Jones v. Mississippi

141 S.Ct. 1307

Brett JONES, Petitioner

v.MISSISSIPPI

No. 18-1259

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued November 3, 2020

Decided April 22, 2021

David M. Shapiro, Chicago, IL, for the petitioner.

Deputy Solicitor General Krissy C. Nobile, for the respondent.

Frederick Liu for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondent.

Jacob Howard, Roderick & Solange Macarthur Justice Center, Jackson, MS, Jeffrey T. Green, David A. Goldenberg, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, David M. Shapiro, Counsel of Record, Roderick & Solange Macarthur Justice Center, Northwestern Pritzker, School of Law, Chicago, IL, Amir. H. Ali, Eliza McDuffie ^,† Devi Rao, Roderick & Solange Macarthur Justice Center, Washington, DC, Marlow Svatek, Andrew F. Rodheim, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, for petitioner.

Lynn Fitch, Attorney General of Mississippi, Kristi H. Johnson, Solicitor General, Krissy C. Nobile, Counsel of Record, Deputy Solicitor General, Justin L. Matheny, Assistant Solicitor General, Scott Stuart, Special Assistant Attorney General, State of Mississippi, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, MS, for the State of Mississippi.

Justice KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole, but only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment. In this case, a Mississippi trial judge acknowledged his sentencing discretion under Miller and then sentenced petitioner Brett Jones to life without parole for a murder that Jones committed when he was under 18. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the discretionary sentencing procedure satisfied Miller .

Jones argues, however, that a sentencer's discretion to impose a sentence less than life without parole does not alone satisfy Miller . Jones contends that a sentencer who imposes a life-without-parole sentence must also make a separate factual finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible, or at least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible. And Jones says that the trial judge did not make such a finding in his case.

Jones's argument that the sentencer must make a finding of permanent incorrigibility is inconsistent with the Court's precedents. In Miller , the Court mandated "only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing" a life-without-parole sentence. Id., at 483, 132 S.Ct. 2455. And in Montgomery v. Louisiana , which held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review, the Court flatly stated that " Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement" and added that "a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility ... is not required." 577 U.S. 190, 211, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In light of that explicit language in the Court's prior decisions, we must reject Jones's argument. We affirm the judgment of the Mississippi Court of Appeals.

I

A

In August 2004, Brett Jones was living with his grandparents, Bertis and Madge, in Shannon, Mississippi. Shannon is a small town of about 2,000 in northern Mississippi near Tupelo, about halfway between Memphis and Birmingham off I–22.

At the time, Jones was only 15 years old. On the morning of August 9, 2004, Bertis discovered Jones's girlfriend, Michelle Austin, in Jones's bedroom. Bertis and Jones got into an argument, and Bertis ordered Austin out of the house. A few hours later, Jones told Austin that he " ‘was going to hurt’ " his grandfather. 938 So.2d 312, 314 (Miss. App. 2006).

That afternoon, Jones was in the kitchen making himself something to eat. Jones and Bertis began arguing again. The clash escalated from shouts to shoves to punches. Jones then stabbed his grandfather with a kitchen knife. When that knife broke, Jones picked up a second knife and continued stabbing Bertis. In total, Jones stabbed his grandfather eight times.

Bleeding profusely, Bertis staggered outside, fell to the ground, and died. Jones did not call 911. Instead, he haphazardly attempted to cover up his role in the murder. He dragged Bertis's body back inside. Jones then washed the blood off his arms with a water hose, changed out of his bloody shirt, and moved Bertis's car over some blood stains on the carport floor.

While Jones was outside, he was seen by a neighbor. The neighbor called the police. Shortly thereafter, another neighbor saw Jones and Austin leaving the house together on foot. Later that night, police located Jones and Austin at a gas station several miles away. When questioned, Jones and Austin provided fake names to the officer. After a police pat down revealed a knife in Jones's pocket, the officer asked Jones whether it was the knife that he " ‘did it with.’ " Id., at 315. Jones responded, " ‘No, I already got rid of it.’ " Ibid .

B

Jones was charged with murder. The trial judge instructed the jury on murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Jones claimed that he was not guilty because he acted in self-defense. The jury rejected that defense and found Jones guilty of murder.

Under Mississippi law at the time, murder carried a mandatory sentence of life without parole. Miss. Code Ann. § 97–3–21 (2000), § 47–7–3(g) (2004) ; see Parker v. State , 119 So.3d 987, 996–997 (Miss. 2013). The trial judge therefore imposed that sentence. In 2006, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. See 938 So.2d 312.

Jones later moved for post-conviction relief in state court, asserting among other things that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. See 122 So.3d 725 (2011).

In 2012, while the Mississippi Supreme Court was considering whether to review Jones's case, this Court decided Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Miller held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for murderers under 18, but the Court allowed discretionary life-without-parole sentences for those offenders.

In the wake of Miller , the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Miller applied retroactively on state collateral review. In Jones's case, the State Supreme Court ordered a new sentencing hearing where the sentencing judge could consider Jones's youth and exercise discretion in selecting an appropriate sentence. See 122 So.3d 698 (2013).

At the resentencing, Jones's attorney argued that Jones's "chronological age and its hallmark features" diminished the "penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences." App. 25, 27 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S., at 472, 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; emphasis deleted). Jones's attorney added that "nothing in this record ... would support a finding that the offense reflects irreparable corruption." App. 143–144.

At the end of the hearing, the sentencing judge acknowledged that he had discretion under Miller to impose a sentence less than life without parole. But after considering the factors "relevant to the child's culpability," App. 149, the judge determined that life without parole remained the appropriate sentence for Jones, id., at 152.

Jones appealed his sentence to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, citing both Miller and the then-recently decided case of Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), which in the interim had held that Miller applied retroactively on collateral review. According to Jones, in order to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a defendant who committed a murder when he or she was under 18, the sentencer must make a separate factual finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible. The Mississippi Court of Appeals rejected Jones's argument, relying on this Court's express statement in Montgomery that " ‘ Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility.’ " 285 So.3d 626, 632 (2017) (quoting Montgomery , 577 U.S., at 211, 136 S.Ct. 718 ).

In light of disagreement in state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller and Montgomery , we granted certiorari. 589 U. S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1293, 206 L.Ed.2d 374 (2020). Compare, e.g., Malvo v. Mathena , 893 F.3d 265 (C.A.4 2018), Commonwealth v. Batts , 640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410 (2017), and Veal v. State , 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016), with, e.g., United States v. Sparks , 941 F.3d 748 (C.A.5 2019), People v. Skinner , 502 Mich. 89, 917 N.W.2d 292 (2018), and State v. Ramos , 187 Wash.2d 420, 387 P.3d 650 (2017).

II

According to Jones, a sentencer's discretion to impose a sentence less than life without parole does not alone satisfy Miller . In Jones's view, a sentencer who imposes a life-without-parole sentence must also either (i) make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, or (ii) at least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an "implicit finding" of permanent incorrigibility. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32; see id., at 6, 14.

As we will explain, the Court has already ruled that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required. In Montgomery , the Court unequivocally stated that " Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement" and added that "a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility ... is not required." 577 U.S., at 211, 136 S.Ct. 718. In a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State's discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.¹

A

In 2004, the year that Jones murdered his grandfather, about 16,000 individuals committed a homicide in the United States. See ...