Johnson v. Gondo

ROBERT JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MOMODU GONDO, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. GLR-19-995

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

March 31, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Jemell Rayam's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 19); Defendant Momodu Gondo's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22); and Defendants Baltimore City Police Department, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, and former Baltimore City Police Commissioners Anthony W. Batts and Frederick H. Bealefeld, III's (collectively, the "City") Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23). The Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Rayam and Gondo's Motions and deny the City's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On August 27, 2014, Defendants Gondo and Rayam, then members of the BaltimoreCity Police Department's ("BPD") Gun Trace Task Force ("GTTF"), stopped the car in which Plaintiff Robert Johnson was a passenger. (Compl. ¶¶ 93-94, ECF No. 1). Johnson alleges that the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause. (Id. ¶ 93). Gondo and Rayam ordered Johnson and the driver, Jeffrey Simmons, out of the car and searched them before searching the car. (Id. ¶¶ 94-95). Johnson alleges that Gondo and Rayam falsely asserted that they found a firearm inside the car. (Id. ¶¶ 95-96). Johnson and Simmons were arrested and charged with firearm offenses. (Id. ¶ 97).

At the time of his arrest, Johnson was on probation in an unrelated case, and this new arrest constituted a violation of his probation. (Id. ¶ 98). Johnson alleges that he was "pressured" into accepting a plea agreement "due to the collateral consequences of the potential probation violation." (Id. ¶ 99). "Under duress" and "with the assurance" that Gondo and Rayam would testify against him, Johnson pled guilty on November 18, 2014 and was sentenced to five years of incarceration. (Id. ¶ 100; Rayam Mot. Dismiss Compl. ["Rayam Mot. Dismiss"] ¶ 11, ECF No. 19-1). Johnson remained incarcerated for four years. (Compl. ¶ 101).

On February 23, 2017, Rayam and other GTTF members were indicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") for, among other things, falsifying arrest reports and stealing narcotics seized during traffic stops. (Id. ¶ 58). Rayam pled guilty to conspiracy, admitting that he stole money from citizens he detained and arrested, sometimes sharing the proceeds with other GTTF officers, including Gondo. (Id. ¶ 57).

On December 18, 2017, Johnson and the State's Attorney's Office for Baltimore

City moved to withdraw Johnson's guilty plea. (See Rayam Mot. Dismiss Ex. C ["Joint Mot. Withdraw Guilty Plea"], ECF No. 19-4).² The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland granted the motion on January 26, 2018. (See Rayam Mot. Dismiss Ex. D ["Order Granting Joint Mot."], ECF No. 19-5).

On April 2, 2019, Johnson filed this lawsuit, seeking monetary damages. (ECF No. 1). As to former officers Gondo and Rayam, the Complaint alleges: false arrest (Count I); false imprisonment (Count II); intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") (Count III); violation of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV); and violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V). (Compl. ¶¶ 105-129). Against the City, the Complaint alleges negligent supervision, training, retention, and custom or policy of deliberate interference (Count VI).³ (Id. ¶¶ 130-138).

On July 15, 2019, Gondo and Rayam each filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 19,22). The City filed its Motion to Dismiss on July 16, 2019. (ECF No. 23). On August 28, 2019, Johnson filed Oppositions to each Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 26, 27, 28). On September 11, 2019, Gondo and Rayam each filed a Reply. (ECF Nos. 31, 32). The City filed its Reply on September 18, 2019. (ECF No. 33).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Before addressing the substance of the parties' motions, the Court finds it helpful to identify how Johnson's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for false arrest and imprisonment will be addressed based upon the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017).

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging fabrication of evidence may rely upon either the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question before the Manuel Court was whether the Fourth Amendment governed claims for pretrial detention after the time that detention became "pursuant to legal process." 137 S.Ct. at 916. In answering that question in the affirmative, the Court engaged in an analysis of the respective roles of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in § 1983 claims for wrongful detention. Id. at 917-18. The Court ultimately concluded that the Fourth Amendment governs claims of pretrial detention both before and after a judge's probable-cause determination. Id. at 918. In contrast, "once a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 920 n.8 With this framework in mind, Johnson's detention between his August 27, 2014 arrest and November 18, 2014 guilty plea will be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, and his period of incarceration beginning on November 18, 2014 will be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Statute of Limitations⁴

Johnson alleges false arrest and pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and common law; illegal search and seizure in violation of Article 26; and IIED. All of these claims are time-barred.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may file suit against any person who, acting under color of state law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012). However, § 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).

Section 1983 does not have an express statute of limitations, so to determine whether a § 1983 claim has been timely filed, federal courts borrow from the mostanalogous state law cause of action. Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorney's Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). In Maryland, tort claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are governed by a three-year statute of limitation. Gray v. Maryland, 228 F.Supp.2d 628, 635 (D.Md. 2002).

Federal law controls the accrual date on which limitations start to run, which turns on common-law principles. Id. at 389. "'Under those principles, it is the standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action' against a defendant—that is, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury." Id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims "seeking damages for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process." Kato, 549 U.S. at 397.

In Johnson's criminal case, the District Court for Baltimore City, Maryland made a probable cause determination on August 28, 2014 and bound the case over for trial. (See Gondo Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1 ["State Ct. Dockets"] at 3, ECF No. 22-2).⁵ Johnson was held without bond pending trial. Id. On November 5, 2014, Johnson was arraigned in Circuit Court and later pled guilty on November 18, 2014. Id. at 5. Thus, Johnson's Fourth Amendment claim accrued, at the earliest, on August 28, 2014 and, at the absolute latest, on November 18, 2014. Under the most generous calculation, Johnson's claim became time-barred by November 18, 2017. Accordingly, his Complaint, filed April 2, 2019, isuntimely. Johnson attempts to invoke the discovery rule to avoid dismissal. The Court is not persuaded.

Under the discovery rule, "a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known of the wrong." Brown v. Neuberger, Quinn, Gielen, Rubin & Gibber, P.A., 731 F.Supp.2d 443, 449 (D.Md. 2010) (citing Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 801 (2000)), aff'd, 495 F.App'x 350 (4th Cir. 2012). However, "[t]his standard . . . does not require actual knowledge on the part of the plaintiff but may be satisfied if the plaintiff is on 'inquiry notice.'" Dual Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 857 A.2d 1095, 1104 (Md. 2004). A plaintiff is on inquiry notice when the plaintiff "possesses facts sufficient to cause a reasonable person to investigate further" such that a "diligent investigation" would have revealed his victimization under the alleged tort. Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that the discovery rule is applicable generally in all actions. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (Md. 1981).

Here, Johnson claims that he could not have known of the fabrication at the time of his arrest because he was neither the owner nor driver of the car, and he was ordered out of the car before Gondo and Rayam searched it. Johnson asserts that the statute of limitations is thus tolled until March 2017, when he learned of the GTTF officers' RICO indictment. However, Johnson's Complaint contradicts this argument.

First, the Complaint alleges that, after searching the car, "Officers Gondo and Rayam falsely asserted that they found a firearm...