Johnson v. Helion Techs.

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TYLER JOHNSON, et al., Individually and on behalf of similarly situated employees v. HELION TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

Civil Action No. DKC 18-3276

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 2, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, United States District Judge

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case is a motion filed by Defendant Helion Technologies, Inc. (“Helion”) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 and for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50. (ECF No. 163). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.

I. Background

This case primarily concerns unpaid overtime claims against Helion by four former employees, three Field Technicians and one Systems Administrator.^[1] The Field Service Technician Plaintiffs Joseph McCloud, William Toomey, and Milton Turnerhill, were employed to provide on-site information technology (“IT”) system support to Helion's automobile dealership clients. Until May 2018, Helion classified the Field Technician Plaintiffs as exempt from overtime requirements under the Computer Employee Exemption. On May 20, 2018, Helion reclassified them as non-exempt and began to pay them overtime wages. Prior to their reclassification, Helion did not use a system to record the total hours that Field Technicians worked or the number of hours over forty that they worked in a given week. As a Systems Administrator, Wayne Carroll provided remote IT-system support to Helion's clients. Helion has always classified the Systems Administrator position as exempt from overtime requirements.

In October 2018, this collective FLSA action was initiated against Helion. Various former Helion employees later opted-into the suit, but only Plaintiffs McCloud, Toomey, Turnerhill, and Carroll proceeded to trial. Plaintiffs McCloud, Turnerhill, and Carroll's sole claims were for unpaid overtime under the FLSA. Mr. Toomey brought claims for unpaid overtime under the FLSA and under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”) and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”). Helion countersued Mr. Toomey for breach of contract and Mr. Toomey asserted, in response, a claim for FLSA retaliation. The court granted summary judgment to Mr. Toomey on Helion's contract claim and on all liability as to his FLSA retaliation claim. (ECF No. 107, ¶ 4). It denied Helion's summary judgment motion on Plaintiffs' overtime claims.

A jury trial occurred from March 18 to March 28, 2022. Helion moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) at the close of Plaintiffs' case. The motion was largely denied. However, the court held that Mr. Toomey had not presented sufficient evidence of non-economic damages on his FLSA retaliation claim, declined to send that issue to the jury, and, because the amount of damages was the only remaining issue in that claim, awarded Mr. Toomey $1 in nominal damages. (ECF Nos. 149, at 1; 166, at 106-07). Helion again moved for judgment at the close of all evidence, incorporating the remaining grounds from its earlier motion. The court denied the motion and sent overtime claims to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict, (ECF No. 156), in favor of Helion on Mr. Carroll's FLSA claim, concluding that Helion proved that the Systems Administrator position was exempt under the Computer Employee Exemption. It separately found in favor of the three Field Technician Plaintiffs on their FLSA claims. The jury concluded that the Field Technician position was not exempt and that Helion failed to pay appropriate overtime, but that the violation was not willful. It awarded various damages amounts to each Field Technician Plaintiff for the two-year period before they joined the lawsuit. The jury also found in favor of Mr. Toomey on his parallel state-law claims. It awarded him the same amount for those violations as it did for the FLSA violation, even though the look back period was longer (three years) for the state labor laws. It found Mr. Toomey was not entitled to liquidated damages on his state-law claims because it found that he did not prove that Helion acted in bad faith. The Field Technician Plaintiffs' liquidated damages under the FLSA were tried to the court. It declined to award any because it found that Helion acted in good faith. (ECF No. 149, at 2-3).

On April 11, the prevailing Plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees and costs. (ECF No. 159). The next day, Helion moved for attorneys' fees against Plaintiff Toomey. (ECF No. 160). Those motions have been stayed pending resolution of the post-trial substantive motion now at issue. (ECF No. 162). On April 26, Helion moved to alter or amend the judgment in favor of Plaintiff Toomey on his retaliation claim and renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Field Technician Plaintiffs' overtime claims. (ECF No. 163). Plaintiffs opposed and Helion replied. (ECF Nos. 164; 165).

II. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on Plaintiff Toomey's FLSA Retaliation Claim

A. Standard of Review

Neither party provides the relevant standard of review. A motion to alter or amend filed within 28 days of the judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See MLC Auto, LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 280 (4^th Cir. 2008); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., No. 04-cv-3621-WDQ, 2013 WL 5934055, at *3 (D.Md. Oct. 31, 2013). “A district court has the discretion to grant a Rule 59(e) motion only in very narrow circumstances[.]” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4^th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Only one is relevant here: to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See U.S. ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4^th Cir. 2002) (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4^th Cir. 1998)). “In general, reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Analysis

Helion argues that the court's $1 nominal damages award on Mr. Toomey's FLSA retaliation claim was improper for three reasons. First, it contends that a violation of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is not “the type of invasion of common law or constitutional rights which typically triggers a nominal damages award.” (ECF No. 165, at 5 & n.4). It is not clear whether Helion suggests nominal damages were not available at all or simply were not mandatory. Second, Helion contends that Mr. Toomey “waived or forfeited any claim for nominal damages by failing to request a nominal-damages jury instruction and a verdict sheet line item for nominal damages.” (ECF No. 163-1, at 3). Third, it argues that the nominal damages award was impermissible additur under the Seventh Amendment. (Id.). Helion raised none of these objections at the time the court awarded Mr. Toomey nominal damages, after granting Helion's motion for judgment on Mr. Toomey's claim to non-economic damages. (See ECF No. 166, at 107).

1. Availability of Nominal Damages

To the extent that Helion argues otherwise, nominal damages are an available remedy for Mr. Toomey's FLSA retaliation claim. Under the statute, any employer who retaliates against its employee “shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the anti-retaliation provision], including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount of liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Nominal damages are a form of legal or equitable relief appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the FLSA's antiretaliation provision.^[2] As the Supreme Court recently held, “nominal damages are in fact damages paid to the plaintiff” and constitute “‘relief on the merits[.]'” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S.Ct. 792, 801 (2021) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 11, 113 (1992)). Courts have also held that nominal damages can be awarded to “vindicate rights” that might not cause tangible injury, Bayer, 861 F.3d at 872, because “every legal injury necessarily causes damage,” see Uzuegbunam, 141 S.Ct. at 798-800 (emphasis in original) (summarizing cases); see also Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7^th Cir 2003) (nominal damages are “recognition of a violation of rights” (citation omitted)). In addition, “[n]ominal damages serve . . . to clarify the identity of the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees and costs in appropriate cases.” Bayer, 861 F.3d at 872 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In summary, nominal damages can compensate non-tangible injuries, vindicate rights, and signal who the prevailing party is, opening the door to attorney's fees. These effects further the purposes of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision by repairing damage, enabling employees to bring suit, and creating a deterrent against future violations. In short, nominal damages “‘affec[t] the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff' and thus independently provide redress.” Uzuegbunam, 141 S.Ct. At 801 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)). Moreover, the court has identified several cases in which plaintiffs were awarded nominal damages on FLSA retaliation claims. Sondesky v. Cherry Scaffolding Inc., Nos. 19-2899 & 19-2900, 2021 WL 4147099, at *1 (3^d Cir. Sept. 13, 2021) (unpublished); Demirovic v. Ortega, No. 15-cv-0327, 2018 WL 1935981, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2018); Schaeffer v. Warren Cnty., No. 14-cv-0945, 2017 WL 5709640, at *11 (S.D.Miss. Nov. 27, 2017).^[3]

2. Waiver

First the waiver rule is not implicated here. ...