Jones v. Tope

1

DANIEL JONES, Petitioner, v. DANIELLE TOPE, Psy. D., Respondent.

No. 9:21-CV-01007 (AMN/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

June 26, 2024

APPEARANCES:

DANIEL JONES Petitioner, pro se

HON LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General Attorneys for Respondent

OF COUNSEL:

PAUL B. LYONS, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Hon Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 13, 2021, Petitioner pro se Daniel Jones (“Petitioner”), filed a petition seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1 (the “Petition”). In the Petition, Petitioner asserts ten grounds upon which he should be released from the custody of the New York State Office of Mental Health, under whose supervision he is currently civilly confined. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8-31.^[1] The Petition's grounds for relief concern alleged procedural deficiencies which Petitioner asserts pervaded the probable cause hearing mental abnormality trial waiver, and dispositional hearing held pursuant to Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”). See id. On March 17, 2022, after an extension, Respondent submitted certain records, an Answer, and a memorandum of law (“Respondent's brief”) seeking to dismiss the Petition as improper and meritless. Dkt. Nos. 16-18. On June 13, 2022, Petitioner filed a Traverse in support of his Petition. Dkt. No. 29.

The Petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Miroslav Lovric, who, on February 16, 2024, issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Petition be dismissed and no certificate of appealability be issued. Dkt. No. 38 at 24-25 (the “Report-Recommendation”). Magistrate Judge Lovric advised the parties that under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), they had fourteen days to file written objections and failure to object to the Report-Recommendation within fourteen days would preclude appellate review. Id. at 25 & n.3. On March 4, 2024, Petitioner filed Objections to the Report-Recommendation. Dkt. No. 39 (the “Objections”). On April 18, 2024, following an extension, Respondent submitted a response to the Objections. Dkt. No. 43.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court^[2] adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court may award habeas corpus relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the adjudication resulted in an outcome that: (1) was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” DeBerry v. Portuondo, 403 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). This standard is “highly deferential” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that “a federal habeas court may overturn a state court's application of federal law only if it is so erroneous that there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with th[e Supreme] Court's precedents.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508-09 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).

B. Review of a Report and Recommendation

This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “To be ‘specific,' the objection must, with particularity, ‘identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection.'” Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F.Supp.3d 223, 228-29 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 72.1(c)). If no specific objections have been filed, this Court reviews a magistrate judge's report-recommendation for clear error. See id. at 229 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition). Similarly, when a party files “[g]eneral or conclusory objections, or objections which merely recite the same arguments [previously] presented to the magistrate judge,” the district court reviews a magistrate judge's report- recommendations for clear error. O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322 (TJM) (DRH), 2011 WL 933846, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (citations omitted); accord Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002) (a “statement, devoid of any reference to specific findings or recommendations to which [the plaintiff] objected and why, and unsupported by legal authority, was not sufficient to preserve” a claim); Petersen, 2 F.Supp.3d at 228-29 & n.6 (collecting cases). “When performing [ ] a ‘clear error' review, ‘the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Dezarea W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-CV-01138 (MAD/TWD), 2023 WL 2552452, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Canady v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-0367 (GTS/WBC), 2017 WL 5484663, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2017)).

“[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (additional citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). That said, “even a pro se party's objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate's proposal ....” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 13320 (DAB) (JCF), 2011 WL 3809920, at *2, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation omitted); accord Caldwell v. Petros, No. 1:22-cv-567 (BKS/CFH), 2022 WL 16918287, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022). After appropriate review, “the court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner has properly challenged his civil confinement pursuant to a judgment of a state court with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Roache v. McCulloch, No. 9:16-CV-1069-JKS, 2019 WL 4327271, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2019) (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001) (a state court order of civil commitment satisfies § 2254's “in custody” requirement)); accord Buthy v. Comm'r of Office of Mental Health of N.Y., 818 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1987) (petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 is the appropriate method for an individual to challenge the fact or duration of an involuntary civil commitment to a state psychiatric institution). Petitioner's Objections are organized into ten categories, generally tracking the ten grounds initially articulated in the Petition, and functionally objecting to the entire substance of the Report-Recommendation.^[3] See Dkt. No. 39 at 1-15. Although each particular objection is alone not necessarily specific, even when read with the solicitude due to Petitioner in light of his pro se status,^[4] the Court herein conducts a de novo review of the Report-Recommendation.

A. Ground 1: The Untimely Probable Cause Hearing

Petitioner's first ground concerns the fact that a probable cause hearing pursuant to MHL § 10.06(g), which had been scheduled to occur on March 7, 2012, was adjourned until June 27, 2012-a delay of nearly four months. Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9. Petitioner maintains that he was neither responsible for the delay nor consented to it. Id. The Report-Recommendation adopted the reasoning of Respondent's brief, specifically highlighting that “the delay in holding the hearing was primarily attributable to Petitioner's request for a change in venue” and that “[t]he New York Appellate Division's denial of Petitioner's claim did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court law.” Dkt. No. 38 at 17; see also id. at 6. In his Objections, Petitioner argues against the Report-Recommendation's conclusions with respect to the first ground because: (a) in requesting a change in venue he did not “consent[ ] to a waiver of all time frames for holding a probable [cause] hearing;” and (b) “the delay in conducting the probable cause hearing was a chain of violating” Petitioner's procedural due process rights by extending his “detention beyond the days allotted by the statute.” Dkt. No. 39 at 1-2. On this ground, the Court agrees with the Report-Recommendation that Respondent has the better argument.

The MHL affords a detained individual a probable cause hearing to “commence no later than seventy-two hours from the date of the [individual's] anticipated release date.” MHL § 10.06(h). However, the same section of the MHL makes clear that a “failure to commence the probable cause hearing within the time periods specified shall not result in the dismissal of the petition and shall not affect the validity of the hearing or the probable cause determination.” Id. Accordingly, while Petitioner may have correctly identified a failure to comply with state law, such failure is, per the terms of the state law, not...