Jones v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 16-cv-85 (TSC)

177 F.Supp.3d 542

Vaughn Jones, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-cv-85 (TSC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed April 14, 2016

Yaida O. Ford, The Ford Law Firm, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Sarah L. Knapp, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN, United States District Judge

In the instant case, Plaintiffs Vaughn Jones and Antonio Pixley assert four causes of action against Defendants: (i) failure to afford due process; (ii) municipal liability; (iii) fraud and deceit; and (iv) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 138-82).¹

This case was removed to this court from the Superior Court for the District of Columbia in January 2016. Prior to removal, Superior Court Judge Geoffrey M. Alprin issued a temporary restraining order (the “TRO”), which Defendants now move to dissolve.² The TRO ordered that Plaintiffs be restored to their coaching positions at Coolidge and prohibited them from being removed from those positions until a full and fair investigation is conducted into the allegations against them. (See Mot. Ex. 1).

Upon consideration of the District's motion, Plaintiffs' opposition thereto, and the District's reply in support thereof, and for the reasons set forth below, the motion is hereby GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND

During the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiffs served as basketball coaches at Coolidge High School. Coaching was not their primary employment or source of income—Jones was employed as a teacher at a public charter school and Pixley was “employed full-time at Coolidge as a Behavioral Technician working with at-risk students.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18). Coaching positions within DCPS are “extra duty pay” assignments open to non-DCPS employees, with head coaches like Jones making an annual stipend of $4,500 and assistant coaches like Pixley making an annual stipend of $2,000. (See Mot. Ex. 2 ¶¶ 3-5).

Plaintiffs were removed from their coaching assignments in October 2015 after an investigation purportedly determined that they had told a Coolidge guidance counselor during the 2014-15 school year that a Coolidge basketball player was a rising junior “when [they] knew or should have known that” he was actually a rising senior. (Am. Compl. Ex. A). This alleged misrepresentation led the guidance counselor to incorrectly adjust the student-athlete's records, thereby improperly extending his eligibility to play basketball for another year. (See id. ).

Plaintiffs sued DCPS in Superior Court in December 2015, simultaneously filing a motion for a temporary restraining order. On December 29, 2015, after an in-chambers hearing, Judge Alprin issued the TRO, which ordered that Plaintiffs be restored to their coaching positions at Coolidge and prohibited them from being removed from those positions until a full and fair investigation is conducted into the allegations against them. (See Mot. Ex. 1).

Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint in Superior Court, substituting the District of Columbia for DCPS and adding four individual DCPS employees as defendants sued only in their official capacities. The District removed the case to this court on January 15, 2015 based on the federal question raised by Plaintiffs' due process claim. (See Notice of Removal). Plaintiffs have since amended their complaint again. (See generally Am. Compl.).

The District now moves for the dissolution of the Superior Court TRO.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When a case is removed to federal court, “[a]ll injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1450. Importantly, however, “federal rather than state law governs the future course of proceedings, notwithstanding state court orders issued prior to removal.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty. , 415 U.S. 423, 437, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974).

Under federal law, injunctive relief is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that is “never awarded as of right,” Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 689-90, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (quotation and citations omitted), and “that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Cobell v. Norton , 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citation omitted). A party's entitlement to injunctive relief depends upon his or her ability to demonstrate (i) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) that he or she would suffer irreparable injury absent the requested injunctive relief; (iii) that the balance of equities tips in his or her favor; and (iv) that the public interest would be furthered by the requested injunctive relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).

“The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm.” CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision , 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting Sampson v. Murray , 415 U.S. 61, 88, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974) ); see also Trudeau v. FTC , 384 F.Supp.2d 281, 296-97 (D.D.C. 2005), aff'd , 456 F.3d 178 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“A showing of irreparable harm is the sine qua non of the preliminary injunction inquiry.”) (citing Experience Works, Inc. v. Chao , 267 F.Supp.2d 93, 96 (D.D.C.2003) ). Accordingly, the “failure to show any irreparable harm is ... grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C.Cir.2006) ; see also Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 105 F.Supp.3d 108, 112 (D.D.C.2015) (“the movant must always show irreparable harm or injury, and if a party makes no showing of irreparable injury, the court may deny the motion for injunctive relief without considering the other factors”) (citing CityFed , 58 F.3d at 747 ).

The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury.” Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297. “[T]he injury ‘must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.’ ” Id. (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.Cir.1985) (per curiam)). The injury must also be “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the injury must be “beyond remediation,” Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297, as it is “well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has made clear that

[t]he key word in this consideration is irreparable . Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.

Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297–98 (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674 ) (emphasis in original).

III. ANALYSIS

The District argues that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because they allege only loss of employment and reputational injuries, which are “clearly redressable through corrective means after trial and thus [are] not irreparable as a matter of law.” (See Mot. at 7-9).

Plaintiffs acknowledge “that economic loss alone does not give rise to irreparable harm.” (Opp'n at 10) (citing Davis v. Billington , 76 F.Supp.3d 59, 65 (D.D.C.2014) ). They point out, however, that there may be situations “where ‘the circumstances surrounding an employee's discharge, together with the resultant effect on the employee, may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable injury might be found,’ ” though these “ ‘extraordinary cases are hard to define in advance of their occurrence.’ ” Davis , 76 F.Supp.3d at 65 (quoting Sampson , 415 U.S. at 92 n. 68, 94 S.Ct. 937 ). They also point out that economic loss can “rise to the level of irreparable harm when it threatens the movant's business” (Opp'n at 10) (citing Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674 ), and that “ ‘[r]eputational injury can be used to establish irreparable harm in certain circumstances.’ ” (Opp'n 10) (quoting Trudeau , 384 F.Supp.2d at 297 ).

More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the “decision to dismiss [them] goes far beyond them losing a job,” as they are “banned ... from pursuing coaching opportunities at other DCPS high schools,” as well. (Opp'n at 10). Plaintiffs further assert that, after his initial removal from his coaching position, Jones was questioned by his employer about the allegations against him, various colleges and universities stopped communicating with him regarding scholarship opportunities for certain Coolidge players, several Coolidge players and assistant coaches protested his removal, and he “began having migraine headaches, pains in his left arm, chest pains and sleeplessness,” leading his wife and son to move out of the family home “because of the impact [his removal] was having on him.” (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiffs also claim that Pixley's future coaching prospects were harmed, that he suffered “significant distress,” and that he “resigned from his position as a behavior tech at Coolidge and now works part time at a hotel.” (Id. at 11-12).³

The District responds by arguing that Plaintiffs' opposition brief fails to show that any harm to them will be irreparable.

(See Reply at 2).⁴ It also notes that the three main cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their irreparable injury argument—Davis, Wisconsin Gas Company and Trudeau —are all...