Johnson v. Wayside Prop., Inc.

41 F.Supp.3d 973

Scott JOHNSON, Plaintiff

v.WAYSIDE PROPERTY, INC., a California Corporation, and J & C M Holding, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:13–1610 WBS AC.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed Aug. 29, 2014.

Christopher Arnold Seabock, Phyl Grace, Raymond Ballister, Jr., Potter Handy LLP, Russell Handy, Mark D. Potter, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

Michael David Welch, Michael Welch Associates, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Plaintiff Scott Johnson, who is wheelchair-bound, brought this action against defendants Wayside Property, Inc., and JC & M holding, Inc., the owners of Wayside Lumber. Plaintiff alleges that he encountered several barriers to access when he attempted to purchase wood at Wayside Lumber and asserts that these barriers to access violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and California law. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

I. Factual & Procedural History

Plaintiff is disabled and requires a wheelchair for mobility. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 2 (Docket No. 11–4).) In June 2013, plaintiff visited Wayside Lumber, a store operated by defendants, on two occasions to purchase items for a project. (Id. ¶ 5.) When plaintiff arrived at Wayside Lumber, he found that the only handicapped parking space was located on the far side of the lot, had faded signage, and did not have sufficient clearance for his wheelchair lift. (Id. ¶ 6–7.) The entrance to Wayside Lumber was equipped with a panel-style door handle, which plaintiff found difficult to use. (Id. ¶ 8.) And when plaintiff went inside the store to make purchases, the transaction counter was too high for him to reach comfortably. (Id. ¶ 9.)

On July 23, 2013, Noah Leiter, an investigator with the Center for Disability Access, visited Wayside Lumber to conduct a site inspection.¹ (Leiter Decl. ¶ 3 (Docket No. 11–5).) Leiter indicates that the only handicapped parking space was not marked as van-accessible, did not have a designated access aisle, had faded paint, had no blue border or wheelchair logo, and was located across a vehicular drive path from the building. (Id. ¶¶ 4–6.) He found that the door had a panel-style handle. (Id. ¶ 6.) And when he measured the transaction counter, he found that the counter was between 42 and 45 inches in height across its entire length. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff filed this action on August 5, 2013, and asserted four claims for: (1) violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.Code §§ 51 et seq.; (3) violations of the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 54 ; and (4) common-law negligence. Six days after they received the Complaint, defendants retained a Certified Access Specialist and scheduled a site inspection. (McVey Decl. ¶ 3 (Docket No. 14–2).) Less than a month later, defendants took several steps to remedy the alleged violations: they relocated and repainted the handicapped parking spaces, installed new door handles, and set up an area of the transaction counter with distinctive signage and a clipboard for disabled patrons. (Id. ¶¶ 4–6.) On May 29, 2014, Leiter returned to Wayside Lumber and confirmed that defendants had modified their handicapped parking area and door handle. (Leiter Decl. ¶¶ 10–11.) Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on his ADA and UCRA claims pursuant to Rule 56.² (Docket No. 11.)

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence ... will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... ruling on a motion for summary judgment....” Id.

A. Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA was enacted in 1990 to “remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals,” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001), and permits private lawsuits against businesses that fail to accommodate individuals with disabilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a). In order to prevail on an ADA claim, a “plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir.2007). Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff satisfies the first two elements.

“The third element—whether [a plaintiff is] denied public accommodations on the basis of disability—is met if there was a violation of applicable accessibility standards.” Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816 F.Supp.2d 831, 847 (N.D.Cal.2011) ; see Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). Those standards are set forth by the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”),³ which “provide [ ] the objective contours of the standard that architectural features must not impede disabled individuals' full and equal enjoyment of accommodations.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945 ; see 28 C.F.R. pt. 1191 (2010 Standards); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. D (1991 Standards).

Although the ADA does not mandate removal of structural barriers in existing facilities where removal is not “readily achievable,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), even minor or technical violations of access standards are a per se violation of the ADA when removal is readily achievable, Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. Indeed, its requirements are as “precise as they are thorough, and the difference between compliance and noncompliance with ... the ADA is often a matter of inches.” Id. at 945–46.

1. Violations of the ADA

Plaintiff identifies three ADA violations that he encountered at Wayside Lumber. First, under the 1991 Standards, any business that provides parking spaces must provide handicap parking spaces. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. D, § 2.2. Among other requirements, the 1991 Standards mandate that those parking spaces “shall be located on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance.” Id. § 4.6.2. Plaintiff indicates that when he visited Wayside Lumber in June 2013, he was forced to park in a “faded parking space” that was “located across a vehicular drive path,” rather than adjacent to the building. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has also submitted a photograph showing a faded handicap parking space located on the opposite side of the parking lot from the store entrance. (Docket No. 11–7.) Defendants have not submitted any evidence showing that the parking space complied with the ADA, and admit that “[it] is undisputed that Mr. Johnson encountered parking lot issues.” (Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 10 (Docket No. 14).)

Second, the 1991 Standards require that all door hardware “shall have a shape that is easy to grasp with one hand and does not require tight grasping, tight pinching, or twisting of the wrist to operate.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. D, § 4.13.9. When plaintiff visited Wayside Lumber in June 2013, he found that the door had a “panel style” handle that was difficult for him to grasp. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff submits a photograph showing this door handle. (Docket No. 11–7.) As with the parking space, defendants do not submit any evidence showing that the door handles were ADA-compliant.

Finally, the 1991 Standards require that any transaction counter used for sale or distribution of goods or services to the public have a section with a maximum height of 36 inches. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. D, § 7.2(1). Plaintiff states that when he visited Wayside Lumber, the transaction counter was “too high.” (Johnson Decl. ¶ 9.) Leiter subsequently visited Wayside Lumber on July 23, 2013, took measurements, and determined that the entire length of the transaction counter measured between 42 and 45 inches in height. (Leiter Decl. ¶ 8.) When Leiter returned to Wayside Lumber on May 29, 2014, he found that the counters were no lower than 42 inches in height. (Id. ¶ 11.) Although the parties...