Johnson v. Doty

LARRY JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. WARDEN DOTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 15-CV-7823 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 16, 2019

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Larry Johnson, Jr.

Somers, CT

Pro Se Plaintiff

Irma W. Cosgriff, Esq.

Taryn A. Chapman, Esq.

Westchester County Attorney's Office

White Plains, NY

Counsel for Defendants

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Larry Johnson, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), currently an inmate at Osborn Correctional Institution, brings this pro se Action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Warden Doty, Father Paul, Imam John Nashid, Warden R. Orlando, and Officer Matthew Kitt (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging violation of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at Westchester County Jail. (See Third Am. Compl. ("TAC") (Dkt. No. 107).)¹ Before the Court is Defendants' MotionTo Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the "Motion"). (Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 115).) For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual History

The following facts are drawn from the Third Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of resolving the instant Motion.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate at Westchester County Jail (the "Jail"). (TAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff is a "devout" Muslim who "makes salaat (individual prayer) five times daily, faithfully attends [Jumu'ah] services every Friday, and observes all Islamic holidays as well as the strict requirements of those holidays, like fasting and attending group prayer ceremonies." (Id. ¶ 8.) On October 5, 2014, Plaintiff planned to observe Eid-ul-Adha, a "group prayer service" that "is an imperative part of the Ramadan holiday" and "must be administered by an Imam, before noon." (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.)

"In the weeks leading up to" Eid-ul-Adha, Plaintiff was informed by Imam Nashid, the Jail's Muslim chaplain, that the group prayer ceremony would take place between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. on October 5, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 12.) Upon learning this, Plaintiff complained to various prison officials. First, Plaintiff wrote to Imam Nashid to tell him that 11:00 a.m. "was lunch time," "that no movement is allowed" during lunch until "all of the food trays werereturned, and that that process often takes upwards of [45] minutes." (Id. ¶¶ 14, 22.)² Imam Nashid told Plaintiff "that he would look into it," but never responded. (Id. ¶ 14.) Second, Plaintiff wrote to Father Paul — the Jail's religious coordinator and the official "responsible for scheduling . . . Islamic services," including the Eid-ul-Adha service — to inform him that he had complained to Imam Nashid and to further request that Father Paul "reschedule the service to a more appropriate time." (Id. ¶¶ 5, 9, 15, 22.)³ Father Paul never responded. (Id. ¶ 15.) Third, Plaintiff wrote to Orlando — the Jail's "warden in operations" — and "inform[ed] him of the scheduling conflict." (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff further told Orlando that Kitt — a correction officer at the Jail responsible for calling out inmates for prayer services — had "repeatedly interfere[d] with Islamic services by "constantly calling Islamic services very late, and forcing them to be ended early"; Plaintiff thus "request[ed] that Kitt not be put on the post responsible for calling and concluding the services." (Id. ¶¶ 7, 16, 23.) Plaintiff's letter to Orlando was "copied and sent to Doty, Orlando's superior officer." (Id. ¶¶ 16, 23.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's requests, the Eid-ul-Adha service was not rescheduled to a different time and Kitt was not removed from his call-out responsibility. (Id. ¶ 17.)

On October 5, 2014, Kitt, acting "consistent with his prior actions" of "cancelling and [interfering] with Islamic services," did not call the Eid-ul-Adha service at 11:00 a.m. as scheduled, but rather called it at 11:45 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 21.) Further, "before those intent on attending said service could even leave the housing unit, Kitt called back and informed the housing unit officer not to release the inmates because the ceremony was already over." (Id.) Asa result, Plaintiff was prevented from observing the Eid-ul-Adha service. (Id. ¶ 20.) "No safety and security concern" was present "that would warrant delaying or cancelling the . . . service." (Id. ¶ 19.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on October 2, 2015. (Dkt. No. 2.) Defendants filed an initial motion to dismiss on September 19, 2016, (Dkt. Nos. 21-24), and Plaintiff responded on December 12, 2016, (Dkt. No. 27). On May 22, 2017, the Court issued an Opinion & Order (the "Opinion") granting that motion and dismissing the Complaint without prejudice. (Opinion 12 (Dkt. No. 31).) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on June 27, 2017, (Dkt. No. 34), and a Second Amended Complaint on May 8, 2018, (Dkt. No. 86).

On September 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Third Amended Complaint. (TAC (Dkt. No. 107).) On October 4, 2018, Defendants filed a letter seeking a pre-motion conference in anticipation of moving to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 108.) On October 10, 2018, the Court set a briefing schedule. Defendants filed the instant Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers on November 13, 2018. (Not. of Mot.; Decl. of Irma Cosgriff, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. ("Defs.' Decl.") (Dkt. No. 116); Defs.' Mem.) Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on December 14, 2018. (Opp'n of Larry Johnson To Defs.' Mot. ("Pl.'s Mem.") (Dkt. No. 120).) On January 11, 2019, Defendants filed a reply. (Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. ("Defs.' Reply") (Dkt. No. 121).)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of hisentitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff need allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his or her] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'show[n]' — 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) ("In addressing the sufficiencyof a complaint we accept as true all factual allegations . . . ." (quotation marks omitted)). Further, "[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the "complaint[] must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). However, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them." (italics and quotation marks omitted)).

Generally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, however, the Court may consider "materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint," Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (quotation marks omitted), including "documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers," Agu v. Rhea, No. 09-CV-4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) (italics omitted), statements by ...