Jones v. Attorney Gen.

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DAVID WAYNE JONES, Petitioner, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 24-1510 (UNA)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 31, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, United States District Judge

David Wayne Jones, Jr. (“Petitioner”) is serving a prison sentence at the Roxbury Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, Maryland. A criminal case allegedly remains pending against him in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and on July 18, 2023, Petitioner's Warden issued a Notice of Untried Indictment, Information or Complaint and of Right to Request Disposition. See Pet. (ECF No. 1), Ex. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2). On that same date, Petitioner executed a Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints. See id., Ex. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4). According to the Certificate of Inmate Status, as of July 18 2023, Petitioner has served roughly 11 months of a five-year prison sentence; his parole eligibility date is February 18 2025; and his projected release date is December 11, 2025. See id., Ex. (EF No. 1-1 at 5-6).

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner's claim arises under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), see Pet. at 1, 4 which in relevant part provides:

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint; provided, that, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.

D.C. Code § 24-801 art. III(a).

“[T]he IAD encourages expeditious disposition of charges and establishes cooperative procedures among party States.” Grant v. United States, 856 A.2d 1131, 1133 (D.C. 2004) (citation omitted). As indicated above, it “authorizes a prisoner to file a request for final disposition of outstanding charges related to a detainer after which request the prisoner must be brought to trial in the receiving jurisdiction within one hundred and eighty days from the date the request was made unless the court grants a continuance for ‘good cause.'” Id At 1133-34 (citation omitted); see Felix v. United States, 508 A.2d 101, 107 (D.C. 1986) (“The generally accepted view is . . ., that notwithstanding the mechanism used to obtain a prisoner's custody in the receiving state, where a prisoner files the proper written notice or certificate requesting final disposition of charges, the 180-day speedy trial period contained in Article III is the operative time provision.”). The clock begins to run when “the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.” Cooper v. United States, 28 A.3d 1132, 1137 38 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Fex v. Michigan, supra, 507 U.S. 43, 52 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of this discussion, the Court presumes without...