Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia

1

SHARNENE JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-3167 (JEB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

April 4, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, CHIEF JUDGE

Plaintiff Sharnene Johnson alleges that Metropolitan Police Department officers used excessive force in unlawfully restraining and subsequently shooting and killing her son, DeAndre Johnson on October 18, 2021. Her Amended Complaint names as Defendants the District of Columbia, Chief of Police Robert Contee, Officer Juwan Jefferson, and the two unknown police officers who accompanied Jefferson during the incident. Defendants now move to dismiss a subset of Plaintiff's causes of action as legally deficient. The Court agrees that she has not sufficiently pled Contee's supervisory liability, the District's municipal liability, or one theory for negligent use of force leading to death. Her counts for negligent supervision, retention, discipline, and training, conversely, survive. The Court accordingly grants the Motion in part and denies it in part.

I. Background

The Court at this stage sets forth the facts as pled in the Amended Complaint, assuming them to be true. Johnson brings this case as the mother of decedent DeAndre Johnson and as Personal Representative of his estate. See ECF No. 23 (Am. Compl.), ¶ 1. (At times the Court calls individuals by their first names for the sake of clarity and without meaning any disrespect.) Sharnene alleges that on October 18, 2021, Jaquia Taylor, the mother of DeAndre's son, obtained a Temporary Protection Order against DeAndre. Id., ¶¶ 14-16; ECF No. 23-1, Exh. 3 (TPO). Later that day, Taylor requested a police escort to retrieve her belongings from the home that she shared with him. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 14, 17. Taylor and her two children arrived at the home approximately one hour later, accompanied by Officer Jefferson and unknown officers A and B. Id., ¶¶ 19-20. Plaintiff alleges that Taylor neither provided any officer with the TPO nor informed them of DeAndre's prior violent behavior towards her. Id., ¶¶ 17-18.

After Taylor and the officers entered the home, she and DeAndre engaged in a verbal exchange, id., ¶ 22, during the course of which the unknown officers began to surround DeAndre. Id. While the pair continued their conversation, “Officer Jefferson tapped Officer B and crossed his wrists in a handcuffing motion indicating that he was going to make an arrest.” Id., ¶ 23. Jefferson then placed DeAndre's right wrist into one handcuff and - along with Officer B - tackled him onto the floor of his apartment. Id., ¶ 24. While Officer B was still on top of DeAndre, Jefferson fired two shots into DeAndre's body. Id., ¶ 25. Taylor did not observe any officers providing immediate medical assistance to DeAndre after the shooting. Id., ¶ 26. He was pronounced dead on the scene. Id., ¶ 27.

On October 18, 2022, Sharnene, as Personal Representative of DeAndre's estate, brought her initial Complaint against the District of Columbia, Chief of Police Robert Contee, Officer Jefferson, and the unknown officers. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.). She then filed an Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading here, on January 9, 2023. Her Amended Complaint raises a Fourth Amendment claim through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jefferson (Count I), a § 1983 supervisory-liability claim against Contee (Count II), a municipal-liability claim against the District (Count III), as well as common-law claims for battery (Counts IV-V), assault (Counts VI-VII), negligent supervision, retention, discipline, and training (Counts VIII-XI), negligence leading to death (Counts XII-XIII), false arrest (Count XIV), and false imprisonment (Count XV). See Am. Compl. at 6, 10, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30. Defendants have now filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss challenging Counts II, III, and VIII-XIII of the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 28 (MTD).

The Court notes that Plaintiff appears to argue in her Opposition that she cannot respond to the Motion while she has Freedom of Information Act requests still pending. See ECF No. 29 (MTD Opp.) at 1-3. That, however, is not a proper response to the Motion, and the Court does not entertain it here. See Clay v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 680 F.Supp.2d 239, 248 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Stonehill v. IRS, 558 F.3d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2009)) (noting that “FOIA is not a substitute for discovery rules which govern civil and criminal litigation”); see also Rollins v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (“[A] bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss - without any indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is sought - does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).”).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In evaluating such a motion to dismiss, courts must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).

Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) - that is, the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The Court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)), nor “inferences . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Kowal v. MCI Communications Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). And it may consider not only “the facts alleged in the complaint,” but also “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [courts] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

III. Analysis

In seeking dismissal here, Defendants first challenge Plaintiff's supervisory-liability and municipal-liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that she has failed to sufficiently plead the required elements. They also contend that Johnson has not established her commonlaw causes of action for negligent supervision, retention, discipline, and training, as well as negligent use of force leading to death. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

A. Counts II and III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiff invokes the Fourth Amendment in seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section creates liability for anyone who subjects or causes one to be subjected to the deprivation of constitutional “rights, privileges, or immunities.” To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to allege: 1) “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States” and 2) “that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Johnson principally alleges that Jefferson is personally liable for his use of excessive force when he shot and killed DeAndre. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 28-36. Defendants do not challenge that claim here. See MTD at 1. Instead, they argue that Contee and the District may not also be held liable under § 1983 for the alleged violation of DeAndre's Fourth Amendment rights. This means that Count II, which alleges supervisory liability against Contee, and Count III, which alleges municipal liability against the District, would be dismissed. See id.; Am. Compl. at 10, 19.

1. Supervisory Liability

Johnson seeks to hold Contee liable in his individual capacity because he did not “properly investigate, discipline, and train officers” before Jefferson shot and killed DeAndre. See Am. Compl., ¶ 58. More specifically, Plaintiff points to Contee's failure to properly train officers about MPD policies governing the use of deadly force and the treatment of handcuffed prisoners that she claims Jefferson violated during the incident. See id., ¶¶ 38-46, 49. She does not allege, however, that “Contee was personally involved in the events giving rise to the death of Mr. Johnson.” MTD Opp. at 5. In seeking dismissal, Defendants contend that Contee cannot be held liable on such a supervisory-liability theory.

A government official may not be held liable under § 1983 solely on a respondeat superior theory. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Rather, “[supervisory liability under § 1983 is triggered only when a supervisor fails to provide more stringent training in the wake of a history of past transgressions by the agency or provides training ‘so clearly deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction.'” Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Int'l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). In other words, a supervisory-liability claim under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the supervisor was on notice that additional training was required and that his failure to provide that additional training was causally linked to the predicate constitutional violation. Id.; see Wheeler v. Am....