Jones v. Jackson

1

Anthony Jones, Petitioner, v. S. Jackson, Warden, Respondent.

C. A. No. 5:23-4879-TMC-KDW

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

June 17, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge

Anthony Jones (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC, for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's Return and Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 18, 19. On December 27, 2023 pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the Summary Judgment Motion, dismissal procedures, and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's Motion. ECF No. 20. After receiving one extension, ECF No. 23, Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 25. Respondent filed a Reply to Petitioner's Response on February 2, 2024. ECF No. 26.

Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, be granted, and this Petition be denied.

I. Background^[1]

On June 7, 2015, Jones entered a home in Dorchester County through an unlocked door. The victim had left her patio door unlocked for neighbors to return furniture. When the victim returned home, she noticed her firearm was missing from her nightstand and her cat was outside. Investigators found fingerprints inside the victim's residence that matched Jones's fingerprints.

Jones used the stolen firearm in an armed robbery in Charleston County on June 28, 2015. Jones contacted the robbery victim regarding a Craigslist advertisement for a laptop. He and a co-defendant met the victim for the purported sale. The co-defendant opened the victim's car door, grabbed the laptop, and pointed a revolver at the victim. Jones and the co-defendant fled with the laptop.

After police identified the vehicle from the victim's description, a highspeed chase ensued. The vehicle crashed into a tree, and Jones and the co-defendant fled. Police eventually arrested Jones and the co-defendant, and they found the laptop in the vehicle and the revolver in a nearby yard. Police also discovered the vehicle belonged to Jones's father. Later, the co-defendant gave a statement implicating Jones as the person who planned the robbery and provided the weapon.

The State indicted Jones for first-degree burglary in Dorchester County on October 1, 2015, and for armed robbery in Charleston County on October 20, 2015. Jones appeared before the circuit court because armed robbery (subsection 16-11-330(A)) is defined as a Class A felony.⁴ S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (2015 & Supp. 2021); id. § 63-19-20(1) (2010) (excluding a person sixteen years of age who committed a Class A, B, C, or D felony from the definition of “child” or “juvenile”).⁵

Jones agreed to plead guilty to both charges during the plea hearing held in Charleston County on December 12, 2016. After negotiations, the Dorchester County Solicitor recommended to the court that Jones receive the statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison for the first-degree burglary charge. The Charleston County Solicitor did not make a sentencing recommendation.

At the time of his plea and sentencing, Jones was eighteen years old and had previously been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for second-degree burglary, a

⁴ First-degree burglary is exempt from the classification system. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-10(D) (2015 & Supp. 2021).

⁵ In both the 2010 and 2021 version, the subsection allows for remand to the family court at the discretion of the solicitor. weapons charge, and shoplifting. The plea court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for first-degree burglary⁶ and ten years for armed robbery,⁷ to run concurrently.

⁶ See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(B) (2015) (“Burglary in the first degree is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, ‘life' means until death. The court, in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to a term of not less than fifteen years.” (Emphasis added)).

⁷ See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2015) (“A person who commits robbery while armed . . . is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned for a mandatory minimum term of not less than ten years or more than thirty years, no part of which may be suspended or probation granted.” (Emphasis added)).

ECF No. 18-8 at 3-4.

Petitioner is incarcerated in the MacDougall Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. ECF No. 1 at 1. He was indicted at the October 2015 term of the Charleston County Grand Jury on armed robbery and at the October 2015 term of the Dorchester County Grand Jury for burglary-first degree. App. 95-96, 102.^[2] On December 12, 2016, Petitioner appeared before Judge Deadra Jefferson for a plea hearing. App. 1-26. Petitioner was represented by Attorney David Aylor, Esquire, and Assistant Solicitor R. Richard Waring, Esquire, appeared on behalf of the State. Id. According to the facts presented by the solicitor, on June 7, 2015, in Dorchester County, the victim returned to her home at 7 p.m. and reported a gun was missing from her nightstand, and her cat, who had been left inside, was found outside. Id. at 11. The victim indicated she left her patio door unlocked for her neighbor to return furniture; however, Petitioner did not have permission to enter the home. Id. Fingerprints at the scene matched Petitioner, and the stolen gun was used in a subsequent armed robbery. Id. On June 28, 2015, in Charleston County, Petitioner contacted the second victim (“Victim 2”) about a Craigslist ad for a laptop. Id. at 12. Petitioner and his co-defendant met Victim 2 at a gas station. Id. Petitioner and co-Defendant approached Victim 2 individually and left stating they needed more money, then co-defendant approached Victim 2's vehicle, opened the car door, grabbed the laptop, and pointed a gun at Victim 2's face. Id. Petitioner and co-defendant then fled the scene and were involved in a highspeed chase, and they crashed their vehicle. Id. at 12. The gun was found in a yard a few days later. Id. The co-defendant gave a statement implicating Petitioner as the one who planned the robbery, and claimed Petitioner gave him the gun. Id. Petitioner gave a statement admitting to setting up the purchase of the laptop, and Victim 2 positively identified Petitioner. Id. Petitioner agreed with the facts presented by the solicitor, and he entered a guilty plea to first-degree burglary and armed robbery. App. 5-9, 11-20. Judge Jefferson sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 15-years' incarceration on burglary, and 10-years' incarceration on armed-robbery. App. 26.

II. Procedural History

Petitioner filed an application for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) on April 14, 2017. App. 31-34. Petitioner asserted he was being held in custody unlawfully because of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, because the automatic waiver provision of S.C. Code § 63-19-20 is unconstitutional, and his sentence violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. App. 33. The State filed a Return on June 19, 2017. App. 36-41.

A motion hearing convened on November 18, 2019, before the Honorable Robert E. Hood. App. 46-82. Petitioner was present and represented by Attorney Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, Esq., and Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Hunter Limbaugh appeared on behalf of the State. Id. Petitioner and plea counsel Attorney David Aylor appeared and testified at the hearing. Id. The PCR court denied and dismissed Petitioner's PCR Application with prejudice in an order issued on January 31, 2020, making the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety. Additionally, this Court heard the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and was able to observe the witnesses presented, which allowed the Court to scrutinize the credibility presented. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (1985).

Applicant has alleged numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel against plea counsel, David Aylor. Each allegation is addressed fully below.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right-to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Lomax v. State, 379 S.C. 93, 665 S.E.2d 164 (2008).

In a post-conviction relief action, an applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his or her application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441,334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove that “counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied [upon] as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Butler, 286 S.C. at 442.

Strickland does not guarantee perfect representation, only a “reasonably competent attorney.” 466 U.S. at 687 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970)); Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process” that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Just as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of

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