Jones v. Copeland

GEORGE JONES, APPELLANT

v.ELLEN COPELAND, APPELLEE

NO. 07-11-00437-CV

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL A

AUGUST 16, 2012

FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY;

NO. 36,648; HONORABLE LEE WATERS, JUDGE

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, George Jones, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his suit filed against Ellen Copeland. Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his suit as frivolous. We will affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

Jones filed grievances against Copeland in association with his claims that Copeland, property officer at the Jordan Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, wrongfully confiscated some of Jones's personal property and mishandled his legal materials. He claimed that, by mishandling his legal materials, Copelanddestroyed the folders housing those materials and, consequently, "absolutely disrupted [Jones's] legal materials."

Jones had been transferred from the Segovia Unit and arrived at the Jordan Unit in May 2011, at which time he claims Copeland confiscated his property, including legal papers, pens, carbon paper, coffee, envelopes, and a padlock, that he had been stocking up on since 2008 in anticipation of his release. Apparently, twenty-two hours later, prison officials returned his legal materials, both the unbound papers and the accordion folders. He was displeased, however, with the condition of his returned materials and maintained that Copeland had damaged his storage folders and taken fourteen pieces of carbon paper. In connection with these complaints, he filed a grievance. Jones also sought the return of his non-legal property by way of I-60s, but, when he says he got no response to his several requests, he also filed a grievance in connection with the handling of his non-legal property.

In grievance no. 2011172110, Jones claimed that Copeland denied him his constitutional right of access to the courts by dumping his active legal papers into a property bag, causing damage to his storage folders and causing his papers to become disorganized. He also claimed that Copeland scanned through his legal materials. He sought replacement of his folders and fourteen pieces of carbon paper he also alleged were taken or destroyed in the process. In its response, the prison grievance system maintained that the accordion folders were already in "unusable condition" and that it is within prison system guidelines to inventory all inmate property upon arrival at a unit.Copeland denied having read Jones's legal materials and denied having confiscated or destroyed fourteen pieces of carbon paper.

In grievance no. 2011172103, Jones claimed that Copeland wrongfully confiscated non-legal property, including five pens, two and one-half bags of coffee, and a padlock for her own personal use. The response to this grievance concluded that the coffee and padlock were confiscated because ownership or legitimate possession of those items was in question. The response further noted that five pens were taken from Jones per TDCJ policy but further noted that Jones was left with two pens.

Jones then sought review of the prison system's grievance responses by way of his petition which he timely filed in the 223rd District Court of Gray County on September 1, 2011. Jones complains that, although prison officials did return his legal materials, the materials were not returned in the condition in which Copeland took them. He complains that papers relating to active legal matters were "in total disarray" and that, as a result, he had to spend "a vast amount of time attempting to reorganize his legal papers," time he would have otherwise spent preparing for his federal trial. He claims to never have received his remaining, non-legal property. He sought $3,000.00 in punitive damages from Copeland as a result of her mishandling of his legal materials. He appears to have sought the return of or compensation for his other, non-legal property.

The trial court dismissed Jones's suit as frivolous, concluding that Jones's claim had no arguable basis in law or in fact and that his realistic chances of ultimate success were slight. In his brief, Jones takes issue with the trial court's conclusions andcontends his claims relating to both legal materials and non-legal property are meritorious.

Dismissal under Chapter 14

Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to an inmate's suit in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs is filed by the inmate. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002 (West Supp. 2011). Among the several grounds on which a trial court may dismiss a suit subject to Chapter 14, either before or after service of process, is the finding that the inmate's suit is frivolous or malicious. See id. § 14.003(a)(2) (West 2002). In determining whether a claim is frivolous, the trial court may consider whether the following circumstances are present: (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b).

The trial court has broad discretion to dismiss an inmate's claim as frivolous. Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 736 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Generally, we review a trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit subject to Chapter 14 for an abuse of discretion. In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d 273, 293 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).

The trial court concluded that Jones's claims had no arguable basis in law or fact. However, when a trial court dismisses a claim without a hearing, as it did here, the issue on appeal is limited to whether the claim had no arguable basis in law. Moreland v.Johnson, 95 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). The issue of whether a claim has an arguable basis in law is a legal question that we review de novo. Id.; Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). To determine whether there is an arguable basis in law, we examine the types of relief and causes of action pleaded in the petition to determine whether the petition states a cause of action that would authorize relief. See Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 736. We review and evaluate pro se pleadings by standards less stringent than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (calling on courts to view pro se petition with "liberality and patience" and citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)). In reviewing the trial court's dismissal in this particular context, we must take as true the allegations in Jones's petition. See Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Courts may consider a claim as one having no arguable basis in law when either the legal theory on which the claim is based is indisputably meritless or the factual allegations on which it is based are wholly incredible or irrational. Nabelek v. Dist. Att'y of Harris Cnty., 290 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). An inmate's cause of action may not be dismissed, however, merely because the court considers the allegations "unlikely." Minix, 162 S.W.3d at 637.

With the applicable law and standards of review in mind, we turn to the two primary claims Jones presented to the trial court.

Access to Courts Claim

Taking as true Jones's allegations that Copeland mishandled his legal material so badly that he had to spend a good deal of time reorganizing and regrouping his legal materials, we must determine whether his petition stated a cause of action that could authorize relief. See Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 339. Jones specifically complains that Copeland's mishandling of his legal materials amounted to an intentional interference with his constitutional right of access to courts because he was forced to spend a good deal of time regrouping his materials after prison officials returned them to him. This time, he claims, would have otherwise been spent preparing for his upcoming federal trial.

An inmate has a constitutional right of access to courts. Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). To establish a denial of access to the courts, however, an inmate must demonstrate "actual injury" as a result of the alleged violative conduct. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1998); Brewer v. Simental, 268 S.W.3d 763, 771 n.2 (Tex.App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). That is, he must establish that "his position as a litigant was prejudiced by his denial of access to the courts." See McDonald, 132 F.3d at 230-31; see also Hamilton v. Pechacek, 319 S.W.3d 801, 815 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (concluding that inmate could not prevail on access-to-courts claim when he failed to allege how the claimed destruction of his legal documents impacted his position as litigant).

Even taking as true the factual allegations that Copeland's less than careful handling of Jones's folders caused his legal documents to be in disarray and that, consequently, Jones had to spend a great deal of time reorganizing the papers in preparation for federal trial, such an inconvenience or expenditure of time is not sufficient under the law to constitute a denial of access to courts. See Hamilton, 319 S.W.3d at 815; see also Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding inmate was not denied access to courts when "he submitted...