Johnson v. Campbell

215 F.Supp.2d 423

Steven JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Officer Erik CAMPBELL, in his official and personal capacity, and Township of Dewey Beach, a political subdivision of Sussex County, Delaware, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 00-510-JJF.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

July 31, 2002.

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Victor F. Battaglia, Philip B. Bartoshesky, Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, Delaware, for plaintiff.

Norman H. Brooks, Brian L. Kasprzak, Marks, O'Neil, O'Brien, & Courtney, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law Or In The Alternative A New Trial (D.I.114) and Defendants' Motion For Attorney's Fees (D.I.116). For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law Or In The Alternative A New Trial, and deny Defendants' Motion For Attorney's Fees.

BACKGROUND

By his Complaint, Plaintiff Steven Johnson, then head coach of the William Penn Boy's Varsity Basketball program, alleged that Defendant Officer Erik Campbell ("Defendant Campbell") unlawfully arrested, took into custody, and/or detained Plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 1 at 7). Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Township of Dewey Beach ("Defendant Dewey Beach") should have known of the alleged unconstitutional actions of Defendant Campbell, because he was an employee acting on and behalf of and under the supervision and control of Defendant Dewey Beach. (D.I. 1 at 7). The Complaint further alleged that Defendant Dewey Beach failed to adequately train and/or supervise Defendant Campbell in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 1 at 8).

The Court held a three day jury trial on Plaintiff's claims. After its deliberations, the jury returned a verdict against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants Campbell and Dewey Beach on all of Plaintiff's claims. (D.I.112).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that Plaintiff's detention by Defendant Campbell did not violate his constitutional rights; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that Plaintiff's arrest was not in violation of his constitutional rights; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that Dewey Beach adequately trained its police officers. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests a new trial on the grounds that (1) the jury's verdict is against the great weight of the evidence; (2) the jury instruction regarding Section 1983 was inadequate; (3) the jury instruction on Plaintiff's claim of illegal detention was incomplete and erroneous; and (2) the jury instruction on 11 Del.C. § 1301 (disorderly conduct statute) was incomplete and erroneous. In addition, Defendants Campbell and Dewey Beach have filed a Motion For Attorney's Fees requesting the Court to award Defendants attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as the "prevailing party" in this litigation. Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for the Court's review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law

To prevail on a motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial, the moving party "must show that there is `no legally sufficient evidentiary basis' for a reasonable jury to find for defendants." American Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 63 F.Supp.2d 480, 497 (D.Del.1999). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must give the non-moving party, "as [the] verdict winner, the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from the evidence presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in his favor, and in general, view the record in the light most favorable to him." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 16758 (3d Cir.1991). The Court may not judge the credibility of witnesses and may not substitute its assessment of the evidence for that of the jury. Parra, 63 F.Supp.2d at 497. In sum, the court must determine "whether the record contains the minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief." Id. (citing Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir.1993)); see also 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2524 at 249-266 (3d ed. 1995) ("The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed, but whether there is evidence upon which the jury properly could find a verdict for that party.")

II. Motion for a New Trial

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in any action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the court of the United States ...

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1). The decision to grant or deny a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). Although Rule 59(a) does not specify the grounds upon which a court may grant a new trial, it is clear that a district court may, in its discretion, grant a new trial because of improper or inadequate jury instructions. Lafate v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), 123 F.Supp.2d 773, 785 (D.Del.2000), quoting Finch v. Hercules, 941 F.Supp. 1395, 1413 (D.Del. 1996).

III. Motion For Attorney's Fees

In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

To recover attorney's fees, the party must be a prevailing party, and the fees sought must be reasonable. In addition, to prevent a chilling effect on lawsuits filed by plaintiffs, courts have limited a defendant's recovery of attorney's fees to actions which are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or which the plaintiff has continued to litigate after it has become clear that the action is frivolous or groundless. Izquierdo v. Sills, 1999 WL 1427351, *1-2, 1999 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 20820, * 4-6 (D.Del.1999) (citing Christiansburg Garment v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law

A. Whether There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support The Jury's Verdict That Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated By His Detention

By his Motion, Plaintiff contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict that Plaintiff's detention was not a violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the actions of Defendant Campbell contravened the teachings of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), because "Defendant Campbell could not articulate, specify or explain any basis for his detention of Plaintiff other than that he fit the description of the person Sgt. Berry told him Christine Price had said made her nervous." (D.I. 115 at 10).

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants, as the verdict winners, the Court concludes that sufficient evidence supports the jury's conclusion that the detention of Plaintiff did not violate his constitutional rights. "[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Whether an officer's conduct is appropriate is judged according to a reasonableness standard. "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921. In assessing whether a brief stop is reasonable, the court must weigh the circumstances against an objective standard. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The subjective good faith belief of an officer is insufficient. Id. Rather, for a Terry stop to be considered valid from its inception, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the stop. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Stated another way, the court must ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the stop "`warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Although the totality of the circumstances is considered in determining whether an officer acted reasonably in stopping an individual, specific factors of importance include the time of day or night, the location of the suspect parties, the parties' behavior when they become aware of the officer's presence, and the experience of the officer. See e.g. United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Grey, 2001 WL 965077, *6 (D.Del. Aug.23, 2001) (Sleet, J.) (recognizing that police officer's "personal observations and `commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior'" can provide a basis for reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop) (citations omitted).

In this case, the evidence at trial established that Defendant Campbell made the investigatory stop of Plaintiff on December 29, 1999, after 8 p.m in the evening. The evening was both dark and cold. Defendant...