Jones v. Perkins

PRINCE JONES, Plaintiff, v. TODD PERKINS et al., Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-03168 (APM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

November 24, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Prince Jones brings this action, pro se, against Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Lieutenant Todd Perkins, MPD Senior Detective Elbert Griffin, MPD Detective Sergeant Douglas Carlson, MPD Sergeant Rachel Pulliam (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), and their employer, the District of Columbia (the "District"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights, and that Defendants also violated the Privacy Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

Before the court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for insufficient service of process and for failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants the Motion to Dismiss for insufficient service of process as to the Individual Defendants and for failure to state a claim as to the District and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 2014, a jury convicted Plaintiff of several offenses arising from two alleged incidents of sexual assault and robbery. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 707 (D.C. 2017); United States v. Jones, No. 2013 CF1 018140 (D. C. Super. Ct. 2014). The prosecution relied heavily on evidence acquired immediately following Plaintiff's arrest. See Jones, 168 A.3d at 725. The arrest occurred after MPD illegally used a "cell-site simulator"—a technology that allowed the Individual Defendants to locate and track Plaintiff's phone, and therefore his physical location, in real time—without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 708-10, 713 ("A cell-site simulator allows police officers who possess a person's telephone number to discover that person's precise location remotely and at will."). In 2017, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed Plaintiff's convictions after finding that MPD "violated the Fourth Amendment when it deployed [a] cell-site simulator against [Plaintiff] without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause." Id. at 707, 711-25. Following remand, in 2018, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to kidnapping, robbery, and robbery while armed. See United States v. Jones, No. 2013 CF1 018140 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2018).

B. Procedural History

On October 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint in this court naming as defendants the four officers involved in the warrantless acquisition of evidence against him, in both their individual and official capacities. See Compl., ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.], at 1-3. On February 18, 2020, the Clerk of the Court issued summonses to the Individual Defendants at the MPD (the "February 18 Summonses"). See Summons, ECF No. 10. The February 18 Summonses were returned unexecuted. See Unexecuted Summons, ECF No. 11. The court then ordered Plaintiff to "provide new addresses where [the Individual] Defendants can be served with process"and warned that failure to do so within 30 days of the order may "result in dismissal of this action." Order, Apr. 16, 2020, ECF No. 12. Rather than providing additional addresses for the four officers, Plaintiff instead submitted the address of the Solicitor General for the District of Columbia and noted that "Defendants are officers or agents of the District of Columbia." See Response to Order, May 1, 2020, ECF No. 13. Within days of the submission, a copy of the February 18 Summonses and Complaint—which named only the Individual Defendants as defendants—was received by the Attorney General for the District of Columbia (Attorney General), see ECF No. 15 (received Apr. 30, 2020), and Mayor of the District of Columbia (Mayor), see ECF No. 14 (received May 5, 2020).

On May 6, 2020, because the original Complaint named the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, the court "construe[d] th[e] pro se complaint as if Plaintiff had named the District of Columbia as a party defendant" and ordered "service to be effected upon the Mayor and the Attorney General." Minute Order, May 6, 2020. That service occurred on June 9, 2020, and the Mayor and Attorney General returned executed summonses on June 15, 2020.¹ See Return of Service, ECF Nos. 14, 15 [hereinafter Return of Service]. The Individual Defendants and the District of Columbia then moved to dismiss the Complaint on July 22, 2020. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot.]. For his part, Plaintiff opposed dismissal, see Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 20 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp'n], and filed a Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 19. The parties' motions are now ripe for consideration.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Service of Process

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to properly serve both the Individual Defendants and the District. See Defs.' Mot. at 6-8. A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she has effected proper service. See Hilska v. Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). "To do so, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicable provision of law." Light, 816 F.2d at 751. "[U]nless the procedural requirements for effective service of process are satisfied, a court lacks authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151, 160 (D.D.C. 2007). "Failure to effect proper service is thus a 'fatal' jurisdictional defect, and is grounds for dismissal." Jouanny v. Embassy of Fr. in the U.S., 220 F. Supp. 3d 34, 37-38 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). For the following reasons, the court agrees that the Individual Defendants have not been properly served but finds that the District has been properly served.

1. Individual Defendants

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides a plaintiff with two paths to serve the Individual Defendants. First, a plaintiff can take any one of the following three actions:

(A) deliver[] a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;

(B) leav[e] a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) deliver[] a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A)-(C). Alternatively, a plaintiff can "follow[] state law for serving a summons . . . in the state where the district court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). The District of Columbia Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure ("D.C. Rules") outline the procedures forservice of any defendant in her individual capacity, "whether or not the officer or employee is also sued in an official capacity." D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(3)(E). The only procedure implicated here, D.C. Rule (4)(e), mirrors Federal Rule 4(e)(2)—the first path described above. Therefore, the question before this court is whether Plaintiff properly served the Individual Defendants in accordance with any of the three methods listed in Rule 4(e)(2).

The court finds that Plaintiff has not properly served the Individual Defendants. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff failed to "deliver[] a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A); D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A), or that he failed to serve the Individual Defendants at their "dwelling or usual place of abode," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(b); D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(b). Plaintiff instead argues that he effected proper service under Rule 4(e)(2)(C) because "the Mayor and Attorney General . . . are the [a]uthorized [a]gents appointed by [l]aw to receive service of [p]rocess" for the Individual Defendants. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7.² But Plaintiff is incorrect. The D.C. Rules do not authorize the Mayor and Attorney General to accept service of process on behalf of MPD officers when the officers are sued in their individual capacities. Compare D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(3)(A) (allowing the Mayor and Attorney General to accept service on behalf of the District), and D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(3)(D) (permitting the Mayor and Attorney General to accept service on behalf of officers sued only in their official capacity), with D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(3)(E) (requiring that officers sued in their individual capacity be served under Rule 4(e) in addition to service on the District of Columbia under Rule 4(j)(3)(A)). Because Plaintiff here has not "alsoserve[d] the officer[s] . . . under Rule 4(e)," see D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(3)(D) (emphasis added), the court finds that the Individual Defendants have not been properly served.

"In certain circumstances, courts have granted a [pro se] plaintiff the opportunity to perfect inadequate service of process, rather than dismissing the case for failure to comply with Rule 4." Hampton v. Comey, No. 14-CV-1607 (ABJ), 2016 WL 471277, at *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 8), aff'd, No. 16-5058, 2016 WL 6238558 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2016). But the court here has already provided Plaintiff the opportunity to perfect service. See Summons, ECF No. 10; Order, Apr. 16, 2020, ECF No. 12. Because Plaintiff still has not complied with Rule 4, the court now grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to the Individual Defendants. See Johnson v. District of Columbia, 65 F. Supp. 3d 92, 94 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014), (dismissing for insufficient service of process where pro se plaintiff had "yet to comply with the court's orders to provide a service address"), aff'd, 927 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

2. The District

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to properly serve the District of Columbia. See Defs.' Mot. at 7-8. "The District of Columbia must be served by delivering . . . a copy of the...