Johnson v. Smith

1

EDWARD JOHNSON PLAINTIFF v. BRIAN SMITH et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 5:21-CV-00187-GNS-LLK

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division

March 27, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Greg N. Stivers, United States District Court Chief Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 40) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (DN 49).^[1] The motions are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed below Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Edward Johnson (“Johnson”) called 911 to report that nonparty James Forte (“Forte”) was being “belligerent” outside the motel where Johnson was staying with his niece Chaquita Johnson (“Chaquita”). (See Defs.' Mot. Summ J. Ex. 1, at 1-2, DN 40-2). Defendant Edward Eastman (“Eastman”), a Hopkinsville Police Department (“HPD”) officer, arrived at the hotel a day later and arrested Forte because of an active warrant for his arrest. (Eastman Video 22:14:06-22:16:30, DN 41). While arresting Forte, Chaquita had multiple exchanges with Eastman, who eventually informed her that she would be arrested for disorderly conduct if she did not return to her motel room and remain there. (Eastman Video 22:14:06-22:16:00). Soon after, Defendants Brian Smith (“Smith”) and Josh Stallons (“Stallons”), two other HPD officers, arrived on scene. (Stallons Video, DN 41; Smith Video, DN 41). Chaquita again began speaking to the officers about a key that Forte had and was again warned that she would be arrested if she “[came] outside screaming again ....” (Stallons Video 22:16:30-22:16:55). Stallons retrieved the key from Forte, walked to the motel room, and gave the key to Johnson. (Stallons Video 22:16:5522:18:05). At that time, Stallons advised Johnson, “Yeah you might want to shut the door before she goes with him[,]” to which Johnson responded, “Alright.” (Stallons Video 22:18:0022:18:12). Johnson closed the door. (Stallons Video 22:18:10-22:18:30).

Stallons and Eastman arrested Forte, placed him into a police car, and began a search of Forte's vehicle. (Stallons Video 22:18:30-22:20:30; Eastman Video 22:18:30-22:20:30). During that time, Smith stood outside of Johnson's motel room. (Smith Video 22:19:15-22:19:45). When Chaquita emerged again, Smith instructed her to go back inside and closed the door. (Smith Video 22:20:35-22:20:50). Chaquita and Johnson could be heard arguing behind the closed door, and then Johnson opened the door. (Smith Video 22:20:50-22:21:12).

Johnson stood in the threshold of his motel room and asked Smith for his badge number, which Smith provided before instructing Johnson to go back inside. (Smith Video 22:21:1222:21:17). Johnson continued standing in the doorway and told Smith, “You need to chill out.” (Smith Video 22:21:17-22:21:20). Smith instructed Johnson to step back inside again or go to jail. (Smith Video 22:21:20-22:21:27). Johnson continued standing in the threshold, and Smith grabbed Johnson by his arm and pulled him out of the doorway. (Smith Video 22:21:20-22:21:27). Stallons arrived and assisted Smith with placing Johnson in handcuffs. (Smith Video 22:21:2722:21:30). During the arrest, Johnson fell to the ground and Stallons placed his knee on Johnson's back while he and Smith put Johnson in handcuffs. (Smith Video 22:21:30-22:22:00). At the same time, Eastman passed by the arrest and walked into the motel room to attempt to control the other occupants. (Eastman Video 22:21:30-22:21:54). Johnson was placed under arrest and taken to the emergency room due to complaints of knee pain. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 7, at 1-3, DN 40-8). Johnson was charged with obstructing governmental operations in violation of KRS 519.020, which was later dismissed due to lack of evidence. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 9, DN 40-10; Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 5, at 1, DN 50-6).

Johnson initiated this lawsuit, asserting claims against Smith in his individual capacity for: (1) violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) assault and malicious prosecution; and (3) libel. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-20). Johnson brings claims against Stallons for: (1) violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2) Assault. (Compl. ¶¶ 2127). Johnson brings claims against Eastman for violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-31).

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because a federal question is presented. The Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims arising from the same case or controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Thereafter, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts indicating a genuine issue of a disputed material fact essential to the case, beyond “some metaphysical doubt.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The nonmoving party must present facts demonstrating a material factual dispute that must be presented to “a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial[;]” the evidence, however, is “not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence ....” First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 89 (1968). When considering the evidence, the Court must view it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 60 Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987). If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead the trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, the motion should be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Johnson's claims. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 1, DN 40-1 [hereinafter Defs.' Mem.]). Johnson concedes Defendants' motion as to his federal claims to the extent they are based on violations of his Fifth Amendment rights and his state law claims for abuse of process^[2], libel, and for certain medical expenses.^[3] (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 18, 22-23, DN 50-1 [hereinafter Pl.'s Resp.]).

A. Federal Claims

Defendants argue that Johnson cannot prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that, even if he can, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established.^[4] (See Defs.' Mem. 20-22).

“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person in the official's position would have known.” Ward v. Borders, No. 3:16-CV-393-RGJ-RSE, 2023 WL 5108598, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2023) (quoting Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006)). “It ‘provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Qualified immunity shields federal and state official from liability unless a plaintiff shows both “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). “A right is clearly established for purposes of overcoming the qualified immunity defense only when ‘existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate ....'” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). “Thus, an official ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it.'” Id. (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018)). “The ‘salient question' in determining if a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is whether she had ‘fair warning' that her conduct was unconstitutional.” Id. at 276 (quoting Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 932 (6th Cir. 2019)).

“The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof in establishing that a defendant has no right to qualified immunity.” Ward, 2023 WL 5108598, at *6 (citing Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000)).

A defendant must first argue facts that they acted within their discretionary authority. See Hartman v Thompson, No. 3:16-CV-00114-GNS-DW, 2018 WL 793440, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2018) (citing Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 311). If a defendant succeeds, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's conduct violated a right so clearly established that any official in his position would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct.” Id. (quoting Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 311). To do so, a plaintiff need not identify an earlier decision that is “directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that a right may be clearly established even without existing precedent where a violation was “sufficientl...