Johnson v. Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist.

420 F.Supp.3d 14

Joe Nell JOHNSON, II, Plaintiff,

v.RIVERHEAD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

14-CV-7130 (LDH) (AKT)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 11, 2018

Order Denying Reconsideration June 28, 2019

Harriet A. Gilliam, Law Office of Harriet A. Gilliam, Riverhead, NY, for Plaintiff.

Joe Nell Johnson, II, Riverhead, NY, pro se.

Anne C. Leahey, Jesse D. Rutter, Andrew Patrick Wenzel, John M. Shields, Theodore D. Sklar, Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, NY, David H. Arntsen, Law Offices of Thomas M. Volz, PLLC, Nesconset, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge Plaintiff Joe Nell Johnson, II, brings the instant action against Defendants Riverhead Central School District (the "District"), the Riverhead Central School District Board of Education (the "Board"), Ann Cotton-Degrasse, Gregory Meyer, Thomas Carson, Christopher Dorr, Amelia Lanz, Kimberly Ligon, Susan Koukounas, Lori Hulse, Nancy Carney, Joseph Ogeka, David Wicks, Sam Schneider, and Debra Rogers¹ (collectively "Defendants") asserting the following: discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; violations of due process and equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"); Monell liability; and several state law claims.² Defendants move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, to dismiss the action in its entirety.

UNDISPUTED FACTS³

Plaintiff is an African-American who was a tenured teacher employed by the District since at least 2000. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ("Defs.' 56.1") ¶ 1, ECF No. 109-2; Defs.' Ltr. Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conf., Ex. D, at 10, ECF No. 105-5; Defs.' Answer ¶ 8.) Before 2012, Plaintiff "had a stellar work record." (Defs. Ltr. Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conf., Ex. D at 16.) In 2012 and 2013, however, Plaintiff was charged by the District, pursuant to N.Y. Education Law § 3012 and § 3020-a, in relation to two separate incidents. First , on June 12, 2012, Plaintiff was charged with knowingly presenting an affidavit containing false information with the knowledge or belief that the application would be filed with the District. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit to the District stating that a criminal history check would reveal no criminal history, when, in fact, Plaintiff had prior criminal convictions. (Id. ) In September 2012, the District and Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with regard to this charge. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff agreed to be suspended without pay for a portion of the first semester of the 2012-2013 school year. (Defs.' Ltr. Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conf., Ex. B, ¶ 2, ECF No. 105-3.) Second , on December 10, 2013, Plaintiff was charged by the District with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and in possession of a loaded firearm without a license to possess such firearm. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3.) The District also charged that this conduct was incompatible with the standards requiring teachers to be seen as positive role models for students. (Id. ) Hearings were held with respect to the December 10, 2013 charges on March 7, March 17, March 24, April 9, April 30, and June 26, 2014. (Id. ¶ 4.)

During the pendency of the December 2013 charges, on January 17, 2014, Plaintiff was administratively reassigned to work at the District Office and assigned a desk in a temporary mobile office known as "Portable 11." (Id. ¶ 8.) According to Plaintiff, the conditions in Portable 11 were intolerable in that Portable 11 was inadequately heated, air conditioned, and ventilated. (Defendants' Reply 56.1 Statement ("Defs.' Reply 56.1") ¶ 145, ECF No. 113.) Plaintiff also contends that Portable 11 lacked bathroom facilities and that the District failed to provide Plaintiff a key with which to lock Portable 11. (Id. ) Defendants dispute Plaintiff's characterization of Portable 11. (Id. )

In an August 15, 2014 decision, the hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty of both charges and recommended that Plaintiff be terminated. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 5.) On August 26, 2014, the Board terminated Plaintiff by adopting a resolution implementing the August 15, 2014 decision of the hearing officer. (Id. ¶ 11.)

On August 15, 2014, Plaintiff initiated a proceeding pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 75 challenging the hearing officer's decision as arbitrary, capricious, and irrational. (Id. ¶ 6.) On May 5, 2015, Judge Joseph C. Pastoressa of the New York Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's application and dismissed the petition. (Id. )

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the District with the U.S. Department of Education. (Id. ¶ 19.) On January 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the District with the New York State Division of Human Rights. (Id. at ¶ 20) Plaintiff contends, and Defendants dispute, that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") on December 20, 2013. (Defs.' Reply 56.1 ¶ 143.) After his termination, Plaintiff received a notice dated October 31, 2014 regarding his right to continue health insurance under COBRA. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 34-35.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment must be granted when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant[s are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. At summary judgment, the movants bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Feingold v. New York , 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004). Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movants' initial burden at summary judgment can be met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the non-movant's claim. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the movants meet that burden, the non-movant may defeat summary judgment only by producing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Davis v. New York , 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The court is to view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must present concrete evidence and rely on more than conclusory or speculative claims.

Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp. , 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The litigant opposing summary judgment ... ‘may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials’ as a vehicle for obtaining a trial.") (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp. , 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Title VII and § 1981 Discrimination Claims

Title VII claims and claims for race and national origin discrimination under § 1981 are analyzed under the three-step burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Ruiz v. Cty. of Rockland , 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination." Id. at 491-92. After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 492. Once the defendants articulate a nondiscriminatory explanation for their action, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendants were a pretext for discrimination. Id. To create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, a plaintiff is required to produce "not simply ‘some’ evidence, but ‘sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendants] were false, and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for the [employment action].’ " Weinstock v. Columbia Univ. , 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines , 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1996) ).

There is no dispute that Plaintiff, as an African-American, is a member of a protected class and that he has suffered an adverse employment action. The parties dispute, however, whether Plaintiff was qualified to continue serving as a teacher and whether the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. (See Defs.' Mem. at 2-6; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 13-19.) As to Plaintiff's qualifications to continue serving as a teacher, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's "ability to be viewed and function effectively as a positive role model was thoroughly compromised by his operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and in possession of a loaded firearm." (Defs.' Mem. at 2.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that he was qualified for his position because, as the hearing officer found that "up to the time of his arrest, [Plaintiff] had a stellar work record." (Defs.' Ltr. Mot. for Pre-Mot., ECF No. 105, Ex. D, at 16.) This dispute raises an issue of fact not properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. This does not save Plaintiff's claims, however, because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fourth element of a Title VII and § 1981 race...