Jones v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Sys., Inc.

86 F.4th 1010

Brenda JONES, as Co-Administrator of the Estate of John David Hortman,Jill Hortman Morris, as Co-Administrator of the Estate of John David Hortman, Plaintiffs-Appellants,Adalia Lee Redd, Individually and Co-Administrator for the Estate of Steven Burton Redd,Dezaray Redd, Individually, Jazlyn Redd, Individually and Co-Administrator for the Estate of Steven Burton Redd,Trystyn Redd, Individually, Consolidated-Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GOODRICH PUMP & ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC., Rolls-Royce Corp., Consolidated-Defendants-Appellees,L-3 Communications Corporation, L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., Consolidated-Defendants,Goodrich Corporation, Rolls-Royce North America, Inc., MD Helicopters, Inc.,L3 Communications Integrated Systems, LP, Allison Engine Company, Inc., Boeing Co., Defendants.

No. 20-2951

August Term, 2021

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Argued February 23, 2022

Decided November 21, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, No. 12-cv-1297 (Eginton, J.)

Tejinder Singh, Goldstein & Russel, P.C., Bethesda, Maryland (Ronald L.M. Goldman, Timothy A. Loranger, Crawford Appleby, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, PC, Los Angeles, California, Arthur Alan Wolk, The Wolk Law Firm, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, John J. Gagliano, Gagliano Law Offices, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John W. Cerreta (James H. Rotondo, Andraya P. Brunau, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, Connecticut, Thomas R. Pantino, Fitzpatrick & Hunt, Pagano Aubert, LLP, New York, New York, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc.

J. Denny Shupe (Robert J. Williams, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Steven E. Arnold, SA Law, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Rolls-Royce Corporation.

Jeffrey R. White, American Association for Justice, Washington, D.C.; Justin T. Green, Anthony Tarricone, Joseph P. Musacchio, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, New York, NY, for American Association for Justice, amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Allison M. Zieve, Adina H. Rosenbaum, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington D.C., for Public Citizen, amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jonathan M. Hoffman, MB Law Group LLP, Portland, OR, for Product Liability Advisory Council, amicus curiae in support of Defendants-Appellees.

Lauren L. Haertlein, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Inc., Washington, D.C., for General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Inc., and National Association of Manufacturers, amici curiae in support of Defendants-Appellees.

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Mark B. Stern, Lindsey Powell, Ben Lewis, Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the United States, amicus curiae in support of neither party.

Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, KEARSE and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Eunice C. Lee, Circuit Judge:

After two United States Army pilots tragically perished in a helicopter crash, their surviving family members sued various companies responsible for the making of the helicopter. The family members alleged that manufacturing and/or defective operating instructions and warnings caused the pilots' deaths. The companies countered that the family members' asserted state law claims were barred by a number of preemption doctrines.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies, finding that there was implied field preemption under the Federal Aviation Act (the "FAAct" or "Act"). The district court held that the family members' claims were preempted under this Court's case law stating that Congress intended for the FAAct "to occupy the entire field of aviation safety," Jones v. Goodrich Corp., 422 F. Supp. 3d 518, 521, 525-26 (D. Conn. 2019) (Eginton, J.) (citing Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm'n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2011)). Although the family members argued that the FAAct could not preempt their claims because the Act applies only to civil aircraft—and the helicopter that crashed here was a military aircraft—the district court rejected that argument, reasoning that, even though the FAAct "exempt[s] government military aircraft from [FAAct] standards," this "does not constrain the clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety." Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525.

We disagree. Field preemption is always a matter of congressional intent, and we think Congress's removal of military aircraft from the FAAct's reach indicates that it did not wish to include them in the FAAct's preempted field. Rather, Congress intended for the Department of Defense ("DoD") to have autonomy over their own aircraft. While it is possible that the family members' claims may be barred by the military contractor defense, another preemption doctrine, see generally Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988)—this determination requires a fact-intensive analysis to be handled by the district court in the first instance. Finally, aside from any issues of preemption by the military contractor defense, the family members offered sufficient evidence under Georgia law for their strict liability manufacturing defect claim to survive summary judgment.

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 8, 2011, United States Army Captain John David Hortman and Chief Warrant Officer Steven Redd were piloting a military helicopter in connection with a training exercise at Fort Benning, Georgia. The helicopter crashed, killing them both.

Approximately 36 seconds before the crash, the helicopter's Full Authority Digital Electronic Control ("FADEC"),¹ the engine module that controls the flow of fuel to the engine, detected an anomaly that caused it to disable its normal mode of automatic operation. Instead, the FADEC entered fixed mode, in which it provides the engine with fuel at the same rate it had at the moment it left automatic mode.

For a pilot, a FADEC entering fixed mode signals an emergency. In response, the pilot must switch the FADEC out of fixed mode into its manual mode, which requires properly timing when to make the switch, waiting for the FADEC to switch over, and then piloting the helicopter while using a lever mechanism to regulate the flow of fuel. Unfortunately, Captain Hortman and Chief Redd were unable to regain control of the helicopter in time.

Plaintiffs-Appellants ("Appellants"), surviving family members of Captain Hortman and Chief Redd, sued the engine manufacturers—Rolls-Royce Corporation ("Rolls-Royce") and Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc. ("Goodrich")—collectively, Consolidated Defendants-Appellees ("Appellees"), among other defendants not party to this appeal, because the FADEC at issue was developed by Goodrich in collaboration with Rolls-Royce.

Appellants allege that the fatal helicopter crash resulted from defects in the FADEC's design and manufacture. First, they contend that one of the FADEC's components, its potentiometer, failed in a manner indicating that it was defectively manufactured, and that, once the potentiometer failed, no pilots could have recovered the helicopter to avert the crash at issue in this case. Second, Appellants argue that the engine's maintenance manual was defectively designed because it failed to identify the potentiometer as a part to be investigated when the FADEC enters fixed mode. Indeed, two weeks prior to the crash that killed Captain Hortman and Chief Redd, the same helicopter had a FADEC issue, but Army engineers did not check the potentiometer because they followed the manual's troubleshooting steps. As a result, the helicopter was put back into service.

Contesting Appellants' theories of liability, Rolls-Royce and Goodrich argued, in relevant part, that the helicopter engine in question—including its FADEC—was manufactured and designed to meet specifications the Army required in a contract. Among other things, the Army contract required Rolls-Royce to obtain a type certification from the Federal Aviation Administration (the "FAA") for the helicopter's engine. "[T]ype certification" is "[t]he first stage of the FAA compliance review" that a manufacturer must complete "before marketing" certain types of aircraft and aircraft parts. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 805, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). The FAA is to "issue a type certificate" once it finds that the aircraft or aircraft part "is properly designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and minimum standards prescribed under" other parts of the FAAct and its implementing regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1); see also 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (discussing type certification requirements). And, under the Army contract, the helicopter's engine maintenance manual also had to be provided to the FAA for certification.

After the parties completed summary judgment briefing, the district court sua sponte requested briefing on whether this Court's cases on FAAct implied field preemption applied to Appellants' claims. The district court subsequently held that Appellants' claims were preempted because "[t]he Second Circuit has found clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety." Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 521 (citing Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm'n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2011)). The court reasoned that, because Goodrich and Rolls-Royce had obtained the "type certificate," this meant that the engine "met federal certification standards," and thus that using state tort "law rules for aircraft components would interfere with the uniform requirements established by the federal government." Id. at 523-24. In reaching its holding, ...