Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co.

610 F.Supp.3d 867

Lester JOHNSON

v.COOPER T. SMITH STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-00749-BAJ-RLB

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed July 11, 2022

Lawrence Blake Jones, Kristi A. Post, Blake Jones Law Firm, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Lester Johnson.

Andrew Vincent Waters, Jones Walker LLP, New Orleans, LA, Daniel Richard McClelland, Samuel Lawrence Fuller, Jason P. Waguespack, Fredric Eisenstat, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, New Orleans, LA, Cody Willis Castle, Metairie, LA, for Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc.

RULING AND ORDER

BRIAN A. JACKSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Lester Johnson, a self-described "longshoreman," was working aboard a cargo barge moored in the Mississippi River near Darrow, Louisiana, when he slipped, fell overboard, and landed 13 feet below on the deck of the AMERICA, a weight station vessel owned by his employer, Defendant Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc. ("CTS"). Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of his fall, and collected workers compensation benefits from CTS for nearly 18 months, under the compensation scheme set forth in the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (the "LHWCA").

This action seeks more. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he was not merely a longshoreman on the date he was injured, but was instead a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and, as such, entitled to recover additional damages from CTS under various maritime negligence theories. Alternatively, Plaintiff pursues claims of vessel negligence against CTS as owner of the AMERICA, asserting that his injuries resulted from CTS's failure to maintain its vessel in a reasonably safe condition, and to warn him of latent dangers.

Now before the Court is CTS's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) , which argues that Plaintiff's action must be dismissed because the summary judgment evidence shows: (1) Plaintiff is not a seaman, and therefore not entitled to relief under the Jones Act; (2) Plaintiff's accident was not the result of a defective vessel and CTS breached no duties owed to Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff's recovery of compensation benefits under the LHWCA bars him from pursuing an additional general maritime negligence claim against CTS. (Doc. 13-1). Plaintiff opposes CTS's Motion, in part. (Doc. 14). For the reasons stated herein, CTS's Motion will be granted, and Plaintiff's action will be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Summary Judgment Evidence

The following facts are undisputed, as set forth in CTS's Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 13-6, "CTS SOF"), Plaintiff's Response To Cooper's Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 14-2, "Response SOF"), the parties’ joint Pre-Trial Order (Doc. 17, "Joint PTO"), and the record evidence submitted in support of these pleadings.

CTS provides midstream cargo loading and unloading services to vessels traveling the Mississippi River. (See Joint PTO ¶ 1). CTS's base of operations is located near Darrow, Louisiana. (Id. ). And because CTS provides midstream services—transferring bulk cargo from cargo barges to oceangoing vessels in the middle of the River (as opposed to dockside or on the shore)—CTS also owns and maintains multiple boats to aid in this purpose, including weight station vessels (such as the AMERICA), and crewboats to ferry its employees back and forth from the shore. (See id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 6, 8, 14).

In order to provide its stevedoring services, CTS sources longshoremen from the local union. (Id. ¶ 9). Notably, under the terms of its agreement with the union, CTS employs its longshoremen on a per-day basis, terminating employment at the end of each day. (CTS SOF ¶ 13; Response SOF ¶ 13¹ ). Further, CTS does not assign its longshoremen as crew members aboard any CTS vessel. (CTS SOF ¶ 14; Response SOF ¶ 14² ). Rather, CTS hires its longshoremen specifically to assist in loading and unloading cargo from cargo barges, and the fact that a longshoreman performs a day's work aboard a particular vessel is merely incidental to the nature of providing stevedoring services midstream, away from the shore. (CTS SOF ¶¶ 15-17; Response SOF ¶¶ 15-17³ ).

Plaintiff is a self-described "longshoreman," (Doc. 13-2 at p. 14), a member of the local union and, consistent with the terms set forth above, has worked for CTS since 2008. (See Joint PTO ¶¶ 9-10). Plaintiff's job responsibilities have varied over the course of his employment with CTS; mostly, however, he has operated heavy machinery moving cargo in and among cargo barges moored near CTS's Darrow facility. (Joint PTO ¶ 11). Significantly, Plaintiff's employment with CTS does not require him to sail aboard any CTS vessel, whether to sea or even between ports on the Mississippi River; rather Plaintiff's work aboard any particular cargo barge or cargo vessel is limited to performing discrete stevedoring services, after which Plaintiff's connection to the vessel ends. (CTS SOF ¶¶ 20-21; Response SOF ¶¶ 20-21⁴ ).

