Johnson v. United States

1

JONI AMBER JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Nos. 3:22-CV-119-KAC-DCP, 3:18-CR-137-KAC-DCP-2

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Knoxville

September 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

A jury convicted Petitioner Joni Amber Johnson of (1) conspiring to kidnap and (2) aiding and abetting a kidnaping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and (c) [Doc. 69]. The Court sentenced Petitioner to 300 months' imprisonment and five (5) years of supervised release [Doc. 101 at 2-3].^[1]The Sixth Circuit affirmed Petitioner's sentence and conviction [Doc. 124]. And the Supreme Court denied her petition for a writ of certiorari [Doc. 129]. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed a pro se “Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence” [Doc. 1 in 3:22-CV-119] and “Supplement” [Doc. 5 in 3:22-CV-119]. The United States opposed [Doc. 8 in 3:22-CV-119]. For the below reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner's Section 2255 Petition.

I. Factual Background

On June 30, 2018, Petitioner and Petitioner's male codefendant drove a black Chevrolet Malibu to the home of Linda Spoon, a seventy-three-year-old resident of Tennessee.

[Doc. 86 ¶ 16, *sealed]. Petitioner and her codefendant exited the vehicle and forcibly entered Spoon's home [Id., *sealed]. Petitioner held Spoon at gunpoint [Id., *sealed]. Petitioner then bound Spoon's hands and feet together with cords [Id., *sealed]. Petitioner's codefendant “ransacked” Spoon's home, stealing jewelry and knives, among other items [Id., *sealed]. The encounter lasted between twenty (20) and twenty-five (25) minutes [Doc. 124 at 4]. Petitioner and her codefendant then fled Spoon's residence [Doc. 86 ¶ 16, *sealed]. Spoon freed herself and reported the incident to law enforcement, providing descriptions of (1) Petitioner and Petitioner's codefendant and (2) the make and model of the black Chevrolet Malibu [See Doc. 124 at 4-5].

On July 18, 2018, a law enforcement officer in Mercer County, West Virginia received a report of six (6) other home invasion robberies involving “a black sedan” and a male and female perpetrator [See Doc. 86 ¶¶ 17 19, *sealed]. The robberies occurred on June 14, 2018; June 29, 2018; July 2, 2018; July 6, 2018; July 11, 2018; and July 17, 2018 [Id. ¶¶ 20-29, *sealed]. Victims and eyewitnesses of the home invasion robberies on June 29, July 2, and July 6 relayed that the assailants used a “sedan,” “black Chevrolet Malibu,” or “Chevrolet Malibu” [Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 24, *sealed]. The law enforcement officer also “received an anonymous tip” that Petitioner and her codefendant “were driving a black sedan with an out-of-state registration” [Doc. 124 at 5]. And the officer learned that Petitioner and her codefendant had pawned suspected stolen items at Mercer County pawn shops [Doc. 86 ¶ 17, *sealed]. As luck would have it, as a law enforcement officer drove to one Mercer County pawn shop, that officer observed Petitioner and her codefendant driving a black Chevrolet Malibu [Id., *sealed]. The officer reviewed the pawn shop's surveillance footage, which showed Petitioner and her codefendant pawning several knives [Id., *sealed]. One of those knives had a Tennessee phone number inscribed on it [Id., *sealed].

Law enforcement learned that Petitioner's codefendant had an active Tennessee arrest warrant [Id., *sealed]. An arrest warrant had also been issued for Petitioner [Doc. 124 at 5].

On July 19, 2018, law enforcement located the black Chevrolet Malibu “operated by” Petitioner and Petitioner's codefendant [Doc. 86 ¶ 17, *sealed]. Law enforcement arrested Petitioner's codefendant, but Petitioner fled the scene in a white truck [Doc. 124 at 5]. A search of the black Chevrolet Malibu revealed several stolen items and a receipt with Petitioner's name on it [Docs. 86 ¶ 17, *sealed; 124 at 5]. On July 20, 2018, officers located the white truck in which Petitioner fled and arrested Petitioner [Doc. 86 ¶ 18, *sealed]. The truck contained a knife that belonged to Spoon's husband [Id., *sealed]. Officers also discovered that Petitioner's codefendant pawned jewelry belonging to Spoon at another Mercer County pawn shop [Id., *sealed].

