Johnson v. Bilotta

DWAYNE S. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. LAURA BILOTTA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-8879 (ES) (JAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 23, 2018

Not for Publication

OPINION

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dwayne S. Johnson, a prisoner currently confined at New Jersey State Prison, brings this Complaint asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his trial and conviction in November 2014. (D.E. No. 1). Plaintiff has previously been granted in forma pauperis in this matter. (D.E. No. 6). The Court will review the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may by granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion to amend the caption of his Complaint to include additional defendants, will dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and because it seeks monetary relief from immune defendants, and will grant Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint, should he elect to do so.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in November 2016 and named as defendants: Laura Bilotta, whom he identifies as an Assistant Deputy Public Defender; the Office of the Public Defenders; and Dr. Leanne Cronin, whom he identifies as an Assistant Medical Examiner. (D.E. No. 1 at 4-5). Plaintiff's claims primarily concern his criminal trial and subsequent conviction for the murder of Terrence Everett. (Id. at 6). He asserts that Defendant Bilotta and the Office of the Public Defenders ignored his requests for pre-trial hearings, failed to properly examine the State's medical examiner, and failed to raise exculpatory evidence. (D.E. No. 1 at 6-7). He further alleges that Defendant Cronin gave a "false declaration of death" and she was not "qualified or authorized" to testify. (Id. at 5).

On January 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming additional defendants and including additional facts to support his claims. (D.E. No. 4). He names Detective Lovejoy, Detective of the Newark Police Department; Paul Bradley, Assistant Prosecutor of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office; and Honorable Michael L. Ravin, Judge of the Superior Court, as defendants in his action. (D.E. No. 4-2 at 1-2). Plaintiff asserts claims against Detective Lovejoy for a violation of Plaintiff's "civil rights and liberties," against Paul Bradley for "intentionally with[holding] ... exculpatory evidence," and against Judge Ravin for failure to suppress evidence, failure to consider Plaintiff's mental health history, and failure to grant Plaintiff's motion for acquittal. Id. at 3-7.

In two letters to the Court in June 2017, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the caption of his Complaint to include the additional defendants and reiterates in much detail his allegations against the defendants. (D.E. Nos. 7-10). With respect to relief sought, Plaintiff states, "[t]here is noamount of money that can pay for the injustice that's done. I will leave it up to the Court." (D.E. No. 1 at 9).

Because courts are required to liberally construe pleadings drafted by pro se parties, see Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)), this Court will construe the original Complaint, as well as the Amended Complaint together, grant Plaintiff's motion to include the additional defendants in his caption, and include the additional facts in his Complaint. However, Plaintiff is cautioned that in the future he must submit one all-inclusive pleading. Plaintiff's original Complaint was filed on November 30, 2016 and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed on January 6, 2017.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), district courts are required to review civil actions in which a prisoner proceeds in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing such actions, the PLRA instructs courts to dismiss cases that are at any time frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune. Id. "The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the applicable provisions of the PLRA apply to the screening of his Complaint. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of theelements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. In order to survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, they "still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala, 704 F.3d at 245.

IV. ANALYSIS

a. Challenge to State Court Criminal Conviction

The Court first notes that Plaintiff appears to challenge his State Court criminal indictment and conviction. Thus, the majority of his challenge must be addressed as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To the extent Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the outcome of his State Court conviction, his recourse is to exhaust state law remedies and, if he has constitutional challenges to his conviction, he can file a habeas petition in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.¹ See Love v. Middlesex Cty. Pros. Office, No. 11-4154, 2012 WL 124031, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2012). "[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 1987). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot challenge his State Court criminal conviction in this § 1983 action.

Moreover, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that "a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated." Id. at 489-90. Here, Plaintiff has not pleaded that he had any convictions or sentences overturned. Thus, his claims are not ripe for consideration of monetary damages, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking damages.² Nevertheless, the Court will also address Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 below.

b. § 1983 Claims

The Court will also consider Plaintiff's claims to the extent they could be construed as properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

To recover under this provision, two elements must be shown. First, a plaintiff "must establish that the defendant acted under color of state law," and second, that the plaintiff has been deprived of "a right secured by the Constitution." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Here, Plaintiff's filings may also be raising § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution against Defendant Cronin, Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Defendant Bilotta and the Office of the Public Defender, and due process violations against Defendant Lovejoy.

1. Allegations Against the Office of the Public Defender

From the outset, the Court will dismiss with prejudice all claims against the Office of the Public Defender, because it is not an entity amenable to suit under § 1983. It is well established that "the Office of the Public Defender is not amenable to a § 1983 action as it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." Davis v. Brocado, No. 13-1133, 2014 WL 1607359, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2014); see also Souels v. McGuigan, No. 13-0935, 2013 WL 822267, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2013) (dismissing the Office of Public Defender as not amenable to a § 1983 suit). Accordingly, the claims against the Office of the Public Defender will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Judicial Immunity for Defendant Judge Ravin

The Court will also dismiss with prejudice all § 1983 claims against Defendant Judge Ravin. "A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts." Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) ("A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was...