Jones v. Erie Cnty. Court of Common Pleas

JAMIL JONES, Petitioner v. ERIE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, WARDEN OF THE ERIE COUNTY PRISON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ERIE COUNTY, Respondents

No. 1:19-cv-203

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

August 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]

RICHARD A. LANZILLO United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jamil Jones pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied.^[1]

I. Background

Jones is currently serving a sentence of two and one-half to six years' imprisonment imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County following his conviction, at a jury trial, of a violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 firearms not to be carried without a license. His direct appeal concluded when the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v Jones, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2335; 174 A.3d 80 (Pa. Super. 2017). He subsequently filed a petition for relief pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA petition was dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Jones, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3185; 195 A.3d 1041 (Pa. Super. 2018). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on February 26, 2019. Commonwealth v Jones, 203 A.3d 207 (Pa. 2019).

Jones filed this timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus on or about July 16, 2019. ECF No. 1. Respondents filed a response to the petition on October 11, 2019. ECF No. 4. The petition is ripe for disposition.

II. Analysis

A. Grounds One/Four: Ineffectiveness for failure to raise sufficiency of the evidence^[2]

Jones first argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. ECF No. 1 at 5. Jones raised this claim in his PCRA petition in the context of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to raise the sufficiency claim on direct appeal. The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed this claim as follows:

A prior panel of this Court summarized the pertinent facts:

During her shift on July 5, 2015, Officer [Cheryl] Frey saw [Jones], two other adults and a small child crossing the street on foot. [Jones] was wearing a red vest. Officer Frey recognized [Jones's] face but could not recall his name. She thought his name might be Laquan Martin. During the roll call prior to her shift, the names of [Jones] and Laquan Martin were listed as having active warrants. Officer Frey got out of her vehicle and asked [Jones] for his identification. [Jones] asked Officer Frey why she was stopping him, and Officer Frey responded that she believed there was a warrant for his arrest. [Jones] took off his vest and handed it to a friend before giving Officer Frey his identification. After confirming through dispatch that there was a warrant, Officer Frey handcuffed [Jones] and retrieved [his] vest from his friend, who still had the vest over his arm.

While Officer Frey was walking [Jones] back to the vehicle, [Jones] asked Officer Frey why she took the vest, claiming it belonged to his friend. Officer Frey told him she was suspicious of why he would hand it to his friend when all she wanted was his identification. [Jones] then told Officer Frey there was a firearm in the vest. According to Officer Frey, she did not ask [Jones] any questions to prompt this statement. Officer Frey placed [Jones] in the back of her vehicle and laid the vest on the ground. When back-up officers arrived, they retrieved a .380 automatic Ruger from the vest and unloaded it.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 174 A.3d 80, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2335 (Pa. Super. 2017), unpublished memorandum, at 1-2 (record citations omitted). ...

[Jones] claims trial counsel was ineffective, pursuant to § 9543(a)(2)(ii) of the PCRA, for failing to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence during trial and on direct appeal. Appellant's Brief at 2. “On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, an appellate court's standard of review is whether the ruling of the PCRA court is free of legal error and supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 2007 PA Super 255, 932 A.2d 179, 181 (Pa. Super. 2007). To establish that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must plead and prove that (1) the underlying issue is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for the action or inaction; and (3) counsel's error prejudiced the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352 (Pa. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996). Failure to establish all three prongs results in failure of the claim. Id.

[Jones] argues that trial counsel should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence because the Commonwealth's case rested entirely on the testimony of Officer Frey, and no other evidence confirmed his possession of a concealed firearm. As noted above, Officer Frey testified that she observed [Jones] wearing a vest; that [Jones] removed the vest and handed it to his friend; and that back-up officers retrieved a firearm from inside the vest after Officer Frey retrieved it from [Jones's] friend. Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, and the court cannot reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Commonwealth v. Kane, 2010 PA Super 218, 10 A.3d 327, 332 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 689, 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011). Given the strictures governing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the reviewing court would not have been free to discredit Officer Frey's testimony or reweigh it in light of any other relevant evidence. Because Officer Frey's testimony was more than sufficient to establish that [Jones] was in possession of a concealed firearm, any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was doomed to failure. We reject [Jones's] assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel because the underlying issue lacks arguable merit.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3185, at *1-2, 3-5 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Because the state court reviewed this claim and rejected it on its merits, the following standard is applicable:

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996, if a state court rejects a claimed federal violation on the merits, to obtain habeas relief a petitioner must show that the ruling:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d). See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009).

An unreasonable application of federal law focuses on whether the state court unreasonably applied relevant Supreme Court holdings. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419-20, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014). A petitioner must show an error so egregious “that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). An unreasonable determination of the facts is one where the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), that the conclusion drawn from the evidence by the state court is so improbable that it “blinks reality.” See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005); This is a high bar to clear: as long as reasonable minds might disagree about the correctness of a factual determination, a federal habeas court must defer to the state court's determination. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006).

Allen v. Kerestes, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193970, at *2-4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2019).

Jones offers no challenge at all to the Superior Court's ruling. He asserts only:

The arresting officer never seen me possess any firearm. Furthermore it was never secured from my person. The firearm was retrieved after she removed an item from another person. The Commonwealth offered no physical evidence such as fingerprints/DNA but only the cop testimony.

ECF No. 1 at 5.

This argument was rejected by the Superior Court as meritless. Because Jones has failed to show why this Court should not defer to that ruling, he has failed to meet his burden and cannot receive habeas relief on this claim. It will be dismissed.

B. Ground Two: Illegal search and seizure

Jones next argues that he was subject to illegal search and seizure. Specifically, he asserts:

Cop stopped me thinking I was another person. She claimed I was Laquan Martin. Told her I wasn't and she didn't let me leave. There was no criminal activity afoot. She testified to thinking I was one of two ppl., but she stated only one name.

ECF No. 1 at 7.

Jones raised this issue in his direct appeal. The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed it as follows:

On appeal, [Jones] argues that Officer Frey lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because s

...