Jones v. Blair Wellness Ctr.

KAMILLE D. JONES, Plaintiff, v. BLAIR WELLNESS CENTER, LLC et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. ADC-21-2606

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 1, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A David Copperthite United Stales Magistrate Judge

Defendants Blair Wellness Center, LLC (“Blair Wellness”) Blair Management, LLC (“Blair Management”), and Matthew Edward Blair (collectively, “Defendants”) move this Court to dismiss, or in the alternative grant summary judgment on, Counts I and II of Plaintiff Kamille D Jones’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 48) alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). ECF No. 51.^[1]After considering Defendants’ Motion and the responses thereto (ECF Nos 51, 55, 57), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). For the reasons stated herein,-the Defendants’ motion, construed as a motion to dismiss, is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a Black woman who worked at Blair Wellness Center, a medical cannabis retail business in Baltimore City, Maryland. ECF No. 48, ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff was hired in October 2019 as i a “Patient Advisor,” also known as a “budtender,” and was promoted to Assistant Inventory Manager: Id. At ¶¶ 8-9. During the former Assistant Inventory Manager’s tenure, upper management discovered “substantial discrepancies regarding dispensary inventory and [the Marijuana Enforcement Tracking Regulation and Compliance System].” Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Despite these discrepancies, no disciplinary or adverse employment action was taken against the former Assistant Inventory Manager, a white male. Id. at ¶ 11. Shortly after the discrepancies were discovered, the Assistant Inventory Manager voluntarily resigned, and Plaintiff was promoted. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. As Assistant Inventory Manager, Plaintiff was tasked with “designing and implementing procedures for bringing the dispensary’s product intake, labeling, and storage systems into compliance with the applicable provisions of COMAR.” Id. at ¶ 9. Although the inventoiy was “in complete disarray” when Plaintiff assumed the position, she did not receive any additional training or instruction.^[2] Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.

While working as an Assistant Inventory Manager, Plaintiff discovered that she earned less than her white predecessor and white colleagues. Id. at ¶ 14. On October 29,2020, Plaintiff raised the pay discrepancy with human resources, claiming racial discrimination.^[3] Id. While Defendants never directly responded to Plaintiffs claims, they did lower “the white coworker’s wages [.]” Id. at ¶ 15. Mr. Blair later informed Plaintiff that her position was being eliminated “due to COVID-■ 19 economic downturns,” and offered her a “lateral move” to a “non-management position” with a pay decrease. Id. at ¶ 21. After Plaintiff accepted the offer, she sent Mr. Blair an email inquiring about the benefits of her new position. Id. at ¶ 22. In response, Mr. Blair informed Plaintiff that the offer of employment was rescinded “because of her unacceptable attitude,” and offered her a severance package in exchange for her agreeing to sign a “Mutual Release.”^[4] Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. Hours later, Plaintiff was informed by human resources that she was being terminated for “violations of overtime policy.” Id. at ¶ 25.

On November 18, 2020, Plaintiff received an email from Mr. Blair stating that her severance package had been “revoked due to misconduct found in the course of a routine audit[.]” Id. at ¶ 29. The following day, Mr. Blair reported to the Baltimore Police Department that . thousands of dollars of products were stollen from Blair Wellness between July 2020 and November 2020. Id. at ¶ 30. Although “(e]very single employee of Blair Wellness Center has received discounted and/or free promotional products,” Plaintiff and Blair Wellness’s “only other two Black managers” were criminally charged with the perpetration of a theft scheme. Id. at ¶¶ 30, 34. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ll of the transactions presented to the police as evidence of theft and/or theft scheme were witnessed by other employees, and several were witnessed by members of upper management” as discounted rates could only be applied by a non-purchasing employee of Blair Wellness. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. After criminal charges were filed, Mr. Blair authorized the circulation of a text message, email, and social media post informing staff •

members and customers that the three former employees had perpetrated a theft scheme.^[5] Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. The State commenced a criminal trial against Plaintiff on January 14, 2021, and, although subpoenaed, Mr. Blair did not appear to testify. Id. at ¶¶ 43,. 68. The charges were eventually dismissed nolle prosequi. Id. at ¶ 44.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in this Court on July 14, 2,022. ECF Nos. 1, 48. Defendants filed the present motion on July 28, 2022. ECF No. 51. Plaintiff responded in opposition on August 11,2022, and Defendants replied on August 25,2022. ECF Nos. 55, 57.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

1. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the Complaint, not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206,214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists when Plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is- liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. An inference of a “mere possibility of misconduct” is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When ■ considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true, but not legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. (citations omitted). When deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) courts may, in addition to the complaint and matters of public record, “consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem ’I. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176,180 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Episcopal Church in S.C. v. Church Ins. Co. of Vt., 997 F.3d 149,154 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e may consider authentic, extrinsic evidence that is integral to the complaint, as well as matters of public record.”).

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be . no genuine issue of material fact.” (emphasis in original)). An issue of fact is material if, under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the factual dispute could affect the outcome. Anderson, Ml U.S. at 248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. See Dulaney v. Packaging Corp, of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). On the other hand, if after the Court has drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and “the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, Ml U.S. at 24950 (citations omitted). .

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing either that no genuine issue of material fact exists or that a material fact essential to the non-movant’s claim is absent. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the onus is on the non-movant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In order to meet this burden, the non-movant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings,” but must instead “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

B. Conversion

Defendants have styled their motion as a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 51. A motion posed in the alternative implicates the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v Montgomery Cnty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436-37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). If a Court considers documents that are not integral to or incorporated in the complaint, Rule 12(d) provides that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion “must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). “The Court ‘has complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in ....