Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.

1

DEANNA JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 19-cv-10167

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

August 22, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT OF HARASSMENT ALLEGATIONS NOT INVOLVING PLAINTIFF (ECF No. 120) AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE CONCERNING MISCELLANEOUS EVIDENTIARY MATTERS (ECF No. 122)

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

On January 17, 2019, Plaintiff DeAnna Johnson (“Plaintiff” or “Johnson”) initiated the instant employment discrimination action against Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant” or “Ford”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's currently pending claims are for sexual harassment/quid pro quo and hostile work environment under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”) and for racial harassment/racially hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.^[1] See id. at PageID.7-9

Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence or Argument of Harassment Allegations Not Involving Plaintiff (ECF No. 120) and Defendant's Motion in Limine Concerning Miscellaneous Evidentiary Matters (ECF No. 122). Both motions are fully briefed, and per the agreement reached at the Final Pretrial Conference on August 1, 2023, the parties have also submitted supplemental briefing on both motions. Upon review of the parties' submissions, the Court concludes that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of these matters. Therefore, the Court will resolve the instant motions on the briefs. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the following reasons, and subject to qualifications discussed below, the Court will GRANT Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence or Argument of Harassment Allegations Not Involving Plaintiff (ECF No. 120) and will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Defendant's Motion in Limine Concerning Miscellaneous Evidentiary Matters (ECF No. 122).

II. Law & Analysis

A. Legal Standard

“A motion in limine is ‘any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.'” Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984)). Such motions are “designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Id. (quoting Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990)).

However, the standard for relevancy is “extremely liberal” under the Federal Rules of Evidence.^[2] Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Rule 401 states that evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401 (emphasis added). Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible while irrelevant evidence is not admissible at all. Fed.R.Evid. 402. “[E]ven if a district court believes the evidence is insufficient to prove the ultimate point for which it is offered, it may not exclude the evidence if it has the slightest probative worth.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting DXS, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 100 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 1996)).

Nevertheless, the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403.

A district court has “broad discretion in determining the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and its rulings on evidentiary matters will be reversed only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion.” United States v. Branch, 956 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Drake, 280 Fed.Appx. 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2008).

B. Discussion

1. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence or Argument of Harassment Allegations Not Involving Plaintiff (ECF No. 120)

Defendant moves to exclude “all references to allegations of harassment that do not pertain to Plaintiff, including allegations relating to Ford plants in Chicago.” ECF No. 120, PageID.2455. In response, Plaintiff clarifies that she “has no intention of delving into allegations of harassment in other cases, including those related to Ford's Chicago plants.” ECF No. 132, PageID.2988. Instead, consistent with her testimony during her deposition and the declaration she submitted in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff plans to testify that Clemons showed her “a file of materials related to Ford sexual harassment cases” during their meeting on November 25, 2018. Id. at PageID.2989. Defendant argues that “Plaintiff could provide almost no details about the purported [file], other than to concede that it contained no names, and did not mention litigation against Ford,” and it has never been produced and is thus inadmissible hearsay as well as irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative. ECF No. 120, PageID.2455-56.

The Supreme Court has held that “[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible” and supports an award of punitive damages, so long as the jury does not use the evidence to punish the defendant for harm suffered by nonparties. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007). However, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), under which Plaintiff brings her sexual harassment claim, “does not permit punitive damages.” Hubbell v. FedEx Smartpost, Inc., No. 14-13897, 2018 WL 1288988, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2018), aff'd, 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC, No. 17-12724, 2020 WL 1242821, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2020) (citing Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.3d 391, 400 (Mich. 2004)).

Plaintiff testified that Clemons “gave [her] literature in regards to several other cases that happened or something that happened at Ford” and that this literature referred to incidents in Chicago and at the Dearborn plant, at which Plaintiff worked. ECF No. 55-3, PageID.1185. When asked about the contents, Plaintiff clarified that “[i]t said that there had been sexual harassment in the company of Ford before” and contained Plaintiff's counsel's information, articles, and Clemons' notes. Id. at PageID.1185-86. Likewise, in her affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff stated that the file Clemons provided her “contained various documents related to sexual harassment at Ford.” ECF No. 55-4, PageID.1295. Indeed, in her supplemental brief, Plaintiff states that she and Clemons “confirm[ed] that these materials were specific to sexual harassment.” ECF No. 147, PageID.3233 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff cannot seek punitive damages for her sexual harassment claim and she has given no indication that the file at issue relates to incidents of racial harassment at the Dearborn plant or elsewhere at Ford. This evidence is thus irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages and is therefore not admissible for that purpose. See Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402.

To the extent Plaintiff argues that this evidence is relevant to establishing her sexual harassment claim, the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and risk of confusing the issues. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Under the ELCRA, a plaintiff may demonstrate that a defendant-employer had constructive knowledge of the harassment, or that the harassment constituted a hostile work environment, by showing that the harassment was pervasive. Sheridan v. Forest Hills Pub. Sch., 247 Mich.App. 611, 621 (2001); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir. 2008). In determining pervasiveness, a factfinder “may consider evidence of other acts of harassment of which a plaintiff becomes aware during the period his or her employment, even if the other acts were directed at others and occurred outside of the plaintiff's presence.” Id. Here, however, Plaintiff learned of these accusations during her report to Clemons and the day before Rowan was suspended. Therefore, they had little, if any, impact on her subjective perception of whether her work environment was hostile.

Additionally, Plaintiff testified that she could not recall what the file Clemons showed her said about the Dearborn plant. ECF No. 55-3, PageID.1186. She also testified that the file did not contain any names and did not reference any litigation. Id. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show a nexus between the other allegations of harassment and her own experiences to demonstrate constructive knowledge or that the work environment was objectively hostile. See McLeod v. Parsons Corp., 73 Fed.Appx. 846, 854 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding that evidence of other discrimination lawsuits against defendant-employer was irrelevant “because there was no clear nexus between these lawsuits and this case”).

In contrast, evidence of vague and unsubstantiated allegations of sexual harassment would be highly prejudicial to Defendant and confuse the issues. See Johnson v. Interstate Brands Corp., 351 Fed.Appx. 36, 41 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)). Specifically, there is a risk that the jury will seek to punish Defendant for harm to third parties or use this evidence to “embell...