Johnson v. Ransom

CARL JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. KEVIN RANSOM, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-2694

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 16, 2021

PAPPERT, J.

MEMORANDUM

Carl Johnson seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Reuter issued a Report and Recommendation recommending denial of Johnson's petition. Johnson filed objections to the R&R. The Court overrules the objections, adopts the R&R and denies the petition.

I

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder following a jury trial in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. CP-51-CR-011742-2009 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cnty. May 30, 2012) (hereinafter "Trial Ct. Op."). He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder and a concurrent twenty to forty-year sentence on the conspiracy charge. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 347 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11274675, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2013.)

A

Johnson was convicted for the shooting death of Tyleigh "Sy" Perkins. Perkins was shot four times around 1:00 a.m. on September 14, 2008 while sitting on the front steps of a house with his friend Tyrone Edgefield. See id. The shots "penetrated Perkins' intestine, severed his aorta and lodged in his spine . . . ." Id. He was pronounced dead at Temple University Hospital at 6:30 that morning. Id. Edgefield was not wounded and was the only witness to the shooting who testified at trial.

Several days before the shooting, Shawn Jacobs (Johnson's brother, who was a minor) and Devon Edwards had gotten into a fight. (Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 11/9/2011 (Trial) at 24-25, 29.) Perkins intervened in the argument and picked up Jacobs' cell phone which had fallen to the ground, giving it to a neighbor to return to Jacobs later. (Id. at 24-28.) As Jacobs walked away, he threatened Perkins. According to one witness, Jacobs told Perkins, "you better have your vest on. I ain't playing you. You better make sure you have your vest on." (Id. at 26.) After the fight, Johnson drove around the neighborhood looking for Perkins and eventually took Jacobs' cell phone back from the neighbor. (See Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2.) On the night of the shooting, Johnson drove in front of the house where Perkins sat, lowered the driver's side window and leaned back in his seat. Another person leaned across from the passenger's seat and shot Perkins. (Id.)

B

Johnson appealed his conviction, contending erroneous evidentiary rulings deprived him of a fair trial. The rulings included: (1) the admission of inadmissible hearsay; (2) the "admission of uncharged conduct of a third party without linkage to" him; and (3) the admission of evidence that "conveyed guilt by association," i.e., his brother's refusal to speak with police after consulting with counsel. Commonwealth v.Johnson, No. 347 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11274675, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 69 A.3d 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (Table). The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, 2013 WL 11274675, at *1, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his request for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 74 A.3d 125 (Pa. 2013) (Table).

He filed a timely pro se Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act petition. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, CP-51-CR-00011742-2009 (Pa. Comm. Pl. Phila. Cnty. Jan. 2, 2014). After he was appointed appellate counsel, Johnson retained private counsel and amended his PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Johnson, CP-51-CR-00011742-2009 (Pa. Comm. Pl. Phila. Cnty. Apr. 7, 2017) (see also Resp't Br., Ex. B., ECF 18-1 at ECF p. 15-33). Johnson claimed his trial counsel had been ineffective for not presenting an alibi witness and sought an evidentiary hearing on that issue. (Id. at ECF p. 26-30.) The PCRA court filed a notice of its intention to dismiss his petition under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 and then did so without a hearing. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, CP-51-CR-00011742-2009 (Pa. Comm. Pl. Phila. Cnty. Apr. 6, 2018) (see also Resp't Br., Ex. C., ECF 18-1 at ECF p. 35).

After the PCRA court issued its opinion (Resp't Br., Ex. C., ECF 18-1 at ECF p. 35-44), Johnson appealed to the Superior Court, which agreed his PCRA claims did not merit relief. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6629183, No. 4043 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 203 A.3d 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (Table). Johnson did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; he instead filed a counseled habeas petition in this Court. (Pet'n ECF 1.) Johnson raises six objections to Judge Reuter's R&R. (Pet'rObj., ECF 15; see also R&R, ECF 13.)

II

The Court reviews de novo the specific portions of the R&R to which Johnson objects and "may accept, reject, or modify" Judge Reuter's conclusions "in whole or in part." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

A

28 U.S.C. § 2254 permits the Court to grant habeas relief only if (1) the state court's adjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the" United States Supreme Court; or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). To determine whether a state court's application of federal law is "'unreasonable,'" the Court must apply an objective standard, such that the relevant application "may be incorrect but still not unreasonable." Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10). The test is whether the state court decision "resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent." Matteo v. Superintendent. SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc). Thisstandard "is difficult to meet:" the petitioner must show "the challenged state-court ruling rested on an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 357-58 (2013) (citation and internal quotation omitted).

"'Factual issues determined by a state court are presumed to be correct and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.'" Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 819 F.3d 682, 692 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000)). State court factual determinations are not unreasonable "merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Rather, § 2254(d)(2) requires "substantial deference" to the state trial court. Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015). If "'[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree' about the finding in question, 'on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's . . . determination.'" Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-342 (2006) (alteration in original)). However, "'[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review,'" and "'does not by definition preclude relief.'" Brumfield, 576 U.S. at 314 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).

B

Habeas petitioners must exhaust state remedies before seeking relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Exhaustion ensures state courts have the first opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions. See Davilav. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064, 198 L. Ed. 2d 603 (2017) ("The exhaustion requirement is designed to avoid the unseemly result of a federal court upsetting a state court conviction without first according the state courts an opportunity to correct a constitutional violation.") (citation, internal quotations and alteration omitted). For the same reason, ordinarily "a federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court - that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule." Id. at 2064.

The prohibition on reviewing procedurally defaulted claims may be excused if the petitioner can show "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Id. at 2065 (citation and internal quotation omitted). "Attorney error" may be "an objective external factor providing cause for excusing a procedural default" if it "amounted to a deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel." Id. (citation omitted). Under the "narrow exception" established in Martinez v. Ryan, a federal habeas petitioner may raise an otherwise defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim if in their state post-conviction proceeding, they had "no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012).

To qualify for Martinez's exception, a petitioner must show his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim has "some merit," i.e., "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or for that matter, agree that) the...