Johnson v. W. Hartford Police Dep't

1

KOBBIE DOMINICK JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. WEST HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, TOWN OF WEST HARFORD, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-413 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

September 19, 2022

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER AND ORDER TO UPDATE ADDRESS

Charles S. Haight, Jr. Senior United States District Judge

Plaintiff Kobbie Dominick Johnson, a pretrial detainee at the Camden County Correctional Facility in Camden, New Jersey, commenced this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Doc. 1 (“Complaint” & “IFP Application”). Per Court order, Johnson amended his IFP Application to correct its insufficiency (i.e., Johnson's failure to file the requisite “Prisoner IFP Application” form). Doc. 8-10. Then, by decision and Order, Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish granted Johnson IFP status. Doc. 11.

In his Complaint, Johnson brings his Section 1983 claim against three defendants: the West Hartford Police Department, the State of Connecticut, and the Town of West Hartford.^[1] Johnson alleges that he was falsely arrested by the West Hartford Police Department and extradited to New Jersey. He seeks $5 million in damages. Doc. 1, at 6 (¶ 7 “Relief”).

Because Plaintiff is incarcerated and seeks relief from governmental entities, the Court herein reviews his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) to determine whether his claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.^[2] “While the screening requirement contained in § 1915A(a) applies to complaints in which ‘a prisoner seeks redress,' courts also routinely have applied the statute to screen complaints brought by pre-trial detainees.” Rogers v. Lamont, No 3:22-CV-66 (OAW), 2022 WL 3716446, at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2022) (collecting cases).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the Complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

In reviewing the Complaint, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the Court is “not bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Faber, 648 F.3d at 104 (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008)). Moreover, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Consequently, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Ultimately, “determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663-64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Dismissal of the complaint is only appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 597 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). “This rule applies with particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is submitted pro se.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir.1998).

With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'”) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

This liberal approach, however, does not exempt pro se litigants from the minimum pleading requirements described above: a pro se complaint must still “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Therefore, even in a pro se case, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may not “invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled.” Id.

II. BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2020, Johnson was arrested by the West Hartford Police Department on a solicitation charge from 2012. Doc. 1, at 5 (¶ 6). He contends that he could not have committed the alleged crime because he was in prison in New Jersey from June 29, 2012, until October 6, 2016. Id.

Johnson was taken to the West Hartford Police Department, processed, and fingerprinted. Id. at 5-6 (¶ 6). At that time, Johnson's name did not appear in Connecticut's database of criminal charges, so the West Hartford police contacted New Jersey officials to confirm Johnson's identity. Id. at 6 (¶ 6). In response, officials in Camden County, New Jersey, informed the West Hartford police that Johnson was a “person of interest” in a crime in the city of Camden. Id. A fugitive warrant was placed on Johnson, and he was transferred to Hartford Correctional Center to await extradition. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Johnson asserts a claim for “false arrest” because there was no warrant for his arrest on a charge of solicitation or any other crime in Connecticut. Doc. 1, at 6 (¶ 7). This arrest allegedly resulted in “hardship” because he was then sent to Camden County Correctional Facility and lost his job, apartment, and car. Id.

Other than placing a check on the line in his Complaint (¶1a) to indicate that he brings his action under “42 U.S.C. § 1983,” he has presented no underlying constitutional basis for his claim. Because he asserts that he was falsely arrested, the Court infers that he seeks to vindicate his right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable seizures.^[3] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provisions are applicable to [state] defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.” Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 n. 14 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted). As set forth infra, although Plaintiff names three defendants, he fails to state a cognizable claim against any of them.

A. West Hartford Police Department

While a municipality is subject to suit under section 1983, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978), “[a] municipal police department . . . is not a municipality nor a ‘person' within the meaning of section 1983.” Nicholson v. Lenczewski, 356 F.Supp.2d 157, 164 (D. Conn. 2005). Rather, a municipal police department is “a sub-unit or agency of the municipal government through which the municipality fulfills its policing function.” Id. “Because a municipal police department is not an independent legal entity, it is not subject to suit under section 1983.” Id. See also Alexander v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 3:19-CV-1295(VLB), 2020 WL 4735269, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2020) (noting that East Haven Police Department has no legal existence so any lawsuit would have to be asserted against municipality or individual officers); Reed v. Hartford Police Dep't, No. 3:03-CV-2417(SRU), 2004 WL 813028, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 6, 2004) (dismissing claim against Hartford Police Department and citing cases holding that municipal police department is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983 and thus not subject to suit). Accordingly, Johnson's claims against the West Hartford Police Department will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

B. Town of West Hartford

Johnson also lists the Town of West Hartford as a defendant in his case caption. Doc. 1, at 1. “Claims against municipalities are considered under the standard for municipal liability established in Monell,” 436 U.S. 658. Mayo v. Doe, 480 F.Supp.3d 395, 402 (D. Conn. 2020). “A municipality cannot be found liable merely because...