Johnson v. McCoy

NICHOLAS DANIEL JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN T. MCCOY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:19-cv-00005

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

March 23, 2021

By: Michael F. Urbanski Chief United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nicholas Daniel Johnson, proceeding pro se, was in the custody of the Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority ("SWVRJA") for about four months beginning in November 2018, including at the time he filed suit. According to his address, he is currently in federal custody.

In his amended complaint,¹ Johnson alleges that, while housed at SWVRJA's Haysi facility, the four remaining defendants violated his constitutional rights.² The defendants are Captain T. McCoy, Chaplain Tim Herring, Lieutenant Hurley, and Food Service Manager Barry Viers, all of whom Johnson sues only in their individual capacities. ECF No. 22 at 3.

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, in which they seek judgment in their favor as to all claims. ECF No. 59. The motion is fully briefed, including a sur-reply filed by Johnson, which the court has considered despite the factthat Johnson did not seek or receive permission to file it. See ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the court will grant defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND³

Johnson lists four claims in his amended complaint. His first and third claims allege that defendants denied him the ability to freely practice his religion, Islam. In his first, he claims that defendants McCoy and Hurley denied him a prayer rug and a Qur'an and that Chaplain Tim Herring denied him a Qur'an. In his third claim, Johnson alleges that defendant Viers served food with pork to people with religious diets "inside a no-pork facility." He describes only a single incident in December or January 2019, in which he alleges inmates were served barbecue baked beans, and one of the kitchen inmates told him they had pork in them. ECF No. 23-1 at 2.

Johnson's second claim alleges that McCoy and Hurley subjected him to inadequate living conditions in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. In introducing this claim, Johnson alleges that they deprived him of exercise and "allowed direct abuse of racism to occur" under their authority. ECF No. 22-1 at 1. Elsewhere in his amended complaint, he also references other conditions, such as freezing cold temperatures, the deprivation of showers for limited periods of time and other conditions that he alleges were unconstitutional.

With regard to the allegations of racism, this appears to be based primarily on Johnson's contention that other inmates, described as white supremacists, were racist and discriminated against him and other black inmates. In addition to using offensive racial slurs, the whiteinmates who were kitchen workers sometimes deprived Johnson and others of adequate food portions or put inedible items in their food. Johnson also refers to one instance in which he says he was housed in one of the colder "end" cells when it was very cold, and staff rejected his request for a blanket. He contends that white inmates were later in the same cell under the same circumstance, and they were given an extra blanket when they requested it.

His fourth claim alleges that defendants McCoy and Hurley did not timely respond to his grievances and that Hurley tried to persuade him to delete certain requests or grievances out of the computer. He appears to characterize this as a due process claim.⁴ The fourth claim also lists Viers as a defendant, but does not identify any actions taken by him, and it contains allegations against dismissed defendants.

For relief, Johnson seeks damages from each defendant in specified amounts, and he also asks for injunctive relief. Specifically, he wants prayer rugs made available for purchase in the commissary and "alternatives for inmates who are indigent and practice Islam, including Qur'ans." ECF No. 22-1 at 3.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56, summary judgment is proper where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists only where the record, taken as a whole, could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Ricci v. DeStefano,557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).⁵ In making that determination, the court must take "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

A party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Moreover, "[t]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Id. at 247-48. Instead, the non-moving party must produce "significantly probative" evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor. Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 930 (4th Cir. 1990).

The summary judgment record includes Jeannie Patrick's affidavit with exhibits and the SWVRJ inmate handbook, all submitted by defendants. The court also treats statements made in the verified amended complaint, if based on Johnson's personal knowledge, as evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). Although Johnson's opposition and sur-reply are not verified, the court also treats statements therein, if made on personal knowledge and not in conflict with allegations in the complaint, as part of the summary judgment evidence. The court presumes that Johnson would be able to testify as to those statements at any trial, even though he failed to set them forth in a sworn affidavit.

B. First Amendment Claims⁶

The First Amendment protects an individual's right to the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. amend I. To state a claim that prison officials or regulations have violated his right to freely exercise his religion, a plaintiff must first prove that he holds a sincere religious belief, as opposed to a secular preference, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972), and that the official action or regulation substantially burdened his exercise of that belief, Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). As explained by the Fourth Circuit,

a substantial burden is one that puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, or one that forces a person to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting governmental benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion on the other hand.

Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006).

If the plaintiff establishes a substantial burden on his sincerely held religious belief, the defendants' policy or practice can withstand a First Amendment challenge so long as it is "reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). This inquiry isgoverned by the four so-called Turner factors:

(1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation or action and the interest asserted by the government, or whether this interest is "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational"; (2) whether "alternative means of exercising the right . . . remain open to prison inmates," an inquiry that asks broadly whether inmates were deprived of all forms of religious exercise or whether they were able to participate in other observances of their faith; (3) what impact the desired accommodation would have on security staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist any "obvious, easy alternatives" to the challenged regulation or action, which may suggest that it is "not reasonable, but is [instead] an exaggerated response to prison concerns."

Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-92). In weighing these factors, the court must avoid "the micromanagement of prisons," United States v. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 99 (4th Cir. 1991), and instead "accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators," Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). The inmate carries the burden of proof under the Turner analysis to disprove the validity of the prison regulation at issue. Id.

1. Prayer Rug

Johnson alleges that, throughout the months he spent at Haysi, he repeatedly requested to be able to use a prayer rug. Defendants have provided the affidavit of Patrick, who alleges that prayer rugs "are not allowed in SWVRJA's facilities due to security concerns and administrative costs associated with searching such items for all inmates that would request them." Patrick Aff. ¶ 15, ECF No. 60-1. Instead, each offender receives 1 towel, 1 blanket, and 2 sheets and may use either the towel, sheets, or blanket as a substitute for a prayer rug. Id. Patrick also states that she is "not aware of a 'prayer rug' being an absolute requirement of the Muslim faith." Id. ¶ 16.

Johnson acknowledges that he was told he could use his issued towel or blanket on which to pray. He says that in response, he "put in a grievance explaining to them the difference and significance of a prayer rug and why [he] need[ed] it," although he neither attaches that grievance nor explains that "difference" in his amended complaint. ECF No. 23 at 3. He also alleges that he spoke directly to Lt. Hurley about his request after his lawsuit was filed and he confirmed that all he needed was an extra towel. Hurley said that he could not decide to give Johnson a towel because it was...