Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend

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DARLEANA JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-CV-608 JD

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division

April 26, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

JON E DEGUILIO CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Darleana Johnson filed this action on behalf of herself and her children after she was evicted from her house on Solomon Avenue, which she rented from the Housing Authority of South Bend (“HASB”). In 2021, Ms. Johnson began informing HASB that the Solomon Ave. house had mold, that it was affecting her and her children's health, and that the house was uninhabitable. HASB offered Ms. Johnson two alternative housing options, but Ms. Johnson did not want to relocate because the alternatives did not possess the convenience, social opportunities, and cultural richness of the Solomon Ave. house. After a state court hearing in which Ms. Johnson was not allowed to present evidence or argument about any federal defenses, Ms. Johnson was evicted. Relying on erroneous instructions from the state court judge, Ms Johnson filed this federal action seeking a declaratory action vacating the eviction among other relief. Ms. Johnson argues that her eviction violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and several state laws; she later added retaliation claims based on HASB's failure to provide her a positive tenant reference. Several months ago the Court of Appeals of Indiana vacated Ms. Johnson's eviction, finding the lower court judge erred by disallowing Ms. Johnson's federal defenses.

Rather than inserting itself in the already-advanced state litigation, the Court finds it is appropriate to stay the pendent federal litigation under the doctrine of Colorado River abstention. Such a stay is justified by the significant progress of the state case, the preference to avoid piecemeal litigation, and the vexatious nature of the instant action. In the event the state court is not able to fully resolve Ms. Johnson's claims on final judgment, the Court will lift the stay and consider the merits of Ms. Johnson's claims.

A. Facts

Ms. Johnson and her children previously resided at a house on Solomon Avenue in South Bend, which she rented from HASB. Ms. Johnson and her children began to experience health difficulties related to a mold problem in the Solomon Ave. house. Sometime in 2021, Ms. Johnson requested an inspection of her house by another city agency, which instructed HASB that the mold presented a habitability problem and would need to be removed. Ms. Johnson informed HASB that while she was willing to move temporarily for the purpose of mold removal, she wanted to move back to the Solomon Ave. house after repairs were complete. Though the record is scant, it appears Ms. Johnson and HASB could not come to an agreement about where Ms. Johnson and her children would live during and after the mold removal. HASB proposed two other housing placements, which Ms. Johnson rejected because they lacked the cultural richness and convenience of her current placement.^[1]In January 2022, Ms. Johnson filed a federal action in this Court pro se, complaining that HASB would not fix the mold and had said she would need to move against her wishes. That action was promptly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as no diversity was present and it was not evident that Ms. Johnson had any federal claims.

On April 8, 2022, the Housing Authority of South Bend filed an eviction action against Ms. Johnson, seeking possession of her unit and ten thousand dollars. The eviction appeared to be based on Ms. Johnson's refusal to move.^[2]On June 24, 2022, Ms. Johnson represented herself at an evidentiary hearing for the eviction proceeding. At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Johnson attempted to argue that HASB had violated federal law and therefore it, not she, was in violation of the lease. “Attempted to argue” is the correct wording; the overseeing judge was mistaken about his authority to hear federal defenses in an eviction proceeding and did not allow Ms. Johnson to present any evidence. The judge repeatedly and erroneously informed Ms. Johnson that her defenses were for adjudication in federal court, and she would need to file a separate action in federal court to obtain relief. At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the judge ordered Ms. Johnson's eviction and issued a notice with an August 1 date of eviction. On August 1, 2022, Ms. Johnson and her family were evicted from the Solomon Ave. house.

The same day, Ms. Johnson took the state court judge at his word and filed the present action, which is in large part based on the same federal defenses the eviction judge refused to hear. Ms. Johnson claims that HASB's actions violated the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Fair Housing Act, and several Indiana statutes, as well as her equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (hereafter, “the original complaint”). (DE 1.)^[3]She asks the Court to enter a declaratory judgment, issue an injunction, and award any permissible damages. On September 7, 2022, Ms. Johnson filed a supplemental complaint arguing that HASB had impermissibly retaliated against her by refusing to provide a positive landlord review to her potential new landlord upon request. (DE 13.) Her supplemental complaint seeks identical relief to the original complaint. Defendants timely moved to dismiss each complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (DE 17; 19), and these motions are now ripe for deciding.

While those motions were pending, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the state court opinions ordering Ms. Johnson's eviction and the related entry of damages against her. See Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 204 N.E. 3d 940 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 14, 2023) (reversing eviction); Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, No. 22A-EV-2459, 2023 WL 1980809 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 14, 2023) (reversing entry of damages). The Court of Appeals found the lower court judge erred in not allowing Ms. Johnson to present evidence of her federal defenses and remanded for further proceedings. 204 N.E. 3d at 946. On February 26, 2023, Ms. Johnson filed a motion for a second supplementary complaint again challenging the now-vacated eviction, which HASB opposes. (DE 27; 28.)

B. Legal Standard

Abstention arguments under both Rooker-Feldman and Colorado River implicate a court's jurisdiction. See DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc., 953 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2020); Salem v. Larkin, __F.Supp.3d__, No. 20-CV06531, 2022 WL 17176496, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2022). Arguments for abstention “do not fit neatly into Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).” Whole Woman's Health All. v. Hill, 377 F.Supp.3d 924, 930 (S.D. Ind. 2019). “Such arguments do not deny the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction; they presuppose it.” Id. However, “when such a motion “asks the Court to decline jurisdiction, as defendants' motion does, it fits more comfortably under Rule 12(b)(1).” Nadzhafaliyev v. Hardy, 403 F.Supp.3d 663, 667 (N.D. Ill. 2019). “When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995). Because this case challenges the factual circumstances of jurisdiction rather than solely the pleading of jurisdiction, “the district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009)

C. Discussion

Though the parties briefed whether the Court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, that doctrine no longer applies because the eviction has been vacated. HASB's secondary argument, that Colorado River abstention is appropriate under the circumstances, is persuasive, and the Court now institutes a stay of the federal action pending disposition of the state action.

(1) Rooker-Feldman does not apply because Ms. Johnson is no longer a state court loser.

Rooker-Feldman does not apply to this action because the first prong of the test is not met; Ms. Johnson is no longer seeking to set aside a state court judgment. An analysis of whether a federal court should abstain from jurisdiction over a case under Rooker-Feldman proceeds in two steps: first, a court asks “whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment,” and if so, the court determines “whether the plaintiff [had] a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings.” Taylor v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court does not reach the second issue because the Indiana Court of Appeals' vacating of the offending judgment renders Rooker-Feldman inapplicable.

In Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint they strenuously argue that Rooker-Feldman abstention is appropriate because lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts in civil cases. (DE 20 at 4.) This is a correct statement of the law, but it is not applicable to this case due to the changed posture of the parallel state case. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). At the time of the original complaint, Ms....