Jones v. State

GERTRUDE JONES v. STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL.

No. 471

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

February 21, 2018

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case Nos. 316355011 & 316355013

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S., Beachley, Shaw Geter, JJ.

Opinion by Beachley, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This appeal concerns restitution resulting from an incident in which appellee D.B., while fleeing the police in his car, struck and damaged a parked van owned by the victim, appellant Gertrude Jones ("Jones").¹ Appellee, who was seventeen years old at the time, appeared before a magistrate of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for juvenile delinquency proceedings and was adjudicated delinquent of: (1) failing to attempt to locate the owner of an unattended vehicle after being involved in an accident; and (2) fleeing and eluding a police officer after being signaled to stop. Jones sought restitution for her insurance deductible as well as the cost of the vehicle she rented as a replacement for her damaged van.

Appellee paid Jones one hundred dollars representing restitution for the insurance deductible, but challenged the claimed rental vehicle costs. The circuit court, in an order adopting the findings of the magistrate, found that Jones rented the replacement vehicle because her son and grandsons needed transportation for work purposes. Accordingly, the court deemed the rental vehicle costs "contingent" expenses and declined to award restitution. Jones noted a timely appeal, and presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the victim's expense for a replacement vehicle was not a "direct result" of the delinquent acts that destroyed her vehicle?

We conclude that the damage to Jones's vehicle was a direct result of appellee's delinquent act of fleeing and eluding the police; however, we hold that the rental costs to provide Jones's family members a replacement vehicle do not constitute a "direct out-of-pocket loss" incurred as a direct result of appellee's delinquent act, and therefore are not recoverable as restitution. Accordingly, we shall affirm the circuit court's decision.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 1:05 a.m. on December 17, 2016, an officer in a marked patrol vehicle observed appellee driving a Buick LeSabre with a broken headlight and brake light on Belair Road in Baltimore City. The officer activated his emergency lights and equipment and attempted to stop the Buick. Evading the officer, appellee made several turns and struck another police car before finally crashing into Jones's parked van.

Appellee, age seventeen at the time of the incident, was charged in two juvenile petitions with a total of thirteen counts. Petition No. 316355011 charged appellee with three counts related to his collision with the police car.² Petition No. 316355013 dealt with the remainder of the incident, and charged appellee with the following ten counts: (1) failing to attempt to locate the owner of an unattended vehicle after being involved in an accident; (2) fleeing and eluding a police officer after being signaled to stop; (3) driving in wanton and willful disregard for the safety of persons and property; (4) negligent driving; (5) driving without a license; (6) speeding; (7) driving on the sidewalk; (8) equipmentviolation - broken headlight; (9) equipment violation - broken tail light; and (10) driving an unregistered vehicle.

On March 6, 2017, appellee appeared before a magistrate of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a Juvenile Court, and admitted involvement in the first two counts of Petition No. 316355013: (1) failing to attempt to locate the owner of an unattended vehicle after being involved in an accident; and (2) fleeing and eluding a police officer after being signaled to stop. In exchange, the State nolle prossed the remaining counts in both petitions.

Jones, the owner of the parked van appellee struck, requested reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses she incurred as a result of the destruction of her van, namely a $100 insurance deductible and $562.44 in rental vehicle costs. Jones testified that her son and grandsons used the van for work, requiring her to rent another vehicle for their use until the destroyed van could be replaced. Specifically, Jones indicated that her son was "doing carpet" and, because of the loss of the van, her "grandsons [were] not able to go to work . . . because they were helpers" for her son. The photographs admitted into evidence demonstrated that the damaged vehicle was a full-size white cargo van with no windows in the cabin behind the driver's and front passenger's seats.

Appellee agreed to reimburse Jones for the $100 insurance deductible, but argued that the court lacked authority to order restitution for the cost of the rental vehicle. Noting that restitution is only available for direct out-of-pocket costs incurred as a direct result of a delinquent act, appellee argued that the rental vehicle costs were not a direct result of theincident, and were therefore not subject to restitution. The State argued that appellee's conduct on the night of the incident caused damage to Jones's van and that Jones's rental costs were a direct result of the property damage caused by appellee.

On March 20, 2017, the magistrate issued written findings and recommendations. The magistrate found that the damaged van had been used by Jones's son and grandson³ for work purposes, and recommended that restitution for the rental vehicle costs be denied, concluding that the costs were "contingent" expenses, rather than a direct out-of-pocket loss. The circuit court adopted the magistrate's recommendations, and Jones timely noted an appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We ordinarily apply the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's order of restitution." In re Cody H., 452 Md. 169, 181 (2017) (citing Silver v. State, 420 Md. 415, 427 (2011)). When a trial court's restitution order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutes and case law, we must determine whether the court's conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review. Griffin v. Lindsey, 444 Md. 278, 285 (2015) (citing Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 (2002)). "We will not disturb the judgment on the facts, however, unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous." Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 338 (2005).

DISCUSSION

We have previously noted that restitution under the Criminal Procedure Article is a criminal sanction, as opposed to a civil remedy, and that restitution serves at least three distinct purposes: "First, it is a form of punishment for criminal conduct. Second, it is intended to rehabilitate the defendant. Lastly, it affords the aggrieved victim recompense for monetary loss." McCrimmon v. State, 225 Md. App. 301, 307 (2015) (citing Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 55 (2004)). "The objectives of restitution do not include that the victim must be made whole by the full reimbursement of the victim's loss, but they do not preclude that possibility if the defendant has the ability to pay." McDaniel v. State, 205 Md. App. 551, 558 (2012) (quoting Anne Arundel Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 329 Md. 677, 685-86 (1993)).

Here, Jones sought restitution for her rental vehicle costs pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2017 Supp.) § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"). This section presumes that victims have a right to restitution if: "(1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and (2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section." CP § 11-603(b). Under CP § 11-603(a), the victim of a crime or delinquent act may obtain a judgment of restitution if:

(1) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased;

(2) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered:

(i) actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, or burial expenses or losses;

(ii) direct out-of-pocket loss;

(iii) loss of earnings; or

(iv) expenses incurred with rehabilitation[.]

(Emphasis added).

Jones argues that her rental vehicle costs are recoverable under CP § 11-603(a)(2)(ii), because she personally paid for the rental vehicle, and because she needed to rent a vehicle as a direct result of appellee's delinquent act that destroyed her van. The State, which also filed a brief in this appeal, supports Jones's position for the same reasons.

Appellee argues that Jones is not entitled to restitution for two reasons. First, appellee posits that the damage to Jones's van was not a direct result of his adjudicated delinquent acts. Second, appellee argues that Jones's rental costs were not a direct result of the damage to her van, and contends that awarding Jones restitution to rent a vehicle for her family members would expand the group of persons entitled to restitution beyond that intended by the legislature.

We disagree with appellee's first contention and conclude that the damage to Jones's van was, under CP § 11-603(a)(1) and (a)(2), a "direct result" of appellee's delinquent act of fleeing from police. Based on the circumstances in this case, however, we hold that Jones's rental costs do not qualify as a "direct out-of-pocket loss" as prescribed by CP § 11-603(a)(2)(ii). We explain.

Definition of "Direct" Under CP § 11-603(a)

The definition section of the restitution statute does not provide a definition for "direct" or "direct result." When statutory definitions are not provided, "we determine the intended scope of the term by applying the language's natural and ordinary meaning, byconsidering the express...