Jones v. Tucker

CLARENCE JAMES JONES, Petitioner,

v.KENNETH S. TUCKER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

CASE NO. 4:00cv96-RH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

Dated: May 11, 2012

ORDER DENYING THE PETITION

By petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Clarence James Jones challenges his state-court conviction and death sentence. This order denies the petition.

Facts and Procedural History

Mr. Jones escaped from a Maryland prison and was in Tallahassee with fellow escapees Henry Goins and Irvin Griffin. These three and Beverly Harriswere seated in a stolen car when Tallahassee police officers Greg Armstrong and Ernest Ponce de Leon confronted them. As Officer Armstrong checked the driver's identification and Officer Ponce de Leon ran a computer check on the license plate, one of the car's occupants—overwhelming evidence indicates it was Mr. Jones—opened fire on the officers. Officer Ponce de Leon was hit and died at the scene. Officer Armstrong fired back. Mr. Jones absconded on foot with Officer Ponce de Leon's service weapon, accompanied by Mr. Griffin. Police captured both men after they broke into a nearby home.

The state indicted Mr. Jones, Mr. Goins, and Mr. Griffin on charges that included first-degree murder. Mr. Goins negotiated a guilty plea to second-degree murder in exchange for a 30-year sentence. The state tried Mr. Jones and Mr. Griffin together. Ms. Harris testified that Mr. Jones was the shooter. Other evidence pointed to him as well. But Mr. Jones testified that the four met up with a drug dealer and that the dealer shot the officer. The jury convicted both Mr. Jones and Mr. Griffin. In separate penalty proceedings Mr. Griffin received a life sentence while the jury recommended death for Mr. Jones by an 11-1 vote. The judge sentenced Mr. Jones to death.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Jones's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Jones v. State, 580 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Jones v. Florida, 502 U.S. 878 (1991).Mr. Jones filed a motion for postconviction relief in state court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied the motion, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Jones v. State, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999) (Jones II). Mr. Jones filed the petition under review in this court while simultaneously filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. Proceedings in this court were stayed pending a ruling on the state habeas petition. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition and denied rehearing. Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2001) (Jones III). Mr. Jones later filed an amended petition in this court, and the state responded.

A second stay was entered pending the Florida Supreme Court's determination of unrelated cases presenting claims under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Florida Supreme Court later issued opinions in those cases. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002). Those opinions left unsettled the question whether the Florida Supreme Court would ultimately declare Florida's sentencing scheme unconstitutional under Ring or clarify the application of Atkins in Florida courts. Because Mr. Jones was pursuing in state court a motion for postconviction relief under both Ring and Atkins, the stay in this court remained in effect pending resolution of the state-court proceedings. The Florida courts ultimately denied Mr. Jones's Atkins and Ring claims, see Jones v. State,962 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2007) (Jones IV), and denied rehearing.

Summary of Claims

Mr. Jones asserts seven claims in this court: that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance in the trial's penalty phase; that the state withheld exculpatory evidence in the penalty phase in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); that Mr. Jones's attorney was ineffective on direct appeal, including by failing to assert penalty-phase errors; that the sentencing judge erred by failing to find mitigators; that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on aggravators; that after disapproving aggravators on which the jury was instructed, the Florida Supreme Court erred by failing to reweigh the aggravators and mitigators or to conduct a harmless-error analysis; and that Mr. Jones is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for a death sentence under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). This order addresses each claim in turn.

Applicability of AEDPA

Mr. Jones claims at the outset that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") does not apply to his petition because the crime occurred before its enactment. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the assertion. See, e.g., (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429 (2000) ("Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition after AEDPA's effective date, so the statute applies to his case." (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27(1997))).

Standard of Review

A federal habeas court may set aside a state court's ruling on the merits of a petitioner's claim only if the ruling "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or if the ruling "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A long line of cases addresses these standards. See, e.g., (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Morris v. Secretary, Dep't of Corr.,No. 09-15471, 2012 WL 1370848 (11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012). No purpose would be served by repeating here all the analysis set out in the many cases.

Evidentiary Hearing

Mr. Jones has requested an evidentiary hearing. But he had an evidentiary hearing on his collateral claim in state court and had a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual basis for the claims that were not procedurally barred. See Jones II, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999). Mr. Jones has not suggested "a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). And in any event, "a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he or she alleges facts that, ifproved at the hearing, would entitle petitioner to relief." Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir. 1992)). Mr. Jones has not met this standard.

Claim I: Ineffective Assistance in the Penalty Phase

In claim I Mr. Jones asserts that his attorney was ineffective in the trial's penalty phase.

A. Standard of Review

The standard governing an ineffective-assistance claim is well established and was at the time of the state-court adjudication. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A petitioner "must show that his lawyer's performance fell below an 'objective standard of reasonableness' and that the lawyer's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner." Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 290 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (noting the need for "proof of both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense").

A "strong presumption" exists "that counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable and professional judgment." Van Poyck, 290 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). This presumption specifically applies to an attorney's decision not to present mitigating evidence—adecision that, if undertaken after thorough investigation, is "virtually unchallengeable," and if undertaken after less than thorough investigation, is reasonable "precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (noting that on the question of the investigation supporting a decision not to present a mitigation case, the court must "conduct an objective review of . . . performance, measured for 'reasonableness under prevailing professional norms' " (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)).

B. Facts

To prepare for the penalty phase, Mr. Jones's attorney spoke with three people in Mr. Jones's hometown of Baltimore. (C-4 at 24.)¹ The attorney did not travel to Baltimore. (C-4 at 26.) Instead, the attorney relied on Mr. Jones's prison records, because Mr. Jones had spent the majority of his life in custody. (C-4 at 27-28.) The attorney concluded that no one in Mr. Jones's family was interested in appearing at the penalty phase; they declined to attend due to lack of funds and, when offered funds, claimed illness. (C-4 at 28-30.)

The attorney believed that the prison records were sufficient to permit expert analysis for penalty-phase purposes. (C-4 at 65.) The attorney received courtauthorization to employ an expert, Dr. Lawrence Annis, on the day that the jury returned the guilty verdict. (C-4 at 31.) The attorney told the court at that time that he was unable to proceed immediately with the penalty phase: "I've had no chance to confer with the individual that was involved and act on any kind of information that he can make available [and] there are some family members in Maryland that I would like to compel the attendance, and we can't do it today or tomorrow." (A-25 at 3391.) The court delayed the penalty phase until three days after Mr. Jones's attorney first discussed the case with Dr. Annis. (C-4 at 33.) Mr. Jones now says that the attorney failed to compile a complete life history because he did not obtain school or medical records, or interview friends, neighbors, teachers, or medical personnel. (Pet. at...