Johnson v. Hooper

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RAYMOND JOHNSON #327504, Petitioner v. TIM HOOPER, Respondent

CIVIL No. 5:22-CV-06257

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division

February 28, 2024

SEC P

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by pro se Petitioner Raymond Johnson (“Johnson”). Johnson is an inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Johnson challenges a conviction and sentence imposed in the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish.

Because Johnson cannot meet his burden under § 2254, the Petition (ECF No. 1) should be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. Background

Johnson was convicted of second-degree murder “for the stabbing death of his on-again, off-again girlfriend, Yolanda Moore.” State v. Johnson, 52,762, p. 1 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19); 277 So.3d 1263, 1269, writ denied, 2019-01670 (La. 7/17/20); 298 So.3d 176.

Prior to trial, the State filed multiple notices of its intent to use evidence of other crimes against Johnson. These prior incidents involved domestic abuse against Yolanda Moore (“Moore”) and another former girlfriend, as well as violence against a 1 friend of Moore's. The trial court found most of this evidence to be admissible. Id. at 1270.

Johnson filed a motion to suppress statements made to detectives during custodial interrogation. Johnson contended that the detectives continued with his interrogation despite his request for a lawyer. The motion was denied, and the matter proceeded to trial by jury. Id. Johnson was convicted. He filed a motion for a post verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Johnson was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor.

Johnson appealed. His attorney argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove that Johnson committed second degree murder, and the trial judge erred in denying the motion for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial judge erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of other crimes and acts by Johnson; and (3) the trial judge erred in denying the motion to suppress despite Johnson unequivocally requesting an attorney at the onset of questioning by detectives investigating the homicide. Johnson also filed a pro se appellate brief asserting that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. Johnson, 277 So.3d 1263 at 1284.

Johnson sought review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, but the writ was denied. State v. Johnson, 2019-01670 (La 7/17/20); 298 So.3d 176. He did not seek further review in the United States Supreme Court.

Johnson filed an Application for Post-Conviction Review on July 19 2021. ECF No. 1-3 at 138-171. He asserted the following claims: (1) violation of his Sixth Amendment right to autonomy by trial counsel during closing arguments; (2) Article I of the Louisiana Constitution and Article 782 of the Code of Criminal Procedure violate his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution; (3) jury instruction for a non-unanimous verdict violated his constitutional rights and; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. The application was denied. ECF No. 1-3 at 173.

Johnson sought review in the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. ECF No. 1-3 at 190. The appellate court denied the writ “[o]n the showing made.” ECF No. 1-3 at 212. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs on November 16, 2022. State v. Johnson, 2022-00895, p. 1 (La. 11/16/22); 349 So.3d 995, 996.

The State does not dispute the timeliness of the Petition. ECF No. 14-1 at 11.

II. Law and Analysis

A. There was sufficient evidence to convict.

Johnson asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his second-degree murder conviction under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). He argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justified as self-defense. Johnson claims that Moore viciously attacked him while she was in a “drunken and drug-induced rage” and that he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm when he cut and stabbed her 21 times with a knife.

The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Johnson's writ application without comment, so this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision addressing the sufficiency of the evidence and must presume that the unexplained Louisiana Supreme Court writ denial adopted the same rationale. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). The last reasoned opinion is that of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which applied Jackson and concluded that the evidence was sufficient “for the jury to find that Johnson stabbed Moore while having the specific intent to kill her or to inflict great bodily harm upon her, and that the homicide was not committed in self-defense or the defense of others.” See Johnson, 277 So.3d at 1278.

Since the claim was adjudicated on the merits, it is subject to deferential review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As a mixed question of law and fact, the Court must determine whether the state courts' adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Jackson. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Perez v. Cain, 529 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 995. And this Court's review is doubly deferential, such that the state court determination may not be overturned unless it was an objectively unreasonable application of the deferential Jackson standard. Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012); Harrell v. Cain, 595 Fed.Appx. 439 (5th Cir. 2015). Thus, “a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011).

Under Jackson, the Court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319.

“All credibility choices and conflicting inferences are to be resolved in favor of the verdict.” Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 831 (2005). It is the “responsibility of the jury - not the court - to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. at 2, 132 S.Ct. 2. Additionally, the Court's review is limited to the evidence presented at trial. Johnson v. Cain, 347 Fed.Appx. 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2009) cert. denied, 559 U.S. 995 (2010).

The federal court must look to the substantive elements of the offense when applying the Jackson standard. See Norris v. Dretke, 826 F.3d 821, 833 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1203 (2017). For purposes of Johnson's conviction, second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is the “state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Under Louisiana law, specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the offense and from the defendant's conduct. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 01/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012 (2007).

In 2017, Louisiana law provided that a homicide is justifiable as self-defense “by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). Because the State has the burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the question under Jackson is whether a rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense or the defense of others. See Seals v. Vannoy, CV 16-9892, 2017 WL 11710615, at *56 (E.D. La. July 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, CV 16-9892, 2019 WL 13246629 (E.D. La. May 6, 2019), aff'd, 1 F.4th 362 (5th Cir.2021); Hyman v. Cain, 2015 WL 3755867, *10 (E. D. La. 2015). For several reasons, the record establishes that a rational trier of fact could find that Moore was not killed in self-defense.

First, Johnson stabbed Moore 21 times. The jury heard that Johnson called Moore at 7:29 p.m. on April 28, 2017. ECF No. 14-8 at 166. Johnson told Corporal Schulz that Moore had come over and that they were together for a while. Johnson told him they began arguing when he was getting up and getting ready for work. According to Johnson's statement, Moore had been drinking, was intoxicated, and started a fight with him. She knocked over his furniture and a television. Johnson further reported that Moore started cutting him and chasing him through the house while he tried to get away from her. ECF No. 14-8 at 182. Johnson claimed he grabbed a sheet and ran to a neighbor's house.^[1] He eventually went back home with Moore. Id.

Johnson later told Detectives Logan McDonald and Adam McEntee that Moore was intoxicated and started fighting him when he was getting ready for work. He said she knocked over his furniture and television and started cutting him while they were running through the house. Johnson told the Detectives that he pushed Moore when she grabbed his testicles and then ran out of the house while grabbing a sheet off the floor. He went to his neighbor's...