Jones v. HCA

16 F.Supp.3d 622

Barry F. JONES, Plaintiff

v.HCA (HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA), Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:13cv714.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Signed April 21, 2014.

Barry F. Jones, Henrico, VA, pro se.

Susan Childers North, Leclair Ryan PC, Williamsburg, VA, Naomh Maire Hudson, Leclair Ryan PC, Richmond, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT E. PAYNE, Senior District Judge.

The matter comes before the Court on the MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 6) filed by Parallon Enterprises, LLC (misnamed in the Complaint as HCA). The defendant also challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over Jones' Title VII and ADA retaliation claims, though the motion does not make the challenge under Rule 12(b)(1). The plaintiff's Complaint appears to allege: (1) a violation of the Equal Pay Act, 42 U.S.C. § 206 ; (2) a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 ; (3) failure to accommodate and wrongful discharge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 ; (4) retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) ; (5) retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 ; and (6) a Bowman action for wrongful discharge under Virginia common law. For the reasons set forth below, the allegations of the Complaint are insufficient to state a claim. Therefore, the MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 6) will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Barry Jones began working as a pharmacist at the Central Order Entry Pharmacy (“the Pharmacy”) on June 15, 2009. Hospital Corporation of America (“HCA”) and Parallon Business Solutions (“PBS”) are named as the defendants. An entity named Parallon Enterprises, LLC (“Parallon”) filed an Answer to the Complaint and asserted therein that HCA and PBS were erroneously named as defendants. It appears, however, that Parallon is the correct defendant and that it, through HCA, owns the Pharmacy.

Jones recites that he accepted employment at the Pharmacy pursuant to an offer letter, which contained the terms of compensation. Specifically, the Pharmacy offered Jones a “biweekly salary equivalent to the same or similar pay as any Pharmacist under the Equal Pay Act.” (Complaint at 2, ll.3–5.) Jones' salary was based on 70 hours of work over each bi-weekly period.

After “several months” on the job, Jones began to suspect that his salary was not equal to other similarly situated pharmacists, and he questioned a co-worker, a white male, on this point. After learning that his co-worker earned a salary equivalent to 80 hours of work over each bi-weekly period (70 work hours), while Jones was paid for only 70 hours, Jones brought the apparent discrepancy to his manager's attention. (Id. at 2, ll.9–12.) The manager, Kirk Frey, explained that the difference could be attributed to the different methods of calculating salary.

Jones avers that he subsequently began to receive “excessive negative performance reviews.” (Id. at 2, l.17.) In addition, he alleges that the Pharmacy began refusing to accept, as non-productive, hours that he logged, assigning tasks that he could not credit towards his production quotas, refusing his requests to work from home, and threatening termination. Jones indicates that performance reviews were closely connected to meeting production quotas. (Id. at 2, ll.7, 17–20.)

According to the Complaint, Jones continued to complain, and as he complained, the “negativity escalated to harassment.” (Id. at 2, ll.20–21.) He received pamphlets containing information about sexually transmitted diseases and a rendering of himself as a gorilla. (Id. at 2, ll.21–23.) He alleges that the work environment became highly stressful and led to depression, shortness of breath, insomnia, an inability to focus, and anxiety.

In March 2012, Jones requested medical leave under the Federal Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), but he was initially denied leave and benefits. (Id. at 3, ll.8–9.) After submitting additional paperwork, he was permitted temporary unpaid leave. Around this time, Jones discovered that medications prescribed for his depression and anxiety had triggered the recurrence of a pre-existing metabolic condition first diagnosed during his military service. (Id. at 3, ll.13–18.)

Jones discussed these matters with Franka Bowman (an employee in the Human Resources Department), Mary Scott–Garrett (his new manager), and Noel Hodges (the Division Supervisor), but these discussions did not satisfy his concerns. On June 13, 2012, Jones filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which alleged that the Pharmacy, its management, and its staff had created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.

At some point thereafter, Jones returned to work. In October 2012, he again met with Bowman, Scott–Garrett, and Hodges, who told Jones that he would be held to his production quotas. On October 24, 2012, he requested an opportunity to work from home, which was apparently granted. (Id. at 3, l.20 & 4, ll.7–9.) During this time, he continued to receive “negative” emails regarding his performance, which he believed were retaliatory. He complained about the emails to his team leader, Renee Bauserman. Thereafter, Bowman, Scott–Garrett, and Hodges called Jones into another meeting, during which, Hodges directed Jones to report to the jobsite and stop working from home. (Id. at 4, ll.2–9.) Jones states that, at some point, he began working “off the clock” to meet his quotas, but Scott–Garrett informed him that he could not do so. On February 28, 2013, the Pharmacy terminated Jones' employment for working off the clock in violation of company policy. (Id. at 4, ll.9–22.)

On April 1, 2013, Jones filed a second EEOC charge alleging that he had been subject to retaliation for filing the initial EEOC charge and complaining about what he perceived to be retaliatory behavior.

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir.2009). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's complaint “must provide enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A court “will accept the pleader's description of what happened to him or her along with any conclusions that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.” 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.1998). However, a court need not accept conclusory allegations encompassing the legal effect of the pleaded facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1994) (“[W]e are not so bound by the plaintiff's legal conclusions, since the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”).

When evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, courts first reject conclusory allegations that amount to a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, courts conduct a “context-specific” analysis to determine whether the plaintiff's allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Finally, courts hold pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ).

1. Count I: Alleged Violation of the Equal Pay Act

The Complaint fails to allege that Jones received less pay because of his sex as required to state a claim under the federal Equal Pay Act. The Act prohibits an employer from discriminating “between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which [it] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

The Complaint only alleges that Jones believed that his white, male co-worker was paid a higher salary even though he and Jones held the same positions. Although the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, “[t]he Court is not required to ‘conjure up questions never squarely presented’ in the complaint.” Brice v. Jenkins, 489 F.Supp.2d 538, 541 (E.D.Va.2007) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.1985) ). Therefore, the Court must dismiss this Count as a matter of law. See Houck v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 10 F.3d 204, 206 (4th Cir.1993).

2. Count II: Alleged Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Title VII

Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employments' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment ... in employment, which includes requires people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citations omitted).

To state a claim under Title VII for a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) [he] experienced...