant of summary judgment, finding Section 1929.1 unconstitutional as applied, as violative of the remedies clause of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Ieropoli v. AC & S Corp., 577 Pa. 138, 842 A.2d 919 (2004).3 Specifically, we held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to complaints filed before its effective date because the statute extinguished already existing causes of action.

In direct response to Ieropoli, the General Assembly immediately enacted a second statute, intended to remedy this fatal flaw. The new act, Act 152 of 2004 and now codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524.1, provided that the limitations on successor liability contained in Section 1929.1, supra p. 323, were only applicable to asbestos-related claims for which the two-year statute of limitations began to run after December 17, 2001, the effective date of Section 1929.1.4 The causes of action related tothe cases at bar all had statutes of limitations that began to run after December 17, 2001. Accordingly, and Ieropoli notwithstanding, Section 1929.1, is applicable to the instant cases.

At the time of passage of Act 152 of 2004, the actions filed by Plaintiffs Mauger and Stea against Crown Cork (and other corporations) were proceeding before the supervising judge of the CLC. Upon enactment of Act 152, Crown Cork subsequently filed a second global summary judgment motion, averring that the causes of action stated by Plaintiffs Mauger and Stea were barred by Section 1929.1, because of the imposed statutory cap on (Crown Cork's) liability.

In response to the global summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs Mauger and Stea did not dispute that Crown Cork had already exceeded the statutory cap on liability. Rather, they averred that Section 1929.1, generally, was unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.5 Specifically, they alleged that Section 1929.1 created an unlawful economic protectionism in favor of in-state corporations over similarly situated out-of-state corporations, by limiting in-state successor corporations' asbestos-related liability without affording the same protection to out-of-state corporations doing business in Pennsylvania, thus rendering Section 1929.1 per se invalid. See Response to Global Summary Judgment Motion at 6 (found in Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 229a) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) ("The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness to the evils of 'economic isolation' and protectionism, while at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people. Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.")). For similar reasons, Plaintiffs Mauger and Stea contended that Section 1929.1 violated the Equal ProtectionClause. See Response to Global Summary Judgment Motion at 12-13 (found in R.R. at 235a-36a). Crown Cork countered that Plaintiffs Mauger and Stea did not possess standing to aver such claims because they were not out-of-state...

5 cases
Document | Pennsylvania Superior Court – 2012
Bricklayers of Western Pennsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott's Dev. Co.
"... ... § 1001, et seq. [?] Brief for the Trustee (687 WDA 2010) at 3; Brief for the Trustee (688 WDA 2010) at 3.          Our standard of review for an order dismissing a mechanics' lien claim based upon a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is as follows: ... , a party seeking judicial resolution of a controversy must establish as a threshold matter that he has standing to maintain the action.” Johnson v. Am. Std., 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 329 (2010). Where a statute delineates the class of members who can assert a claim under the statute, standing ... "
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In re Senior Health Ins. Co. of Pa.
"... ... as a matter of law in approving the Plan as within the Rehabilitator’s discretion based on a "legitimate and significant public purposes" standard rather than the classic test of the best financial interest of policyholders in that 310 A.3d 43 the Plan places the entire $1.224 billion ... standing requirements from Article III of the United States Constitution, standing for Pennsylvania litigants has been created judicially." Johnson v. American Standard , 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 329 (2010) (citation omitted). Our doctrine of standing "stems from the principle that judicial ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Supreme Court – 2024
Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pa. Dep't of Hum. Serv.
"... ... Id. at 4. II. Preliminary Issues A. Providers’ Standing 1. Scope and Standard of Review [2–4] The Commonwealth Court sustained DHS’s preliminary objection, finding that Providers lack standing to pursue this litigation ... Johnson v. Am,. Standard, 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 330 (2010); Fumo v. City of Phila., 601 Pa. 322, 972 A.2d 487, 500 n.5 (2009). [6–8] As observed ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court – 2018
Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf
"... ... , Act 198 A.3d 1213 43 provides that sales in temporary structures are governed by the safety standards in "NFPA 1124," defined as Standard 1124 in the 2006 edition of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) CODE FOR THE MANUFACTURE, TRANSPORTATION, AND STORAGE OF FIREWORKS AND ... Pa. Fed'n of Dog Clubs v. Commonwealth , 105 A.3d 51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Am. Standard , 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318 (2010) ; Fumo ). A direct interest requires a causal connection between the asserted violation and the ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Superior Court – 2024
In re Middleton
"... ... Notably, "[t]hreshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 147 A.3d 897, 901 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Am ... "

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5 cases
Document | Pennsylvania Superior Court – 2012
Bricklayers of Western Pennsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott's Dev. Co.
"... ... § 1001, et seq. [?] Brief for the Trustee (687 WDA 2010) at 3; Brief for the Trustee (688 WDA 2010) at 3.          Our standard of review for an order dismissing a mechanics' lien claim based upon a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is as follows: ... , a party seeking judicial resolution of a controversy must establish as a threshold matter that he has standing to maintain the action.” Johnson v. Am. Std., 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 329 (2010). Where a statute delineates the class of members who can assert a claim under the statute, standing ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Supreme Court – 2024
In re Senior Health Ins. Co. of Pa.
"... ... as a matter of law in approving the Plan as within the Rehabilitator’s discretion based on a "legitimate and significant public purposes" standard rather than the classic test of the best financial interest of policyholders in that 310 A.3d 43 the Plan places the entire $1.224 billion ... standing requirements from Article III of the United States Constitution, standing for Pennsylvania litigants has been created judicially." Johnson v. American Standard , 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 329 (2010) (citation omitted). Our doctrine of standing "stems from the principle that judicial ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Supreme Court – 2024
Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pa. Dep't of Hum. Serv.
"... ... Id. at 4. II. Preliminary Issues A. Providers’ Standing 1. Scope and Standard of Review [2–4] The Commonwealth Court sustained DHS’s preliminary objection, finding that Providers lack standing to pursue this litigation ... Johnson v. Am,. Standard, 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 330 (2010); Fumo v. City of Phila., 601 Pa. 322, 972 A.2d 487, 500 n.5 (2009). [6–8] As observed ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court – 2018
Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf
"... ... , Act 198 A.3d 1213 43 provides that sales in temporary structures are governed by the safety standards in "NFPA 1124," defined as Standard 1124 in the 2006 edition of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) CODE FOR THE MANUFACTURE, TRANSPORTATION, AND STORAGE OF FIREWORKS AND ... Pa. Fed'n of Dog Clubs v. Commonwealth , 105 A.3d 51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Am. Standard , 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318 (2010) ; Fumo ). A direct interest requires a causal connection between the asserted violation and the ... "
Document | Pennsylvania Superior Court – 2024
In re Middleton
"... ... Notably, "[t]hreshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 147 A.3d 897, 901 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Am ... "

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