Jones v. Barr

RAVEN PATRICE JONES, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM BARR ET AL., Defendants.

Case No. 2:20-cv-02753-MSN-cgc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

June 7, 2021

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; AND ORDER DENYING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

Currently before the Court cause are the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), (ECF No. 6), Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to the Evidence as a Matter of Course, (ECF No. 8), Plaintiff's Motion for Misjoinder and Nonjoinder, (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff's Motion for Bench Trial, (ECF No. 11), the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation addressing Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, (ECF No. 13), and an additional Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to the Evidence as a Matter of Course to Relate Back. (ECF No. 15.) For the reasons below, the Court ADOPTS both of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations in their entirety and OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections to both. In light of this, Plaintiff's remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

Background

Plaintiff brings this pro se action against various officials in the Executive Branch, Memphis Police Director Michael Rallings, and the CEO of Absolute Wireless, Robert Hartline. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2-5.) She alleges violations of her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution in addition to violations under 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 245, 18 U.S.C. § 1584, 18 U.S.C. § 1592, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631.¹ (Id. at PageID 15.) In conjunction with her pro se complaint, Plaintiff asked for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Magistrate Judge granted that request. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 25.)

As a consequence of pauper status, the Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), which states:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that. . . (B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(ECF No. 6 at PageID 25-26.) Having done so, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. (Id. at PageID 28.)

Indeed, the Magistrate Judge's Report labels the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint as "fanciful, delusional and clearly baseless." (Id. at PageID 25.) As a brief summary, Plaintiff alleges that she was used as a confidential informant by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the United States Secret Service, and the Memphis Police Department for investigations into mortgage fraud, counterterrorism, counterfeit goods, Initial Public Offerings (IPO), and technology procurement trials using the Foreign Surveillance Act of 1978. (Id. at PageID 8.) She goes on to allege that her "body was setup to play the role of a virtual prostitute" as part of these undercoveroperations. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 8.) She also has been "microchipped" without her "knowledge or consent with a listening device to be used as a confidential informant." (Id. at PageID 9.) She requests an award of $1,352,576,000 as compensatory damages and $400,000,000 as "exemplary damages." (Id. at PageID 15.)

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's action for failing to plead a claim for which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 28.) Notwithstanding the outlandish character of Plaintiff's allegations, the Report concluded that the statutory provisions on which Plaintiff relies do not create private rights of action. (Id.) (citing relevant case law). Thus, even when viewed under the liberal pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for relief. (Id. at PageID 27-28.) In addition, the Magistrate Judge's Report also concluded that an appeal on this matter would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). (Id. at PageID 29.)

Plaintiff timely filed her objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report on November 5, 2020. (ECF No. 7.) She has also since moved to amend her complaint. (ECF No. 8.) The Magistrate Judge issued her Report and Recommendation addressing Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend on February 9, 2021. (ECF No. 13.) The Court will take each up in turn.

The Report and Recommendation

A. Standard of Review

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district court duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed. Appx. 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). For dispositive matters, "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has beenproperly objected to." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). After reviewing the evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge's proposed findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge's findings and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. See id. at 151.

Objections to any part of a Magistrate Judge's disposition "must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious." Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 147 (stating that the purpose of the rule is to "focus attention on those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties' dispute."). Each objection to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation should include how the analysis is wrong, why it was wrong and how de novo review will obtain a different result on that particular issue. Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented and addressed by the magistrate judge, does not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the report and recommendation. Id. When an objection reiterates the arguments presented to the magistrate judge, the report and recommendation should be reviewed for clear error. Verdone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-14178, 2018 WL 1516918, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2018) (citing Ramirez v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 932, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).

B. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff's allegations were "fanciful, delusional and clearly baseless." (ECF No. 6 at PageID 25.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court "shalldismiss the case at any time if. . . the action or appeal fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.]" The Magistrate Judge applied the familiar standard under Rule 12(b)(6) to determine if Plaintiff failed to plead a claim for relief. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 26.) Having done so, the Report concluded that Plaintiff failed to plead a claim for which she is entitled to relief. (Id. at PageID 28.)

Plaintiff filed her objection to the Report and Recommendation on November 5, 2020. (ECF No. 7.) Admittedly, the Court struggles to comprehend the arguments laid out by Plaintiff. Normally, objections "must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious." See Currie, 50 F.3d at 380. However, Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, enjoys a less demanding standard. See generally Felts v. Cleveland Hous. Auth., 821 F. Supp. 2d 968, 970 (E.D. Tenn. 2011); In re McFadden, 477 B.R. 686, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012). Even so, this more forgiving approach to pro se pleadings does not remedy Plaintiff's issues here.

The Magistrate Judge's Report found that the statutory provisions Plaintiff cites in her complaint do not provide for private actions, thus dismissal was warranted. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 28.) Plaintiff's objections do not disturb this conclusion.

At times, Plaintiff uses her objections to focus on some aspects not addressed in the Magistrate Judge's Report. For example, Plaintiff accuses the Magistrate Judge of ignoring her "request for injunctive relief." (ECF No. 7 at PageID 31.) After reviewing Plaintiff's complaint, the Court cannot discern where Plaintiff made such a request.

Turning to the aspects of Plaintiff's objections that respond to the Report, the Court finds them without merit. Plaintiff first takes issue with the Report's finding that 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 1584, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 fail to provide for private causes of action. (ECF No. 7 atPageID 32.) Her argument in support of this objection is hard to follow. She contends that the Court has the inherent authority to request additional evidence to allow Plaintiff to substantiate her claims. (Id.) While maybe true, this assertion fails to address the heart of the issue: namely, that the statutes cited do not provide private rights of action. Additional evidence would not cure this deficiency.

Next, she cites to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) in support of her assertion that a private right of action exists. (Id. at PageID 33.) Section 552a(g) concerns individual records possessed by Government agencies. See 5 U.S.C. 552a. Further, it is true that 5 U.S.C. §552a(g) provides that an "individual may bring a civil action." However, Plaintiff did not plead this in her complaint nor does the Court understand the connection between this statute...