Johnson v. Westmoreland Cnty. Prison Bd., Civil Action No. 20-622

RONALD L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON BOARD, WARDEN JOHN R. WALTON,SEAN KERTES, Chairman, GINA CERILLI, Esq., Secretary,and DOUGLAS CHEW, Vice Chairman Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-622

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 3, 2021

Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Ronald Johnson ("Plaintiff"), a pretrial detainee at the Westmoreland County Prison, filed this pro se action claiming that his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated as a result of the conditions of his confinement and the deficient grievance process at the Westmoreland County Prison.

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Westmoreland County Prison Board, Warden John R. Walton ("Walton"), Sean Kertes ("Kertes"), Gina Cerilli ("Cerilli"), and Douglas Chew ("Chew") (collectively, "Defendants"). ECF No. 37. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.¹

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 28, 2020 by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Motion"), which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 1 and 10. Plaintiff amendedhis Complaint twice after the Court issued Deficiency Orders, and the operative Second Amended Complaint was filed on June 30, 2020. ECF Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 8.

A. Second Amended Complaint

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against the Westmoreland County Prison Board, three members of the Westmoreland County Prison Board (Kertes, Chew, and Cerilli), and Warden Walton. ECF No. 8.

1. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of their failure to adequately protect him from contracting COVID-19. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at Westmoreland County Prison, and he is one of 86 detainees on the "C unit." Id. at 2. He is sixty-five years old, with pre-existing medical conditions including: lung and heart disease, severe asthma, chronic liver disease, chronic hepatitis C, spinal cord injury, and high blood pressure. Id.

Plaintiff claims that the units at Westmoreland County Prison are crowded, making "social distancing impossible." Id. According to Plaintiff, 86 detainees are housed together with 2 inmates per cell. The detainees share 6 showers, and there are at least 4-5 detainees seated next to one another during meals. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that the dining and shower areas are unsanitary, and that he contracted a bacterial infection as a result of these conditions. Id. Although Plaintiff was provided with a cloth mask, he claims that Defendants have refused to implement other protections, such as testing for employees or detainees. Id. As a result, he claims that Defendants are operating in violation of the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") guidelines. Id.

2. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide a sufficient grievance process at the Westmoreland County Prison. Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that detainees are intimidated by the "chain of command," as officials may threaten to throw them in the "hole," or they may need to seek grievance forms from the official against whom they have a complaint. Id.

3. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by keeping lights on at all times. Id. He claims that the light harms his health and is a form of "torture," which causes headaches, abnormal sleep and sleep deprivation, eye deterioration, and "death row syndrome." Id. at 4-5.

With respect to all of his claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief, requesting to be released from prison until trial. Id. at 3, 5.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. ECF Nos. 37 and 38. Plaintiff filed a Response and Brief in Support of Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 46 and 47.

The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not acceptbald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not suffice but, rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim").

Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will liberally construe his Complaint and employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies before filing an action challenging prison conditions or experiences. Under the PLRA, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner, confined in any jail, prison or correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).²

Although Defendants argue that "there is no question" that Plaintiff did not file any grievances, they cite nothing to support this finding. While, as Defendants argue, Plaintiff does not affirmatively plead that he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his Second Amended Complaint, he is not required to do so. See ECF No. 38 at 7; Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295-298 (3d Cir. 2002). Rather, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that Defendants must plead and prove. Ray, 285 F.3d at 295; see also Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) ("Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff."). Defendants have not satisfied their burden of proof at this stage. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is denied to the extent it requests the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

B. Count I

Defendants also argue that Count I should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 38 at 4. In particular, Defendants argue thatPlaintiff must show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in order to prove an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 5. Here, Defendants argue, the "possibility of contracting [COVID-19]" is not a serious medical need. Id. Defendants further argue that there are no allegations showing deliberate indifference to any such need, because Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the named Defendants blocked his access to medical care or to a physician. Id. at 6-7. As such, Defendants contend, Plaintiff's claim amounts to nothing more than an inmate "desperately trying to use the system to get out of jail." Id. at 7.

In response, Plaintiff argues that pretrial detainees have a due process right not to be punished. ECF No. 47 at 2-3. He argues that the conditions at Westmoreland County Prison violate his due process rights because keeping at-risk individuals detained in such close proximity without proper sanitation serves no legitimate purpose, and that detention under these circumstances is not rationally related to the enforcement of prison rules. Id. at 4. He also argues that the conditions of confinement have placed him at serious risk of being infected with COVID-19 and, considering his age and various health conditions, Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. Id.

The gravamen of Count I is that Westmoreland County Prison officials have not implemented adequate measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 within the facility. As the United States Supreme Court has held, prison officials are required to "provide humane conditions of confinement," and must take "reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S....