Johnson v. Wetzel

311 A.3d 684

Aquil JOHNSON, Petitioner

v.John WETZEL, Secretary PA. D.O.C., Mark Garman, Super., S.C.I. Rockview et al., Officers, Agents, Servants, Employees and Attorneys, Respondents

No. 497 M.D. 2018

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs January 5, 2024

Decided February 16, 2024

Original Jurisdiction

Aquil Johnson, Petitioner, Pro Se.

Kim Adams, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for Respondent

OPINION PER CURIAM

Petitioner, Aquil Johnson (Johnson), is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution – Rockview (SCI-Rockview). Johnson’s amended petition for review asserts claims of negligence and deprivation of due process. Respondents, John Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections, of the Department of Corrections (DOC), Mark Garman, Superintendent of SCI-Rockview, and various unnamed "Officers, Agents, Servants, Employees and Attorneys"¹ (collectively, Respondents) have filed an application for relief in the form of a motion for summary relief (Summary Relief Motion). For the reasons discussed below, we grant the Summary Relief Motion.

I. Background

In March 2013, Johnson was sentenced in two criminal matters to an aggregate term of approximately 20 to 40 years of incarceration. Johnson v. Wetzel (Johnson II), 662 Pa. 159, 238 A.3d 1172, 1175-76 (2020). The sentencing court also assessed costs and fees against Johnson. Id. at 1175. To satisfy these financial obligations, the DOC began deducting monies from Johnson’s inmate account under Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code,² 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b)(5). Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1175. These withdrawals are known as Act 84 deductions because the provision authorizing them was added to Section 9728 of the Sentencing Code by the Act of June 18, 1998, P.L. 640, No. 84 (Act 84). Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1175 (citing Bundy v. Wetzel, 646 Pa. 248, 184 A.3d 551, 554 (2018)). The DOC began making withdrawals in June 2013, without notifying Johnson in advance. Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1175. Fundamentally, Johnson claims he is entitled to a refund of monies deducted from his inmate account for payment of costs and fees related to his 2013 criminal convictions because no procedural safeguards were in place allowing him to challenge the assessments before the deductions began. Id.

In July 2013, Johnson learned of the deductions and questioned his prison counselor about them. The counselor relayed that the inmates’ account office had stated the deductions were lawful under Act 84 and the financial responsibilities imposed on Johnson as part of his criminal sentences. Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1176; Pet. for Rev., Ex. FC.³

In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that administrative pre-deprivation due process was required prior to the first Act 84 deduction from an inmate’s account and that the requisite due process included DOC notice to the affected inmate of the DOC’s policy concerning Act 84 deductions, the total amount of the inmate’s fees and costs, the rate at which funds are to be deducted, and which funds will be subject to the deductions. Montanez v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit also opined that the DOC was required to provide a reasonable pre-deduction opportunity to object as a means of avoiding any potential errors in the deductions. Id. at 486.

In 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the same due process issue and reached a similar conclusion. See Bundy, 184 A.3d at 558. Of significance here, the Bundy Court also noted that, in circumstances where procedural safe-guards are not feasible in the pre-deprivation timeframe, the availability of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy satisfies due process requirements. Id. at 557; see also Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1176 (citing and discussing Bundy).

Shortly after our Supreme Court decided Bundy, Johnson filed a grievance complaining that he never received pre-deprivation due process as required by Bundy; Johnson sought a refund of all monies the DOC had deducted since 2013, approximately $860. Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1176-77. The DOC denied the grievance because Johnson had failed to provide documentation demonstrating that the assessment was in error. Id. at 1177. Nonetheless, the Department suspended deductions for 15 business days to allow Johnson to provide such documentation. Id.; Pet. for Rev., Ex. GR; see also Pet. for Rev., Ex. RS01 (SCI-Rockview business office response to Johnson directing him to provide documentation if he believed the 2013 cost assessment was in error). Johnson did not do so, however; instead, he lodged an administrative appeal, arguing that the suggested post-deprivation remedy was insufficient in light of Bundy. Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1177. He also filed a second grievance asserting the same denial of due process. The Department denied the appeal and the second grievance. Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1177; Pet. for Rev., Ex. GR2.

