Johnson v. Cnty. of Kalamazoo

1

JOSEPH JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF KALAMAZOO, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-138

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

April 21, 2023

Hon Jane M. Beckering, Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SALLY J. BERENS, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Joseph Johnson has sued Defendant Chantel Einhardt pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with an incident that occurred on February 14, 2020, at the Kalamazoo County Jail, where Einhardt was employed as a deputy. Johnson also sued Captain Michelle Greenlee and the County of Kalamazoo pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging a claim of failure to train/inadequate policies, procedures, customs and practices/failure to supervise.

Presently before me is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 11), which is fully briefed and ready for decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT Defendants' motion and dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

I. Background

This case calls for a textbook application of both prongs of the doctrine of res judicata: claim and issue preclusion. See GMAC Mort., LLC v. McKeever, 651 Fed.Appx. 332, 339 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 818 n.5 (6th Cir. 2003)). As noted above, Johnson alleges federal claims based on an incident that occurred on February 13, 2020, while he was incarcerated in the Kalamazoo County Jail. Johnson filed a previous action in this Court based on the same incident, Johnson v. Sootsman, No. 1:20-cv-1102 (W.D. Mich.) (Johnson I).

The facts pertaining to the incident are fully set forth in the July 1, 2022 Report and Recommendation issued in Johnson I (Johnson I, ECF No. 58), and need not be repeated here in substantial detail. Briefly stated, however, in Johnson I, Johnson sued Deputy Clair Sootsman, Defendant Einhardt, and Deputy Taliah Harris. Plaintiff alleged that as he, Deputies Sootsman, Einhardt, and Harris, and other prisoners were walking down a hallway in the jail, Deputy Sootsman stopped Johnson to lecture him for not following Einhardt's commands. As Johnson turned to continue walking down the hallway before Deputy Sootsman had finished, Deputy Sootsman applied force in Johnson's chest/neck area. Deputy Einhardt reacted by helping to get Johnson to the ground so that he could be handcuffed. (Johnson I, ECF No. 58 at PageID.946.) Deputy Harris, who was further away, was not physically involved in the incident. (Id. at PageID.58.) Johnson alleged that Deputies Sootsman and Einhardt violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force on him and that Deputy Harris violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to intervene.^[1] I concluded that: (1) Deputy Sootsman did not use force that violated the Eighth Amendment and, alternatively, Johnson failed to show that Sootsman violated clearly established law; (2) Deputy Einhardt did not violate Johnson's rights, nor did she violate clearly established law; and (3) Deputy Harris did not fail to intervene as she had no reason to believe that Sootsman intended to use force on Johnson and had no opportunity to prevent the use of force. (Id. at PageID.941-47.) The Court adopted these findings and conclusions over Johnson's objections.

(Id., ECF No. 62.) Johnson appealed the judgment to the Sixth Circuit, where the matter remains pending. (Id., ECF No. 64.)

On or about October 2, 2022, after the judgment in Johnson I was entered, Johnson filed an action in the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court against the County and Sootsman (Johnson II). (ECF No. 11-2.) Johnson alleged a cause of action against Sootsman for assault and battery. He also alleged that the County was vicariously liable for Sootsman's actions (as well as Einhardt's and Harris's actions even though they were not sued) based on Sections 11 and 16 of the Michigan Constitution. The County moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Michigan Constitution does not provide a damage remedy for violations by a local government and, alternatively, that Johnson's claims were barred by collateral estoppel because this Court already determined in Johnson I that Johnson's federal constitutional rights were not violated. (ECF No. 11-3 at PageID.82.) The state court granted the County's motion on the first ground and did not address collateral estoppel. (ECF No. 11-6 at PageID.147-48.) The court entered the order granting the motion and dismissing the case on February 6, 2023.^[2] (ECF No. 11-5 at PageID.126-27.) Johnson did not appeal the order to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Johnson filed his complaint in this action on February 6, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) On February 8, 2023, recognizing that this action is a refiling of Johnson I, the Court administratively reassigned it to the Honorable Jane M. Beckering in the interests of judicial economy and to conserve judicial resources. (ECF No. 7.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on March 1, 2023.

II. Motion Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged- but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Defendants assert that dismissal is warranted because Johnson's claims are barred by claim and issue preclusion arising from the judgment in Johnson I. They further contend that the judgment in Johnson II provides a separate basis to apply res judicata under Michigan law. Defendants further contend that Einhardt is entitled to qualified immunity and that Johnson fails to state a claim against the County and Greenlee.

A. Claim and Issue Preclusion-Johnson I

Because the judgment in Johnson I was rendered in federal court, the preclusive effect is determined by federal common law. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 87 (“Federal law determines the effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.”). The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that if an action results in a judgment on the merits, that judgment operates as an absolute bar to any subsequent action on the same cause between the same parties or their privies with respect to every matter that was actually litigated in the first case, as well as every ground of recovery that might have been presented. Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 1994); see Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982); Bowen v. Gundy, No. 96-2327, 1997 WL 778505, at * 1 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1997). Claim preclusion operates to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, prevent inconsistent decisions, and encourage reliance on adjudication. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Claim preclusion applies when: (1) the previous lawsuit ended in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the previous lawsuit was between the same parties or their privies; and (3) the previous lawsuit involved the same claim or cause of action as the present case. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; accord Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).

“Issue preclusion . . . bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892. Issue preclusion applies where: (1) the identical issue was raised and actually litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the determination of the issue was necessary to the outcome of the prior proceeding; (3) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on...