Jones v. Browning

ERIC DE'JUAN JONES PLAINTIFF v. RICHARD BROWNING, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-118-KS-MTP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI EASTERN DIVISION

January 17, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

For the reasons below, the Court rules as follows:

• The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss [18] filed by the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics;

• The Court grants the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [21] filed by Defendant Trisch Stafford;

• The Court grants the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [23] filed by the Jefferson Davis County Sheriff's Department;

• The Court grants the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [25] filed by the Lamar County Sheriff's Department;

• The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss filed by Brookhaven Newsmedia, LLC [41]; and

• The Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [44] filed by the Town of Prentiss, Mississippi, Joseph Bullock, and Richard Browning. The Court denies the motion as to Plaintiff's slander claim against Defendant Bullock individually, but the Court grants it in all other respects.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, alleges that law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on his home in July 2019 and seized his property. He also alleges that he was arrested, charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and incarcerated after the search. His pleading is a jumble of disconnected factual allegations and legal jargon, but he apparently contends that the law enforcement Defendants violated numerous constitutional rights in their execution of the search and arrest. He also claims that a nurse at the correctional facility violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. Finally, he asserted several claims against a local newspaper arising from its publication of allegedly defamatory statements about him. Several Defendants filed motions to dismiss and/or motions for judgment on the pleadings, which the Court now addresses.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are subject to the same standard of review. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). "To be plausible, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (punctuation omitted). The Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. But the Court will not accept as true "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Id.Likewise, "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics - Motion to Dismiss [18]

First, the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics ("MBN") argues that it enjoys sovereign immunity from liability against Plaintiff's claims against it under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This amendment protects states from being sued in federal court for damages. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2005). But the protection is not absolute. Id. First, states can waive their sovereign immunity. Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2005). Second, "Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the enforcement power conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

MBN is correct. Congress did not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit under §§ 1983 and 1985. Price v. Shorty, 632 F. App'x 211, 212 (5th Cir. 2016)(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979); Early v. S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. College Bd. of Supervisors, 252 F. App'x 698, 700 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Hines v. MDOC, 213 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Mississippi has not waived its sovereign immunity. See, e.g. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5(4); Moore v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 719 F. App'x 381, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2018). Therefore, the Court grants MBN's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 and § 1985 claims against it.

MBN also argues that Plaintiff's state-law claim of trespass is barred because he failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act's ("MTCA") notice requirement. The MTCA codified the common-law sovereign immunity of Mississippi and its political subdivisions, MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3(1), but it waived sovereign immunity "from claims for money damages arising out of torts of . . . governmental entities and the torts of their employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment . . . ." MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5(1). The waiver is subject to numerous conditions, exceptions, and limitations. For example, the statute provides that "any person having a claim under this chapter shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity, except that at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity." MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-11(1). The Mississippi Supreme Court "strictly applies the ninety-day notice requirement . . . ." Gorton v. Rance, 52 So. 3d 351, 358 (Miss. 2011). It "is a hard-edged, mandatory rule." Id.

It appears to be undisputed that Plaintiff did not provide notice to MBN as required by the MTCA. Therefore, his trespass claim against it is barred. The Court grants MBN's motion to dismiss the trespass claim.

B. Trisch Stafford - Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [21]

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Trisch Stafford, a nurse in the Stone County Jail, denied him adequate medical care, in violation of his constitutional rights. Stafford first argues that she enjoys qualified immunity from suit with respect to Plaintiff's constitutional claims against her in her individual capacity. When "a qualified immunity defense is asserted in an answer or a motion to dismiss, the district court must - as always - do no more than determine whether the plaintiff has filed a short and plain statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone." Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 500, 589-90 (5th Cir. 2016). This is not a heightened pleading standard, id. at 590, but the plaintiff must "plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity." Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2015). In that respect, it is no different than the typical 12(b)(6) standard of review under Iqbal.

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). "Although nominally a defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense once properly raised." Poole v. Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012). There are two steps in the Court's analysis. First, the Court determines whether the defendant's "conduct violates an actual constitutional right." Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). Second, the Court must "consider whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively unreasonable in the light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question." Id. The Court may address either step first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

"[S]tate officials have a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide involuntarily detained persons with 'basic human needs, including medical care.'" Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996)). "A pretrial detainee's right to medical care is violated if 'an officer acts with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious medical harm and resulting injuries.'" Brown v. Strain, 663 F.3d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2003)). Under this standard, the plaintiff must show that the official "acted with subjective deliberate indifference to [his] need for medical care." Id. "To show subjective deliberate indifference, [the plaintiff] must present evidence: (1) that [the defendant] had 'subjective knowledge of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn;' (2) that [the defendant] 'actually drew that inference;'and (3) that [defendant's] response to the risk indicates that he 'subjectively intended that harm to occur.'" Id. (quoting Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Among other things, Stafford argues that Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to state a constitutional violation because he did not allege facts demonstrating that she acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious medical harm. This is the only factual allegation in the Complaint that could...