Jones v. Phila. Parking Auth.

1

CHRISTOPHER LOREN JONES, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, et al. Defendants.

Civil Action No. 23-CV-4343

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

November 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM

KELLEY BRISBON HODGE, J.

Pro Se Plaintiff Christopher Loren Jones alleges claims against the Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”) and the City of Philadelphia Parking Violations Branch (“Parking Violations Branch”) after his car was impounded for failure to pay traffic and parking citations. Jones seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Jones leave to proceed in forma pauperis dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, and deny his remaining motions.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Jones alleges in his Complaint that on November 1, 2023, his 2019 Land Rover Range Rover was impounded by PPA. (Compl. at 4 7.)^[1] The automobile was booted and later impounded as a result of three unpaid traffic citations incurred on November 20, 2022, November 26, 2022, and January 18, 2023, and a parking citation issued in May 5, 2023. (Id. at 4, 8, 84, 86, 98, 101.) Jones alleges that after receiving each citation, he “rescinded” the citation within 72 hours “per contract law” but that the recissions were ignored by PPA. (Id. at 4, 8.)

Jones states that he is an “American National with a non-citizen national passport” and that his automobile, which is listed as collateral on a UCC-1 financial statement, is his “private trust property,” thus divesting the PPA of any jurisdiction over it. (Id. at 4.) The Court understands Jones to be alleging that due to his status as an American National, the rules and regulations governing the ownership and operation of automobiles do not apply to him. (Id. at 7 (stating that he is exempted from state law requirements to possess a driver's license, state registration, or automobile insurance).) Jones sent numerous “cease and desist” letters to the PPA, in which he claims that he is not a United States citizen, that the PPA therefore has no “jurisdiction over [him],” and that he “owe[s PPA] nothing.” (Id. at 4, 21, 51, 59, 90, 107.) PPA “ignored” Jones' request that it cease and desist enforcement of the traffic and parking violations. (Id. at 4, 8.)

After receiving repeated notices from PPA and the Parking Violations Branch about the traffic violations, on March 5, 2023, Jones received a “Boot and Tow Eligibility Notice,” informing him that his car would be booted and towed if he did not pay the fines and penalties associated with those citations.^[2] (Id. at 60.) In October 2023, Jones was sent an “Immobilization Warning,” which informed him that any vehicles belonging to him were “eligible to be booted under 12-2400 of the Phila. Traffic Code” for failure to pay delinquent traffic citations. (See Compl. at 76.) The Warning also stated that Jones could avoid his vehicles being booted if he immediately paid the delinquent violations and outstanding fees. (Id. at 76.)

On November 1, 2023, PPA placed a boot on his Land Rover. (Id. at 77.) At the time of placing the boot, PPA notified Jones that he could pay the delinquent fines owed on the traffic citations to avoid impoundment. (Id.)

Based on these allegations, Jones alleges violations of his “unalienable rights as an American National” and to his constitutional right to travel. (Id. at 4, 7.) He requests “immediate release of [his] automobile or, in the alternative, money damages equaling the purchase price of the automobile.” (Id. at 5.)^[3]

On November 21, 2023, Jones filed an “Amended Complaint,” in which he seeks to “expand[] on [his] previous filing . . . with additional allegations” (See ECF No. 8 at 1.)^[4] In his Amended Complaint, Jones seeks to add claims for “unauthorized use of copyright materials” and “unlawful possession and removal of private automobile.” (Id.) He alleges that the PPA has “used [his] copyrighted material, specifically [his] trade name, without authorization,” which is a “violation of [his] intellectual property rights.” (Id.) In an attached exhibit, Jones lists all “fees for unauthorized use of copyrighted material (CHRISTOPHER L. JONES).” (Id. at 12.) The Court understands Jones' copyright infringement claims to be based on PPA's use of his name on the traffic and parking citations. Jones also alleges that “PPA has unlawfully possessed and removed [his] private automobile,” which he contends “constitutes infringement of [his] property rights.” (Id. at 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Jones leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “‘At this early stage of the litigation,' ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,' ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor,' and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.'” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Jones is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court understands Jones to assert constitutional claims in relation to the impoundment of his vehicle. Jones also asserts copyright infringement claims. As set forth below, Jones' fails to state a plausible claim.

A. Constitutional Claims

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

1. Section 1983 Claims Against PPA

Jones alleges that his right to travel was violated after his automobile was impounded. The United States Supreme Court has explained that the right to travel “protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). However, the existence of “a constitutional right to travel . . . does not restrict the State from regulating the use of its roads as a matter of its police powers.” Knox v. Pcobasco, No. 86-2367, 1986 WL 6310, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1986) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966)); see also Carroll v. City of Philadelphia, No. 87-0592, 1989 WL 114721, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1990) (“It is well established that the police powers constitutionally permit regulation of vehicles traveling the public roadways.”).

The imposition of monetary fines and the impoundment of an automobile for violations of parking or traffic laws does not rise to the level of a violation of the right to travel. See e.g., El v. New Jersey, No. 13-1431, 2013 WL 1163495, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (dismissal on screening of 1983 claim for violation of right to travel where claim was based on being ticketed for driving with a suspended license); Murphy v. Koster, No. 10-2095, 2010 WL 5147215, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2010) (rejecting claim that plaintiff's right to travel was violated by defendants “continually issuing traffic citations” and impounding his vehicle); Cholerton v. Brown, No. 13-8992, 2014 WL 3818049, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13-8992, 2014 WL 3828209 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) (“Plaintiff's fundamental right to travel is not implicated by impoundment of his vehicle and/or state requirements that he register the vehicle.”); McCain v. Stockton Police Dept., No. 10-3170, 2011 WL 4710696, *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“To the extent plaintiff contends that her fundamental right to interstate travel is violated by impoundment of her Vehicle or state requirements that she register the Vehicle and possess a valid driver's license, that claim fails as a matter of law.”), aff'd, 695 Fed.Appx. 314 (9th Cir. 2017); McDonald v. Kirkpatrick, No. 07-396, 2008 WL 552850, at *2, n.1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2008) (concluding that plaintiff failed to state a valid § 1983 claim because he failed to show that his right to travel was violated when he was arrested and his car was impounded).^[5]

In any event, Jones cannot base his claims on the contention that his American National status permits him to violate traffic and parking laws. See Sorrells v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 652 Fed.Appx. 81, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of claim as frivolous against the PPA and stating that the plaintiff's “asserted legal basis for the contention that the [PPA]...