Johnson v. State

Page 358

930 P.2d 358

Arthur George JOHNSON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 95-67.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 16, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 1997.

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, State Public Defender Program; James N. Wolfe, Cheyenne, for appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney General; Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, ^* and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

Appellant, Arthur George Johnson (Johnson), claims the district court erroneously admitted hearsay statements pursuant to WYO.R.EVID. 804(b)(3) and 804(b)(6) during his criminal trial. The hearsay statements were made by Ronnie Langley (Langley), a codefendant, during Langley's sentencing hearing, which preceded Johnson's trial. Later, Langley invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and was unavailable to testify at Johnson's trial.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Appellant Johnson presents the issues as:

I. Did the trial court err when it allowed the introduction of hearsay non-self-inculpatory statements of Ronnie L. Langley pursuant to Wyoming Rules of Evidence 804(b)(3) and (6)?

II. Did the introduction of hearsay non-self-inculpatory statements of Ronnie L. Langley violate the Wyoming and United States Constitutions?

Appellee State presents only one issue for review:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted the Langley statement under an exception to the hearsay rule?

FACTS

Austin BlackCrow (BlackCrow) was fatally beaten and stabbed on March 17, 1994, while an inmate at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. An Information was filed on March 19, 1994, charging Johnson with first degree murder in violation of WYO.STAT. § 6-2-101(a). On October 10, 1994, Johnson made a statement, with his attorney present, which was read into the record during Johnson's trial. In the statement, Johnson did not implicate co-defendant Langley in BlackCrow's death, but admitted to repeatedly stabbing BlackCrow and hitting BlackCrow's head on the cell floor.

On October 21, 1994, Langley, a codefendant in the homicide, pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact. Under oath, Langley provided a factual basis for his plea. Although Johnson's counsel was present in the courtroom when Langley entered his plea, he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Langley. As part of the agreement for a reduced charge, Langley was to provide the State with a truthful statement about his knowledge of the events of March 17, 1994. On October 24, 1994, Langley gave that statement. Johnson's attorney was given the opportunity to attend the proceeding at which Langley gave the statement, but was unable to attend.

Before Johnson's trial, Langley invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify at Johnson's trial. The district court allowed Langley's October 21, 1994, statement to be read to the jury. The court's decision to admit the statement was based on WYO.R.EVID. 804(b)(3) ¹ and (b)(6). ² Langley's entire statement was as follows:

Q. If you will just explain for the Court from that point forward after Mr. Johnson left this cell, what transpired and if you will just start filling it in.

A. Jeff Johnson left. Art Johnson left and went down the hall. About five minutes later, I seen him enter BlackCrow's cell. I heard fighting going on inside the cell. And when the fighting stopped, I looked in the curtain and saw BlackCrow on top of Art Johnson.

I entered the cell at that point and took BlackCrow off Art Johnson and then I seen BlackCrow had a shank in his hand.

And Art was trying to get it out and finally got it out.

Q. What did you do, if anything, did you grab BlackCrow?

A. Yeah, I grabbed Mr. BlackCrow and pulled him off Art Johnson.

Q. Had you seen the knife before then or after that?

A. After that when I pulled him off, that is when I seen it in his hands.

Q. What did you do at that time?

A. I held him until he got the knife out of his hand. I still had him. I still had him and then he stabbed BlackCrow a couple of times.

Q. He being, you said he stabbed BlackCrow, he being Mr. Johnson?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you let go?

A. Then I let go.

Q. Then what happened?

A. There was still swinging going on. BlackCrow finally gave up, gave up and passed out. Art Johnson rolled him over and banged his head on the floor. He stayed on the floor all the time. He finally got up. They were--they was calling. I looked out and told Johnson we better leave. That is when I left and went to my house.

Q. When you got to your house, what did you do?

A. I noticed blood on my shoes, on my sweats. I tore my sweats off, flushed them and tried to wipe the blood off my shoes.

Q. Did you use a razor blade?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you access the razor blade?

A. Out of a Bic razor.

Q. When you--when you destroyed your clothing, you say you flushed them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you do it with the intent to prevent the discovery, the detection of prosecution of Mr. Johnson or did you do it to protect--

A. More myself.

On appeal, Johnson objects to the admission of only a part of Langley's hearsay statement. The portion of Langley's statement relevant to this appeal alleged that, during the March 17 fight between Johnson and BlackCrow, BlackCrow "gave up and passed out. Art Johnson rolled him over and banged his head on the floor." A witness at trial testified the head injury killed BlackCrow, although several of the stab wounds were also life-threatening.

The jury found Johnson guilty of second degree murder on November 3, 1994. The district court entered a Judgment and Sentence on January 24, 1995. On appeal Johnson asserts: (1) Langley's statement, BlackCrow "gave up and passed out. Art Johnson rolled him over and banged his head on the floor," was not against Langley's penal interest and should not have been admitted under WYO.R.EVID. 804(b)(3); (2) the statement did not have sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted under WYO.R.EVID. 804(b)(6); and (3) Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to confront Langley was violated by admitting Langley's statement into evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[D]ecisions of the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal." Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 343 (Wyo.1990) (citing Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 101 (Wyo.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982)). "Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district court and are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision, or decision-making process, exceeds the bounds of measured reason in light of those matters properly before that court." Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted). Hearsay evidence is ordinarily inadmissible; however, it can be received in evidence if it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule found in the Wyoming Rules of Evidence and it bears sufficient indicia of reliability to avoid violation of the Confrontation Clause. Hopkinson, 632 P.2d at 132. "We will not reverse [a decision admitting hearsay] unless there is clearly no adequate basis in law supporting the trial court's rulings. Thus, if we can conclude that the challenged evidence was properly admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule then we must affirm its admission into evidence." Hopkinson, 632 P.2d at 129.

DISCUSSION

Art Johnson complains that inadmissible hearsay evidence was received during his first degree murder trial. When interpreting the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, we recall "[t]he Wyoming Rules of Evidence are based on the policy that conformity to federal practice is more important than uniformity of state practice. Therefore, except as indicated in a 'Committee note' following a rule or subdivision thereof, the Wyoming Rules of Evidence are the federal rules verbatim." WYO.R.EVID., Committee note. Consequently, United States Supreme Court cases which interpret equivalent federal rules can be persuasive authority to this Court.

WYO.R.EVID. 804(b)(3) and "statement"

Johnson asserts the most damaging portion of Langley's statement was that BlackCrow "gave up and passed out. Art Johnson rolled him over and banged his head on the floor." Johnson argues this particular statement was not self-inculpatory and therefore was not inherently reliable in the way intended under WYO.R.EVID. 804(b)(3). He urges us to follow Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2435, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory." A factual basis for a plea of guilty on a felony charge clearly falls within the scope of "a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory." Id. See also Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Wyo.1989) (Thomas, J., specially concurring).

In Williamson, Williamson appealed his conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine. He claimed that the trial court's admission of unsworn statements made by an accomplice, Harris, to a Drug Enforcement Administration agent, Walton, violated FED.R.EVID. 804(b)(3) and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The facts framing the legal issue were as follows. A deputy sheriff stopped the rental car driven by Harris for a minor traffic violation. A...