A federal Grand Jury charged Petitioner and her codefendant with (1) conspiring to kidnap and (2) aiding and abetting a kidnaping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and (c) [Doc. 1]. Petitioner did not file any pretrial motions. After a three (3) day trial, a jury convicted Petitioner and her codefendant [Doc. 69]. At Petitioner's sentencing hearing, the United States called a Jefferson County, Tennessee law enforcement officer who testified about two (2) of the uncharged home invasion robberies allegedly committed by Petitioner and her codefendant [See Doc. 111 at 22]. The Court sentenced Petitioner to 300 months' imprisonment and a five-year (5-year) term of supervised release [Doc. 101 at 2-3].

Petitioner timely appealed her sentence and conviction. She argued that (1) the United States failed to prove all of the elements of each of the offenses, (2) the Court abused its discretion in providing certain jury instructions, and (3) her sentence was unreasonable [Doc. 124 at 6-7]. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence [Id. at 22]. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied [Doc. 129].

Afterwards, Petitioner filed the instant Section 2255 Petition, raising eight (8) claims for relief [Docs. 131; 5 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. First, Petitioner alleged that law enforcement in West Virginia arrested Petitioner “on a Tennessee warrant that wasn't signed by a judge,” rendering her arrest and the evidence seized “illegal” [Doc. 131 at 4]. Petitioner asserted that her appellate attorney “was aware” of this fact but “wouldn't raise the issue” before the Sixth Circuit [Id.; Doc. 5 at 4 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Second, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was “ineffective” because he “failed to file any motions to dismiss” based on her “illegal arrest” [Docs. 131 at 7; 5 at 5 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Third, Petitioner alleged that her trial “[a]ttorney failed to file motions to suppress illegally seized evidence” from her purportedly illegal arrest [Docs. 131 at 9; 5 at 6-7 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Fourth, Petitioner alleged that her trial “attorney failed to give [her] all discovery Brady material” [Docs. 131 at 10, 12; 5 at 8-9 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Fifth, Petitioner alleged that her trial “attorney refused to let [her] view all of the discovery” [Docs. 131 at 12; 5 at 9 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Sixth, Petitioner alleged that her trial attorney “allowed U.S. and law enforcement to withhold evidence from [the] jury [sic],” specifically “eyewitness statements, descriptions of other perpetrators to the crimes” [Docs. 131 at 5, 12; 5 at 9, 15 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Seventh, Petitioner alleged that her trial “attorney allowed Federal law enforcement and the U.S. Attorney to fabricate and change eyewitnesses [sic] statements and descriptions” [Docs. 131 at 5; 5 at 15 in case number 3:22-CV-119]. Finally, Petitioner alleged that an officer who testified at her sentencing hearing “committed perjury” by testifying that he “cut duct tape off of” a victim when that victim “told [the] court in a preliminary court hearing that he himself cut off [the] duct tape” [Docs. 131 at 45; 5 at 15-16 in case number 3:22-CV-119].

The United States opposed the Petition, asserting that Petitioner's first and eighth claims are procedurally defaulted and that her remaining claims fail to establish that Petitioner's attorney provided ineffective assistance [Doc. 8 at 4, 6 in case number 3:22-CV-119].

II. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct her judgment of conviction and sentence based on claims that: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;” or (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain post-conviction relief under Section 2255, Petitioner bears the burden to show: (1) “an error of constitutional magnitude;” (2) “a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits;” or (3) “an error fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2001)). “[A]n error of constitutional magnitude” is one that has a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). A successful Section 2255 Motion “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” by showing a “fundamental defect in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error violative of due process.” Fair v. United States, 157 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted).

Rule 2(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts requires a Section 2255 petition to “specify all the grounds for relief available to the moving party” and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts. The Court liberally construes a pro se Section 2255 petition. See McCormick v. Butler, ...