Jones v. Del Toro

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WILLIAM DAVID JONES, Plaintiff, v. CARLOS DEL TORO, Defendant.

Civil No. 3:23cv514 (DJN)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

March 25, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David J. Novak United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro's (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, (“Motion to Dismiss,” ECF No. 38). This matter also comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff William David Jones's (“Plaintiff' or “Jones”) Motion for Reconsideration Under FRCPs 59 and 60 in Light of the Supreme Court's Definition of Supervisor (“Motion for Reconsideration,” ECF No. 41), and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike ECF No. 39 and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (“Motion to Strike,” ECF No 43). For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 38), DENY Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, (ECF No. 41), and DENY Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, (ECF No. 43).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

At this stage, the Court must accept as true the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 35). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Against this backdrop, the Court accepts the following facts as alleged for purposes of resolving the instant Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff alleges that his former employer, the Department of the Navy (“Navy”), discriminated against him and “committed prohibited personnel practices as defined by [5 U.S.C. § 2302] by taking a personnel action (removal) against Jones that it was not authorized to do.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.)

Pointing to the range of discriminatory practices that incur Title VII liability, the Amended Complaint alleges that “[r]eprisal and [Retaliation apply directly,” adding that Plaintiffs “agency decided to ‘look the other way' regarding Religious Discrimination in Jones' EEO filing against an agency employee, but the effects of that filing play a part in Reprisal and Retaliation.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that he filed a religious discrimination equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint with the Navy “on or about 20 December 2020 and 27 January 2021 as a result of observations stemming from the interactions between Lt Col Oscar Alanis and a Federal Contractor, Ms. Jessica Johnson.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Though the Navy dismissed Plaintiffs complaint in March 2021, “its effects had a prolonged and pronounced effect on the supervisor-employee relationship between Jones and Alanis.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that “key employees” in the Navy failed to provide him with “critical information” and thereby prevented him “from being fully engaged in meaningful work at any level,” “promoted a hostile working environment” and “used a pre-existing condition as a component for terminating Jones.” (Id. ¶ 43.)

Recounting various events from his tenure with the Navy, Plaintiff discusses his difficulties accessing Marine Corps Base Quantico (“MCBQ”) (the site of his Navy job) on account of his November 2018 debarment from entering the United States military installation known as the Defense Supply Center, Richmond (“DSCR”). (Id. ¶¶ 52-58.) Plaintiff states that the Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”) barred him from entering DSCR after he resigned from his DLA position, and that he subsequently encountered trouble getting past security personnel at MCBQ when he worked for the Navy. (Id. ¶¶ 52-58, 71, 94.)

Plaintiff next overviews the EEO complaint proceedings, stating that in a December 2020 conversation that Plaintiff overheard, Alanis expressed surprise to a support contractor at her Jewish ancestry, allegedly stating “You're Jewish? But your last name is Johnson; Johnson is not a Jewish name.” (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff “could see the anger on” the support contractor's face in reaction to Alanis' comment and, because Plaintiff himself was “heavily bothered by the event,” he reported the incident to the MCBQ EEO office in December 2020. (Id. ¶ 62-63.) The MCBQ EEO office dismissed his complaint in March 2021. (Id. ¶ 68.)

Plaintiff delineates multiple evaluation meetings that he participated in with Alanis, including meetings in January and February 2022 in which Alanis provided Plaintiff with mixed feedback. (Id. ¶¶ 79-81.) Plaintiff then received a letter in June 2022, assigning him to work for another MCBQ-based Navy employee, Caroline Bloom, on a time-limited detail, and he learned that he had received a performance bonus. (Id. ¶¶ 88-89.) In August 2022, Plaintiff emailed Navy personnel to inform them that his neighbor was suing him, and later learned that Bloom forwarded Plaintiffs email to Lt. Col. Alanis and another superior with the statement “Regarding our earlier conversation ....” Plaintiff subsequently learned that the detail moving him under Ms. Bloom's supervision “ha[d] been made permanent.” (Id. ¶ 93.) Following day-by-day commentary regarding early September 2022, Plaintiff then notes that he received his Notice of Termination on September 9, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 93-99.)

