Jones v. Petty

KEVIN JONES, Plaintiff,

v.JEFF PETTY, et al., Defendants.

NO. 5:10-CV-293 (MTT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

Date: August 2, 2012

Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge

RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jeff Petty, Chance Allen, Officer Davidson, Montien R. Duncan, and Wesley Nunn. Doc. 52. The record shows that Plaintiff Kevin Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) regarding two of his claims. As to the remaining claims, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and Defendants have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 9, 2010, Plaintiff Kevin Jones, proceeding pro se, filed the above-styled action against Defendants Bill Massee, Richard Chapman, Jeff Petty, Chance Allen, Officer Davidson, Montien R. Duncan, and Wesley Nunn. Doc. 1. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges various violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Baldwin County Jail (BCJ) and Wilkinson County Jail (WCJ). The Complaint includes claims of denial of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and a claim of excessive forceclaim under the Eight Amendment.¹ Upon receipt, Plaintiff's Complaint was reviewed for frivolity in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Doc. 8. After dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Massee and Chapman as well as Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief, the Court allowed Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Petty, Duncan, Davidson, Allen, and Nunn to proceed. Doc. 15.

On November 29, 2010, Defendants Petty, Duncan, Davidson, and Allen filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17), and Defendant Nunn filed a separate Motion to Dismiss on February 4, 2011 (Doc. 27). On September 29, 2011, the Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff's First Amendment claims for compensatory and punitive damages, but allowed Plaintiff's First Amendment claims for nominal damages as well as Plaintiff's Eight Amendment claim to proceed. Doc. 45. On October 15, 2011, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 52.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts of the case are as follows: Plaintiff is Muslim and has been practicing Islam since he was approximately sixteen years old. Pl.'s Dep. at 15 (Doc. 59). On April 20, 2009, Plaintiff entered the BCJ following a medical transfer. Pl.'s Compl. (Doc. 1). Upon his arrival at BCJ, Plaintiff informed the booking officer that he was Muslim and that he was allergic to pork.² Pl.'s Dep. at 17-18 (Doc. 59).

At the BCJ, Plaintiff and another inmate began praying in the day room using their towels as prayer rugs. Pl.'s Comp. (Doc. 1). Soon thereafter, Sgt. Simmons announced a policy limiting the items that inmates could bring into the dayroom. Id. Plaintiff continued to pray on thedayroom floor until he contracted an eye infection. Id. Then, after making several requests, Officer Butch authorized Plaintiff to use a towel as a prayer rug in the dayroom. Id. Plaintiff labeled his towel "prayer rug" with a marker and was able to use his towel while praying in the dayroom. Id.

On August 19, 2009, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Petty requesting that he be allowed to practice Ramadan, which requires Muslims to fast from sunrise until sunset for a thirty-day period. Def. Exhibit 3 (Doc. 52-2). After researching Ramadan online, Defendant Petty determined that Plaintiff should be allowed to skip two meals during the day and received a sack lunch at night. Petty Aff. (Doc. 52-2). Petty ordered that Plaintiff continue to receive his medications as regularly scheduled and that Plaintiff receive a sack lunch at night. Id. Plaintiff states that while he was in the "hole" during Ramadan, the meal officer continued to bring his meals at the regularly scheduled times.³ Pl.'s Dep. at 41 (Doc. 59). Plaintiff claims that he was therefore unable to practice Ramadan. Id. Plaintiff states that he never received a response from Defendant Petty regarding his request that he be allowed to practice Ramadan. Id.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Petty authorized Plaintiff to receive a prayer rug and chess set from Plaintiff's brother, but that Defendant Duncan, who was in charge of receiving items left for inmates, refused to give Plaintiff the prayer rug. Pl.'s Compl. (Doc. 1). Defendant Petty testifies that Plaintiff was not authorized to receive the prayer rug, and that a prayer rug was not an approved property item for any inmate. Petty Aff. (Doc. 52-2). As such, Plaintiff was not allowed the prayer rug, and the prayer rug was returned to Plaintiff's brother. Pl.'s Dep. at 31 (Doc. 59). Plaintiff also complains that he was only able to receive one religious book at the BCJ. Id. at 26.

On September 12, 2009, Defendant Davidson entered Plaintiff's cell and instructed Plaintiff to move into the dayroom. Id. Plaintiff, who was praying at the time, did not respond to Defendant's request. Id. Plaintiff believed at the time that he was not allowed to stop in the middle of a prayer, but has since learned that taking a break during a prayer is acceptable. Pl.'s Dep. at 67 (Doc. 59). Plaintiff was instructed numerous times to exit the cell, but Plaintiff continued to ignore Defendant's instructions. Id. at 68. Plaintiff eventually stood up and was hand-cuffed behind his back. Id. at 69. Defendant Allen then escorted Plaintiff down a flight of stairs. Id. Plaintiff states that he was dragged down the stairs, but that his feet never left the ground. Id. at 70. Defendant Allen slammed Plaintiff into the wall and pinned Plaintiff against the wall. Id. at 72, 76. Defendant Davidson then jerked Plaintiff's arms and shoulders up while Plaintiff was still hand-cuffed. Id. at 76. Plaintiff states that his shoulder and knee were injured as a result of Defendants' use of force. Id. at 80. Plaintiff never sought medical treatment following the incident, however. Id. at 63.

On October 10, 2010, while Plaintiff was still using a towel in lieu of a prayer rug, Defendant Allen entered Plaintiff's cell and demanded Plaintiff's towel. Id. at 54. Defendant Allen informed Plaintiff that it was time for all towels to be washed. Id. Plaintiff reluctantly gave up his towel and asked Defendant Allen to return the same towel marked "prayer rug" when the towels were redistributed. Id. at 55. When Defendant Allen returned to redistribute the towels, Defendant Allen refused to give Plaintiff the towel marked "prayer rug." Id. The towel marked "prayer rug" was given to an inmate four cells down from Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was able to trade towels with that inmate to get back the towel marked "prayer rug." Id. at 55-56. Plaintiff continued to use the prayer towel in the dayroom and was not prevented from praying despite theincident. Id. at 56-58. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to the Jones County Jail. Id. at 57.

On December 14, 2009, Plaintiff entered the WCJ to appear in court. Pl.'s Compl. (Doc. 1). There, he was given a breakfast tray containing grits, eggs, toast, and bacon. Pl.'s Dep. at 96 (Doc. 59). After informing a jailer that he did not eat pork, Defendant Nunn intervened and told Plaintiff that he could eat the food on that tray or nothing at all. Id. Plaintiff admits that he did not have any discussion with Defendant Nunn that day nor did Plaintiff ever inform Defendant Nunn that he was Muslim. Id. at 101, 103.

LEGAL STANDARD

In accordance with Rule 56 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact arises only when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Cleotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 324-26. If the evidence presented by the non-movant is "notsignificantly probative" or is "merely colorable," then summary judgment must be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In fact, summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Petty, Duncan, Allen, and Nunn prevented Plaintiff from being able to practice his religion freely and that Defendants Allen and Davidson applied excessive force against Plaintiff, all in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) that Defendant Petty prevented him from practicing Ramadan in violation of the First Amendment; (2) that Defendant Duncan prevented him from obtaining a prayer rug and religious books in violation of the First Amendment; (3) that Defendant Allen prevented him from obtaining his prayer towel in violation of the First...