On June 22, 2018, Plaintiff reported to CTS's Darrow Facility for his standard overnight shift. (Joint PTO ¶ 13). On that day, Plaintiff's work assignment required him to operate a front end loader inside the hold of a cargo barge moored midstream, removing yellow corn from the barge to the AMERICA; in turn, the AMERICA would transfer the corn to a separate oceangoing vessel. (Joint PTO ¶ 15).⁵ Because the cargo barge and the AMERICA were each positioned in the middle of the River, Plaintiff rode a CTS crewboat from CTS's landing dock to the AMERICA to report for his assignment. (Joint PTO ¶ 14).

After completing his work—that is, after removing all the yellow corn from the cargo barge—Plaintiff moved the front end loader into position to be lifted out of the cargo barge's hold. (Joint PTO ¶ 16). Then, Plaintiff himself climbed out of the cargo barge's hold using an aluminum ladder. (Id. ¶ 17). When he reached the top of the ladder, Plaintiff sat atop the barge's coaming wall, and, assisted by another longshoreman, pulled the ladder out of the barge's hold. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20). Then, Plaintiff stood on the deck of the barge and, still assisted by the other longshoreman, lifted the ladder above his head to return it to the "slot"—i.e. , the ladder's storage position on the AMERICA. (CTS SOF ¶¶ 42-44⁶ ).

At this point, Plaintiff slipped and fell off the barge, (id. ¶¶ 45-46), ultimately landing on the AMERICA's catwalk, some thirteen feet below the barge's deck. (Joint PTO ¶ 23). At his deposition, when asked to describe the cause of his accident, Plaintiff testified that he slipped due to cargo (yellow corn) residue "on the side of the barge." (Doc. 13-3 at p. 22). Plaintiff further admitted that he was aware of the cargo residue on the barge's deck when he slipped, and that such residue is a normal part of the unloading process:

Q. What I'm trying to figure out is what caused you to fall, do you know?

A. Basically, I think I slipped, but they had cargo on the side of the barge though. On the side of the barge, on the rig, and on the deck itself.

Q. So, do you believe that you slipped on the cargo?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Had you seen the cargo on the deck of the barge before you stood up?

A. Well, basically when I come out of the barge everything was full of cargo already. When the America on that big bucket it still was cargo.

Q. And when you say cargo, it was whatever grain was being put into the Ocean 1.

A. Yes.

Q. And so that -- whenever you're loading these ships as a function of loading the ship the cargo dust gets on it? It gets all over the place. Right. It gets all over the place.

(Doc. 13-3 at pp. 22-23).

Further, Plaintiff denied that his accident was the result of any difficulty inherent to returning the ladder to its storage position on the AMERICA; instead, he simply lost his footing:

Q. When you were trying -- when you and Mr. Thomas were trying to put the ladder into the slot were you having difficulty doing that?

A. No, sir. You know, I don't have no problems out there you know. It's just something happened that night. It happened so fast in the blink of eye [sic].

Q. You lost your footing on the cargo essentially is what happened; correct?

A. Yes, sir.

(Doc. 13-3 at pp. 24-25).

In any event, Plaintiff sustained substantial injuries as a result of his fall, requiring immediate medical attention, multiple surgeries, and other rehabilitative procedures and therapies, and rendering him temporarily disabled. (Joint PTO ¶¶ 25-55). Fortunately, Plaintiff ultimately recovered, and was eventually cleared to return to work. (See id. at ¶¶ 49-52). From the date of his injury to January 2020, Plaintiff collected benefits from CTS under the workers’ compensation scheme set forth in the LHWCA. (CTS SOF ¶ 5; Response SOF ¶ 5).

B. Procedural History

On November 6, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action, naming CTS as the sole defendant and alleging claims of (1) negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, or, alternatively, (2) vessel negligence under the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) ; and (3) general maritime law negligence. (See Doc. 1; see also Doc. 2; CTS SOF ¶ 6; Response SOF ¶ 6).

Now CTS moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's Jones Act claims fail because he is not a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act; that Plaintiff's vessel negligence claims fail because CTS did not breach any duty owed to Plaintiff; and that Plaintiff's general maritime negligence claim is precluded under 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) because Plaintiff recovered workers compensation under the LHWCA. (Doc. 13-1 at pp. 8-9). Plaintiff does not contest—and therefore concedes—that his general maritime negligence claim is precluded,⁷ but otherwise opposes CTS's motion. (Doc. 14).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56(a) provides that the Court...