Plaintiff proceeds to lay out what he characterizes as “Claims for Relief,” starting with “Claim 1: Jones' Supervisors Failed to Provide Jones with a Path to Advancement to the Target Level, GS-14.” (Id. ¶¶ 104-11.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Col. Alanis and other Navy superiors failed to provide Plaintiff with meaningful work and did not respect his contributions or give him needed guidance. (Id.) The Amended Complaint's “Claim 2” makes similar allegations, stating that Lt. Col. Alanis prevented Plaintiff from engaging in work that corresponded with his role as an operations research analyst and claiming that Alanis “ensured that Jones was not promoted to [the] GS-14” federal employee pay level as “[r]eprisal against Jones for filing the EEO complaint” against Alanis and as an expression of “personal animus” for Plaintiff filing prior EEO filings against DLA in connection with his debarment from the DLA facility. (Id. ¶¶ 112-20.) Plaintiff states that he filed a civil action in a federal district court regarding his debarment from entering DSCR, claiming that the “chain of command was aware of' this civil action, that this situation qualified as a “pre-existing condition” and that “actions taken because of them are prohibited by law.” (Id. ¶ 120.) Alanis allegedly held “personal animus regarding the incidents that Jones faced at the entrance gates to MCBQ.” (Id.)

The Amended Complaint's “Claim 3” alleges that the Navy “promoted a hostile working environment” through Alanis' comments about a support contractor's religion, the EEO office's dismissal of Plaintiff s EEO complaint about these comments and Alanis' negative behavior toward Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 121-28.) Next, “Claim 4” reiterates Plaintiffs contention that the Navy used his “pre-existing condition” of having been barred from the DSCR military facility as a reason for terminating him from the Navy. (Id. ¶¶ 129-36.)

B. Procedural History

The Court received this case via transfer from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on August 10,2023. (ECF No. 1.) On December 22,2023, the Court issued an Order, (ECF No. 33), and accompanying Memorandum Opinion, (ECF No. 32), granting Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 19). The Court affirmed the Merit Systems Protection Board's (“MSPB”) jurisdictional decision dismissing Plaintiffs administrative appeal of his termination from the Navy, dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim with leave to amend within fourteen (14) days and denied as moot Plaintiffs motion for a jury trial. (ECF No. 33.) The Court notified Plaintiff “that should he wish to appeal [the] Order, written notice of the appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of the entry” of the Order, i.e., by January 21, 2024. (Id.)

On January 8,2024, Plaintiff filed his Appeal of Decision Under FRCPs 59 and 60, (ECF No. 34), in which he requested that the Court vacate its December 22, 2023 Order and either provide him with a hearing and trial or directly grant him “full relief.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff cited to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60, the Court liberally construed Plaintiffs filing as, in part, a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's December 22, 2023 Order, and also as a timely Notice of Appeal, which the Court transmitted to the Fourth Circuit. (ECF No. 36); see United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that “courts must liberally construe the claims of pro se litigants”). The Court correspondingly denied Plaintiffs original Motion for Reconsideration, informing Plaintiff that the Court had nonetheless docketed his filing as a timely Notice of Appeal and had transmitted his Notice of Appeal to the Fourth Circuit. (ECF No. 40.)

Plaintiff also filed, contemporaneously with and in the same document as his “Appeal of Decision Under FRCPs 59 and 60,” his Amended Complaint, bringing a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF No. 35.) On January 22, 2024, Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), along with a Memorandum in Support. (ECF Nos. 38-39.)

On February 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Reconsideration, (ECF No. 41). In that same filing, Plaintiff submitted what he styled as his “Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,” (ECF No. 42), and his Motion to Strike, (ECF No. 43). Consistent with the Court's duty to liberally construe pro se litigants' filings, Wilson, 699 F.3d at 797, the Court deems Plaintiffs “Reply,” (ECF No. 42), to constitute a timely Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The Government replied on February 20, 2024, (ECF...