Johnson then filed his original petition for review in this Court, asserting a claim in replevin to recover the roughly $860 the DOC had deducted from his inmate account, together with interest, attorney fees,⁴ and nominal damages. He also alleged a violation of his due process rights, asserting that he should have received an administrative ability-to-pay hearing based on alleged changes in his circumstances. Citing Bundy, Johnson asserted that the Act 84 deductions interfered with his ability to pursue various pending litigation related to his 2013 convictions. See Bundy, 184 A.3d at 559.

Johnson later obtained leave to file an amended petition for review, in which he asserted a negligence claim alleging that his prison counselor had negligently misinformed him in 2013 that the Act 84 deductions were lawful. He further averred that the DOC was negligent in administering his inmate account because it withdrew funds without pre-withdrawal due process. Johnson again demanded a refund of the monies the DOC had withdrawn from his account, together with interest, attorney fees, and nominal damages.

The DOC filed preliminary objections asserting that Act 84 authorized deductions based on the sentencing orders without providing an ability-to-pay hearing before the first deduction. The DOC also asserted that the two-year statute of limitations period pertaining to negligence⁵ barred Johnson’s claim, in that the first deduction was made in 2013, but Johnson did not file his petition for review until 2018. The DOC also posited that it had no constitutional obligation to implement procedural safeguards before the first Act 84 deduction was effectuated. Additionally, the DOC claimed qualified immunity from liability on the basis that government officials are immune from lawsuits based on allegedly unconstitutional actions so long as those officials did not violate individual rights which were clearly established at the time, and about which a reasonable government official would have known. Finally, the DOC asserted sovereign immunity on the basis that Johnson’s action, although couched in terms of negligence, actually alleged only intentional conduct, to which sovereign immunity applies.

Johnson filed preliminary objections to the DOC’s preliminary objections, asserting that the two-year time bar for negligence claims did not apply because the DOC was guilty of fraudulent concealment; qualified immunity was inapplicable, because due process requirements were already established in 2013; and the DOC’s own policies require it to give him, prior to the first deduction, a memorandum informing him of the imminent deductions together with a copy of the official court documents relied on for those deductions.

This Court overruled Johnson’s preliminary objections, sustained the DOC’s preliminary objections, and dismissed the amended petition for review. Johnson v. Dep’t of Corr. (Johnson I), 2019 WL 2400295 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 497 M.D. 2018, filed June 8, 2019). We concluded that the negligence claim in the amended petition replaced the replevin claim in the original petition. We also dismissed the purported negligence claim, agreeing with the DOC that Johnson alleged only intentional conduct. Regarding Johnson’s claims under Act 84, this Court held that Johnson did not allege a relevant change of circumstances, as he had been granted in forma pauperis status and was actively litigating his post-conviction matters. As for the due process claim, we rejected the DOC’s qualified immunity argument but concluded that the due process claim accrued when the DOC made its first Act 84 deduction from Johnson’s account in 2013, such that the two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time Johnson filed his petition for review in 2018. See generally Morgalo v. Gorniak, 134 A.3d 1139, 1147-48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (holding that a two-year limitations period applies to Act 84 deductions). We rejected Johnson’s tolling argument based on fraudulent concealment because he did not exercise adequate diligence by inquiring into the state of the law.

Johnson filed a direct appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising a number of issues relating to his purported negligence cause of action and his due process claim, as well as his alleged entitlement to an administrative ability-to-pay hearing. See Johnson II, 238 A.3d at 1180. Our Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision in large measure.

Regarding Johnson’s negligence claim, our Supreme Court concluded that "the sum and substance of the [amended petition] as a whole … is that the [DOC] violated [Johnson’s] procedural due process rights based on intentional conduct." Johnson II, 288 A.3d at 1181. The Court explained that "[s]imply labeling the claim as one sounding in negligence does not make it so where the harm is alleged to have been caused by the [DOC’s] actions in deducting monies from [Johnson’s] account … and then telling him after the fact that the deductions were authorized …." Id. Because the claim alleged a deprivation of property...