Jones v. Helms

RONALD L. JONES v. LOUISE HELMS ET AL.

No. W2019-00864-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 1, 2020

November 19, 2020

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Gibson County

No. 8861

Clayburn Peeples, Judge

In this case, a sister contests the sale of her deceased brother's interest in real estate they inherited from their mother to satisfy an outstanding judgment lien against the brother. Because the sister waives her right to appellate review of most of her arguments and we discern no error in the circuit court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the circuit court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Louise A. Helms, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Pro se.

Donnie Wayne Knott, Milan, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ronald L. Jones.

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2009, the General Sessions Court of Gibson County (the "generalsessions court") granted a judgment to Plaintiff/Appellee Ronald L. Jones ("Appellee") against David Alderdice d/b/a Whitewing Company in the amount of approximately $5,941 (the "2009 judgment").² Appellee recorded the judgment in the Register's Office for Weakley County on July 9, 2009. Mr. Alderdice died intestate on May 19, 2013, in Weakley County in his family home (the "Weakley County property"). In 2016, the general sessions court issued an execution to the Sheriff of Weakley County to levy on Mr. Alderdice's personal property in Weakley County, which was returned nulla bona. On June 3, 2016, Appellee filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Gibson County (the "circuit court") for an order of sale of the real property in which Mr. Alderdice had an interest at his death, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.07, in order to satisfy the 2009 judgment (plus interest, attorney's fees, and court costs). Appellee asserted that Mr. Alderdice owned a one-third undivided interest in the Weakley County property, having inherited it along with his two sisters when their mother died intestate in 1994. Appellee further claimed that Mr. Alderdice's only heirs-at-law were his sisters, as evidenced by an affidavit of heirship executed by one of his sisters, Defendant/Appellant Louise Helms ("Appellant").³ Thus, Appellee alleged that the sisters inherited Mr. Alderdice's one-third interest in the Weakley County property when he died, subject to the encumbrance of Appellee's judgment lien. Therefore, Appellee named Mr. Alderdice's estate⁴ and Mr. Alderdice's two sisters, Appellant and Defendant Alice Marie Fowler, as defendants (collectively, "Defendants") in the petition for order of sale.⁵ Appellant and Ms. Fowler were served individually, and any potential unknown heirs, including Mr. Alderdice's possible estate, were served by publication.

When Appellee did not receive a response within thirty days of service, he filed a motion for default judgment in the circuit court on August 15, 2017. According to a later order entered by the trial court, Appellant made a special appearance in the circuit court on November 6, 2017, when Appellee's motion for default judgment and petition for order of sale were scheduled to be heard, to contest the circuit court's jurisdiction to order the sale of the Weakley County property. The matter was reset for a hearing on July 2, 2018, whenAppellee also filed a motion to affirm the judgment of the general sessions court against Mr. Alderdice and revive the judgment lien against Appellant and Ms. Fowler. The circuit court entered an order of sale on July 24, 2018, finding, "[b]ased on statements by [Appellant and Appellee] and on evidence produced in open Court and upon the record," that: (1) it had jurisdiction to order the sale of the Weakley County property; (2) the general sessions court had jurisdiction to issue the 2009 judgment, which was recorded in Weakley County and became a perfected lien against all of Mr. Alderdice's interests or ownership in real property; (3) Mr. Alderdice owned a one-third undivided interest in the Weakley County property, per the affidavit of heirship; (4) the Sheriff of Weakley County had returned the general sessions court's execution to levy on Mr. Alderdice's personal property nulla bona; and (5) Appellee's petition for order of sale was on file in the circuit court longer than thirty days following service on Defendants and Defendants had not filed responsive pleadings. The circuit court entered default judgment for Appellee and affirmed the general sessions' court's 2009 judgment, giving it full faith and credit and reviving it against Appellant and Ms. Fowler (the current owners of the Weakley County property and Mr. Alderdice's only heirs at law). The circuit court ordered the Sheriff of Weakley County to levy on the Weakley County property and sell Mr. Alderdice's one-third interest pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.⁶

The sheriff sold Mr. Alderdice's interest in the Weakley County property pursuant to the circuit court's order to Appellee for $3,750.00, the highest bid. The sheriff then filed a motion to confirm the sale, and Appellee filed a motion for disbursement of the sale proceeds. These motions were heard in the circuit court on April 22, 2019. The circuit court entered an order on April 30, 2019, confirming the sale of Mr. Alderdice's interest in the Weakley County property, from which Appellant timely appealed to this Court. The circuit court then ordered that the $3,750.00 in sale proceeds be held pending the decision of this Court. The parties filed competing statements of the evidence, so the circuit court held a hearing on April 13, 2020, to reconcile the differences. The court ultimately adopted Appellee's statement of the evidence, after giving Appellant a chance to review and dispute it but not hearing from her for several months.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Appellant's brief does not clearly designate issues on appeal. From what we candiscern, she raises the following issues.

1. Whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction⁷ to order the sale of the Weakley County property in order to satisfy the 2009 judgment.

2. Whether the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

3. Whether the circuit court violated Appellant's due process rights by disregarding or misinterpreting the documentary evidence she offered, including in arguing that Mr. Alderdice did not own any interest in the Weakley County property, and therefore judgment for Appellee was in error.

4. Whether the circuit court and Appellee erred by citing no law to dispute Appellant's evidence and cited law.

5. Whether Appellant was entitled to a trial.

We address each of these in turn.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, we note that although Appellant is a licensed attorney in Oklahoma, she is not licensed to practice law in Tennessee. As such, she is, in a fashion, a pro se litigant in this Court. The law is well-settled in Tennessee, however, that pro se litigants must comply with the same standards to which lawyers must adhere. Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As explained by this Court:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's adversary. Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted)). Moreover, "we have ruled that this leeway is generally reserved for those 'untrained in the law.'" Masserano v. Masserano, No. W2018-01592-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2207476, at *5 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2019 (quoting Lacy v. Mitchell, 541 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d at 903). Appellant, though self-represented, is certainly not untrained in the law. We keep this in mind in adjudicating this appeal.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Appellant first argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the sale of the subject property. Appellee has the burden of proving the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 146, 161 (Tenn. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tenn. 2013) (citations omitted) ("Where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the party asserting that subject matter jurisdiction exists . . . has the burden of proof."). "Any order entered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, which may be raised at any time in any court." Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d at 844 (citations omitted). Subject matter jurisdiction therefore cannot be waived. Meighan, 924 S.W.2d at 639. Because "determination[s] of subject matter jurisdiction involve[e] questions of law," we review them de novo on appeal, with no presumption of correctness. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d at 844 (citations omitted). In this case, neither party's arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction are clear; because our review is de novo and so as not to tax the length of this opinion, we will not recite their arguments in detail here.

Rule 69.07 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure guides the subject matter jurisdiction analysis in this case.⁸ Rule 69.07 states, in relevant part:

(2) Judgment Lien. A judgment lien

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