Jones v. Georgetown Coll.

1

WILLIAM A. JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GEORGETOWN COLLEGE, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-00058-GFVT-EBA

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Frankfort

March 28, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [R. 24.] Plaintiffs seek a judgment against Defendants for defamation, invasion of privacy intentional infliction of emotional distress, vicarious liability, breach of contract, Title IX violations, and various federal and state constitutional violations. [R. 1-3 at 46-79.] In response, Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Court should dismiss some of the claims and parties as they do not state a proper claim for relief. [R. 24 at 3.] Having reviewed the pleadings, the Court will GRANT Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

I

Mr William A. Jones was the President of Georgetown College for roughly two years. While President, Mr. Jones was accused of sexual assault by a former colleague in 2021. Mr. Jones was then terminated for cause as President of Georgetown College on November 1, 2021. He now seeks damages for “reputational, mental, emotional, and professional damage caused.” [R. 1-3 at 9.]

As the President of Georgetown College, Mr. Jones frequently attended events with colleagues on behalf of the College. On October 18, 2021, Mr. Jones and Hannah Kroskie, a former employee at Georgetown College, traveled to Indianapolis, Indiana to attend a black-tie fundraiser on behalf of the College. Following the trip, Ms. Kroskie filed a report of sexual assault against Mr. Jones with the Indianapolis Police Department. Ms. Kroskie's claims were later dismissed, and Mr. Jones was cleared of all charges. [R. 1-1 at 103.] In addition, Christy Mai, another former employee at Georgetown College, also accused Mr. Jones of sexual assault. The Complaint contends, however, that Mr. Jones' relationship with Ms. Mai was consensual. [R. 1-1 at 54.] Nonetheless, the allegations of sexual assault prompted an emergency meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees, who voted to terminate Mr. Jones' employment contract with Georgetown College. This vote was later affirmed by the full Board of Trustees, and Mr. Jones was terminated on November 1, 2021.

As a result of his termination, Mr. Jones was prohibited from contacting any Board member, faculty, student, or staff at the College. Mr. Jones was also prohibited from entering the College's campus and was asked to immediately vacate the President's home. On November 2, 2021, the College's Acting President, Rosemary Allen, released a statement detailing the events leading to Mr. Jones' termination. [R. 1-3 at 37.]

In addition to Mr. Jones, Mr. Jones' family is also seeking recovery for the damage inflicted on them as a result of Mr. Jones' termination. After Mr. Jones' termination, Mrs. Jones was made an outcast in her community. [R. 1-3 at 9.] The Complaint alleges that Mrs. Jones cannot attend events or worship without fear of retribution. Id. Further, Mr. Jones' daughter, Annalise, who currently attends Georgetown College, was allegedly harassed following her father's termination. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that some members of the Kappa Alpha Order fraternity planned to “gang rape her on the Civil War era cannon located in front of their campus ‘house.'” [R. 1-3 at 9.] Georgetown College issued No Contact Orders on Annalise Jones, ordering her to not have any contact with the fraternity members involved. Id. at 9-10. The College also suspended the fraternity for four years. Id. Mr. Jones' other five children are also included in the complaint, noting that they have all been “scarred and damaged by the physical and emotional trauma inflicted upon their father and by extension their siblings and themselves.” [R. 1-3 at 10.]

Thus, Mr. Jones and his family initiated this lawsuit in Franklin Circuit Court on September 30, 2022, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The Defendants then removed this action on October 19, 2022, to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. [R. 1 at 8.] The Defendants have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing various claims and parties should be dismissed as they do not properly state a claim for relief. [R. 24 at 3.] The matter, having been fully briefed, is now ripe for review.

II

“After the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “The standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Zeigler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001)). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, courts can examine “public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss, as long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are central to the claims contained therein” without transforming a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).

As is the case with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), in a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The Court, however, “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court explained that in order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A

The Court will first address counts with federal claims. Plaintiffs bring Count Eleven under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil action for deprivation of rights. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants deprived Plaintiff Annalise Jones “of her guaranteed First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.” [R. 1-3 at 69.] Georgetown College argues, however, that the College is not a state actor, such that the Defendants cannot be sued under the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court noted that determining whether an organization is a state actor is a “necessarily fact-bound inquiry.” Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (1982).

There are three tests for state action. Brentwood Academy held that courts may attribute state action to a nominally private actor's activity that “results from the State's exercise of ‘coercive power,' when the State provides ‘significant encouragement, either overt or covert,' or when a private actor operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'” Id. at 296. In Faparusi v. Case Western Reserve University, the Sixth Circuit explained that a plaintiff cannot adequately claim that a university is a state actor based solely on the fact that the university investigated the plaintiff pursuant to Title IX. 711 Fed.Appx. 269, 275 (6th Cir. 2017). The risk of losing federal funding is also insufficient to support state action. Id. (citing Doe v. Case W. Rsrv. Univ., No. 1:17-cv-414, 2017 WL 3840418, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017)). Without “evidence that ‘the federal government participated in the proceedings against the plaintiff, or dictated the specific finding of responsibility in th[e] case,'” then a private university's conduct is not state action. Id. (quoting Case W. Rsrv. Univ., 2017 WL 3840418, at *9). The case law, both within and outside the Sixth Circuit, highlights that private colleges are not transformed into state actors while conducting Title IX investigations. See, e.g., Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2020); Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 952 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff Annalise Jones' allegation neither satisfies any of the state-actor tests nor overcomes the persuasive case law of our sister circuits. The Plaintiffs assert that a “private college is acting as a state actor when it is performing Title IX review” because “federal funds are specifically tied to the proper execution of Title IX.” [R. 25 at 4.] However, as noted above, federal funding is not enough to make a private action subject to the state action doctrine. The Plaintiffs further contend that the “42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim rests squarely on the failure of Georgetown College to adhere to Title IX and their disparaging treatment” of Annalise Jones as a result. Id. at 5. Again, as discussed above, the College is not considered a state actor solely because of a Title IX investigation. As such, there is not enough evidence alleged in Count Eleven to make out a plausible Title IX claim against the Defendants. Count Eleven must be dismissed against the Defendants because they are not considered state actors.

B

Further in Count Fourteen of the...