Johnson v. Turner

621 F.Supp.3d 652

Shauna M. JOHNSON v. Kendall TURNER and Melanie Montroll

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-383

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Signed August 15, 2022

Stephanie Legros Willis, Megan E. Snider, Nora Sam Ahmed, Pro Hac Vice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, Kathryn Johnson, Pro Hac Vice, Dorsey and Whitney, Minneapolis, MN, Stephen Roger Weingold, Pro Hac Vice, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Denver, CO, for Shauna M. Johnson.

Daniel Rault Martiny, James Bryan Mullaly, Jeffrey David Martiny, Martiny & Associates, Metairie, LA, for Melanie Montroll, Kendall Turner.

SECTION D (3)

ORDER AND REASONS

WENDY B. VITTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants Lieutenant Kendall Turner and Captain Melanie Montroll of the Harbor Police Department of the Port of New Orleans' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56.¹ Plaintiff Shauna Johnson has filed an Opposition.² Defendants have filed a Reply.³ After careful consideration of the parties' memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Shauna Johnson on February 23, 2020. On February 23, 2020 at approximately 11:15 a.m., Plaintiff was working as a Lyft driver and was present at the Port of New Orleans for the purpose of picking up passengers.⁴ A significant amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic was present in the area.⁵ Plaintiff identified her passengers and pulled her vehicle over to the right side of the road intending to pick them up.⁶ Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Kendall Turner of the Harbor Police Department of the Port of New Orleans approached her passengers and instructed them to walk elsewhere.⁷ Plaintiff exited her vehicle and asked Lt. Turner where he had directed her passengers.⁸ Lt. Turner instructed her to depart that area.⁹ Lt. Turner then stood in front of Plaintiff's car and began directing traffic.¹⁰ Plaintiff claims that she turned on her left turn signal, but was unable to proceed because there was a significant amount of traffic blocking her ability to merge into the left lane.¹¹ Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Turner then again approached her driver side window and told her she was "going to jail," reached through her open window, and removed the keys from the ignition.¹² Plaintiff asserts that she attempted to explain why she was unable to leave to Lt. Turner, but instead Lt. Turner asked her for her driver's license.¹³ Plaintiff did not have a physical driver's license and instead tried to show Lt. Turner her license on the LA Wallet phone app.¹⁴ Plaintiff claims that Lt. Turner would not allow her to access her phone.¹⁵ While Plaintiff objected to Lt. Turner's conduct as an abuse of power, a second officer approached Plaintiff's car.¹⁶ Plaintiff contends that after she continued to inform the officers that they were engaging in misconduct, the unidentified Officer John Doe indicated that he did not have a choice about arresting her and did so.¹⁷

Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against Lt. Turner and Captain Montroll and argues that she was unlawfully arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that the arrest was in retaliation in violation of her First Amendment rights for her criticism of Lt. Turner, and that Captain Montroll failed to properly supervise Lt. Turner.¹⁸ Plaintiff also asserts a state law false arrest claim against Defendants.¹⁹

Defendants Turner and Montroll of the Harbor Police Department have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.²⁰ Defendants argue that Plaintiff's federal and state law claims for false arrest as well as her claim for violation of her First Amendment rights and negligent supervision must be dismissed because the Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on her refusal to move her car in violation of Lt. Turner's order and her inability to produce a valid driver's license.²¹ In addition, Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity.²²

Plaintiff has filed an Opposition and argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because there is a disputed issue of material fact regarding whether she complied with Lt. Turner's order to move her car and whether she was given an opportunity to access her driver's license stored on the LA Wallet app.²³ Plaintiff also contends that because there is a disputed issue of material fact, her First Amendment and negligent supervision claims cannot be dismissed.²⁴

Defendants have filed a Reply and reiterate their argument that there was probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest because she did not take any steps to move her car in compliance with Lt. Turner's order and because a search of a police database revealed that she did not have a valid driver's license.²⁵

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."²⁶ When assessing whether a dispute regarding any material fact exists, the Court considers "all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence."²⁷ While all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or "only a scintilla of evidence."²⁸ Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.²⁹

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial."³⁰ The non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, or by "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party."³¹ If, however, the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.³² The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond the pleadings and, "by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' "³³

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Qualified Immunity Claim.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law. Specifically, it provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.³⁴

Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any substantive rights, "an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability."³⁵ To establish § 1983 liability, the plaintiff must establish the following three elements: (1) deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or federal law; (2) that occurred under color of state law; and (3) was caused by a state actor.³⁶ In this matter, Plaintiff has sued the two arresting officers in their individual capacities.³⁷ A state official can be sued in his individual capacity and held personally liable under § 1983 if a plaintiff can show that the official, acting under state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.³⁸ According to the Fifth Circuit, "This standard requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a constitutional violation."³⁹

As a defense to § 1983 claims, government officials may invoke qualified immunity, which "shields government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."⁴⁰ Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.⁴¹ The Supreme Court has made clear that qualified immunity functions as an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability.⁴² "[T]he qualified immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' "⁴³ "This means that even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation are entitled to immunity."⁴⁴ Once the government official asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to negate the defense.⁴⁵

To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct.⁴⁶ It is up to the district courts' sound discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case.⁴⁷

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claim.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that citizens have the right...