Johnson v. City of Kan. City

695 S.W.3d 165

Jeanne JOHNSON, Respondent,

v.CITY OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, Appellant.

WD 85851

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: April 30, 2024

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 9, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, The Honorable John Torrence, Judge

Larry Dawson, Kansas City, MO counsel for Appellant.

Cooper Mach, Kansas City, MO counsel for Respondent.

Before Division Two: Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge, and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge

The City of Kansas City, Missouri (the "City") appeals a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Jackson County following a jury verdict in favor of Jeanne Johnson ("Johnson") on her claims for disability discrimination and retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). The City raises four points on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to apply judicial estoppel, (2) refusing the City’s proffered verdict form, (3) allowing the issue of future economic losses to be submitted to the jury, and (4) denying its motion for remittitur. The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded with directions.

Background

Johnson was employed by the City from 1999 until her termination on July 16, 2018. Beginning in December of 2000, she worked in the Traffic Signals Maintenance Department of the City Public Works Department. During her employment Johnson suffered multiple workplace injuries.

Johnson received multiple carpal tunnel diagnoses and underwent multiple surgeries. Johnson filed a workers’ compensation claim in 2014 and one in 2015. Johnson filed a workers’ compensation claim in 2014 for a carpal tunnel injury to her right arm from July of that year. Johnson filed a workers’ compensation claim for a carpal tunnel injury to her left arm from January of 2015.

In 2015, Johnson was required to be away from work while treating her carpal tunnel injuries. In October of 2015, Johnson’s workers’ compensation benefits ceased. At that time, Johnson was not cleared to return to work.

Johnson attempted to return to work in the spring of 2016; however, she suffered an aggravation of her prior injuries. At that time, Johnson was on unpaid leave. Johnson continued to treat her injuries with a hand specialist in 2016. Johnson underwent carpal tunnel release surgery in September of 2016. Johnson underwent another carpal tunnel release surgery in December of 2016.

In March of 2017, Johnson received a letter from Hartford, an insurance company that had previously provided Johnson with disability benefits. Hartford indicated that it had referred Johnson to Allsup, a Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") representation company that would assist Johnson in determining her eligibility for SSDI benefits and in obtaining such benefits. In April of 2017, Allsup submitted an application for SSDI benefits on Johnson’s behalf. In August of 2017, that application was denied. In August of 2017, Johnson requested an appeal hearing with the Social Security Administration ("SSA").

On October 31, 2017, the specialist that had been treating Johnson cleared Johnson to return to work. Johnson provided a note from the specialist to the City and sought to return to work. The City did not allow Johnson to return to work. The City did not seek clarification from Johnson’s physician. Johnson continued to contact the City about returning to work. In December of 2017, Johnson was informed that she was on "non-work status." The City informed Johnson that she would not be allowed in the building when Johnson sought to secure her work materials after learning that someone had broken into her tool chest and taken property.

On March 9, 2018, Johnson filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR").

On July 16, 2018, Johnson was terminated from her employment with the City. At the time of her termination, she had last actively worked for the City in April of 2016. A record submitted to the Human Resources Department for the City indicated that the reasons for her termination were: "Failure to report to work/job abandonment," "Excessive absences," and "Due to medical reasons employee has not reported to work since 2016." The document contained a place to mark as a reason for separation: "Inability to perform job." The document did not identify that this was a reason for the separation.

On July 17, 2018, a hearing was held on Johnson’s SSDI appeal. In September of 2018, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") in the SSDI benefits case issued a decision which granted SSDI benefits.

In December of 2018, Johnson filed a petition in the lawsuit from which this appeal follows. The petition included, inter alia, claims for disability discrimination and retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination.

In December of 2020, Johnson’s workers’ compensation attorney, on behalf of Johnson, amended her workers’ compensation claims to include claims for permanent total disability.

Trial began on March 14, 2022. The morning of trial, the City filed an amended answer to include the affirmative defense of judicial estoppel. The City asserted that Johnson should be judicially estopped from claiming that she would have been able to continue her employment with the City or could have accepted a position in any other department with the City with or without reasonable accommodation.

Following a five-day jury trial, the jury found in Johnson’s favor on her claims for disability discrimination, retaliation, and punitive damages. The jury awarded Johnson $278,694.00 in back pay, $994,584.00 in future economic losses, $81,000.00 in noneconomic losses, and $500,000.00 in punitive damages.

Following the verdict, the trial court entered judgment and thereafter entered an amended judgment. The trial court granted the City’s motion to apply the damage cap in section 213.111.4, such that Johnson’s damages for future economic losses, noneconomic losses, and punitive damages were capped at $500,000.00. The amended judgment also granted a motion for attorney’s fees in favor of Johnson.

Following trial, the City filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV"),¹ a Motion for New Trial, and a Motion for Remittitur. The trial court denied the City’s motions on November 17, 2022.

The City now appeals to this court.

Analysis

The City raises four points on appeal. In its first point, the City argues that the trial court erred in declining to apply judicial estoppel to bar Johnson’s claim of disability discrimination. In its second point, the City argues that the trial court erred in refusing the City’s proffered verdict form. In its third point, the City argues that the trial court erred in allowing future economic losses to be submitted to the jury. In its fourth point, the City argues that the trial court erred in denying the City’s motions for new trial and remittitur. We address these points in turn.

Point One

[1–4] In its first point, the City argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict, its motion for JNOV, and its motion for new trial, because judicial estoppel should have been applied to bar Johnson’s claim of disability discrimination.² The City argues that Johnson made claims before other entities that were inconsistent to her claims at trial.

[5] Whether a trial court erred in its discretionary application of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Vacca v. Mo. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. Rels., 575 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Mo. banc 2019). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the trial court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that the ruling shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful deliberate consideration." Black River Motel, LLC v. Patriots Bank, 669 S.W.3d 116, 125 (Mo. banc 2023) (citation omitted).

[6–9] Missouri courts have "long recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is said to be designed to preserve the dignity of the courts and insure order in judicial proceedings." Vacca, 575 S.W.3d at 231 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Judicial estoppel "is a flexible, equitable doctrine intended to preserve the integrity of the courts." Id. at 235. It "is not a cause of action with elements that must be proven and that are prerequisites to its application." Id. Judicial estoppel may be appropriate when a party has taken truly inconsistent positions in separate proceedings. Id.; McKinney v Mercy Hosp St Louis, 604 S.W.3d 680, 690 (Mo. App, E.D. 2020). The doctrine is discretionary, Vacca, 575 S.W.3d at 230, and, in determining whether to apply the doctrine, courts are to consider all relevant factors. Id at 235-36.

The Supreme Court of the United States has identified certain factors that have regularly assisted courts in determining whether judicial estoppel should be applied in a given case. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). These factors have regularly been considered by Missouri courts in "identifying when judicial estoppel should be applied to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and prevent litigants from playing ‘fast and loose’ with the courts." See Vacca, 575 S.W.3d at 236 (considering whether judicial estoppel should have been applied by the circuit court "based on the New Hampshire approach").

New Hampshire indicated that courts should first examine whether a party’s later position is "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier position. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 121 S.Ct. 1808. New Hampshire also noted that courts regularly "inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding...