Jones v. United States

JIMMY A. JONES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-1025-MMH-JRK

Case No.: 3:09-cr-15-MMH-JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

April 15, 2021

ORDER

This case is before the Court on Petitioner Jimmy A. Jones's pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1; § 2255 Motion).¹ Jones raises three claims: (1) that his enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unlawful in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)²; (2) that counsel gave ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing to argue that the ACCA's residual clause was void for vagueness; and (3) that counsel gave ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to challenge whether his prior convictions qualified as violentfelonies under the ACCA. The United States moved to dismiss the pro se § 2255 Motion, arguing that it is untimely as well as meritless. (Civ. Doc. 4; Motion to Dismiss).

A few months after the United States filed the Motion to Dismiss, the Court appointed counsel to represent Jones in pursuing § 2255 relief based on Johnson. (See Crim. Docs. 61, 62, 63). Counsel filed a memorandum in support of Ground One - the Johnson claim - arguing that two of Jones's three ACCA predicates no longer qualify as violent felonies without the residual clause. (Civ. Doc. 11; Supporting Memorandum).³ The United States responded with an opposing memorandum, maintaining that Jones still qualifies as an armed career criminal. (Civ. Doc. 12; Opposing Memorandum).

Thus, the case has been fully briefed and is ripe for a decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings⁴, the Court has considered the need for an evidentiary hearing and determines that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the merits of this action. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion is not required when the petitioner asserts allegations that are affirmatively contradicted bythe record or patently frivolous, or if in assuming the facts that he alleges are true, he still would not be entitled to any relief); Patel v. United States, 252 F. App'x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007).⁵ For the reasons set forth below, Jones's § 2255 Motion is due to be denied.

I. Background

On January 21, 2009, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of Florida indicted Jones on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). (Crim. Doc. 1; Indictment). The Indictment alleged that Jones possessed a firearm after having been convicted of one or more felony offenses, including (1) armed robbery in the state of Florida, (2) resisting an officer with violence in the state of Florida, and (3) assault involving great bodily injury or a deadly weapon in the state of California. Id. Jones initially pled not guilty to the charge. (Crim. Doc. 17; Minute Entry of Arraignment).

On July 27, 2009, Jones appeared before a United States Magistrate Judge to enter a guilty plea. (Crim. Doc. 33; Plea Transcript, Volume I). However, Jones objected to admitting to the specific number and nature of his prior convictions, out of concern for the ramifications under the ACCA. See id. at 25. The Magistrate Judge ended the hearing so the parties could research whether Jones could plead guilty to the charge without admitting the number and nature of his prior convictions. Id. at43-45. Shortly thereafter, Jones and the United States each filed memoranda advising the Court that Jones could plead guilty to violating § 922(g)(1) without admitting the specifics of his criminal record, so long as he admitted he had previously been convicted of a felony offense. (Crim. Docs. 31, 32). Thus, the parties reconvened for a change-of-plea hearing on August 28, 2009, at which time Jones pled guilty to a violation of § 922(g)(1). (Crim. Doc. 52; Plea Transcript, Volume II). Consistent with the parties' memoranda, Jones admitted only to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony offense, but he did not admit the specific number or nature of his prior convictions (though Jones did admit to having one prior conviction for simple possession of cocaine). See id. at 8, 19-21. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court accept Jones's guilty plea as "knowledgeable and voluntary" and "supported by an independent basis in fact." (Crim. Doc. 41; Report and Recommendation Concerning Guilty Plea). On September 18, 2009, Court accepted Jones's guilty plea and adjudicated him accordingly. (Crim. Doc. 42; Acceptance of Plea).

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended that the Court find Jones to qualify to be sentenced as an armed career criminal. PSR at ¶ 28. The PSR identified three prior convictions as supporting the ACCA enhancement: (1) a 1988 conviction in Florida for armed robbery, id. at ¶ 33, (2) a 1990 conviction in California for assault involving great bodily injury or a deadly weapon, id. at ¶ 35, and (3) a 2001 conviction in Florida for resisting an officer with violence, id. at ¶ 43. The PSR did not address whether the prior convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA'selements clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), or the residual clause, see § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).⁶

Jones filed a sentencing memorandum objecting to the ACCA enhancement. (Crim. Doc. 44; Jones's Sentencing Memorandum). Specifically, Jones argued that his prior conviction for resisting an officer with violence did not qualify as a violent felony because "[t]he statute does not require the specific intent to use, attempt to use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another," and because the offense does not involve "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." Id. at 3. The United States filed a sentencing memorandum in support of the ACCA enhancement. (Crim. Doc. 43; United States' Sentencing Memorandum). The United States argued that resisting an officer with violence is a violent felony under both the ACCA's elements clause and the residual clause. Id. at 2-4. The United States also argued that the offense counted as a violent felony regardless of whether it was a specific intent crime because the text of the ACCA does not contain a specific-intent-crime requirement. Id. at 4-5 (citing United States v. Williams, 67 F.3d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Leeper, 964 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1992)).

The parties continued their arguments about the ACCA enhancement at the sentencing hearing on January 4, 2010. (Crim. Doc. 53; Sentencing Transcript). Jones stipulated to the existence and veracity of his prior convictions, but at defense counsel's urging, the United States agreed to strike the narrative information aboutthe prior convictions from the PSR. Id. at 5-6.⁷ Jones maintained that, under the categorical approach, resisting an officer with violence is not a violent felony because the offense does not require the specific intent to do violence. Sentencing Tr. at 10-19. The Court overruled Jones's objection and found that, pursuant to the categorical approach and the Eleventh Circuit's then-recent decision in United States v. Jackson, 355 F. App'x 297 (11th Cir. 2009), superseded by 440 F. App'x 857 (11th Cir. 2011), resisting an officer with violence qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. Sentencing Tr. at 20-24, 27. The Court explained:

The definition of resisting an officer with violence under Florida law requires an individual to knowingly and willfully resist, obstruct, or oppose an officer by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person.

Therefore, in order to be convicted of that offense, one of the elements that would have to be proven is the knowing and willful resistance or obstruction or opposition of an officer by force - I'm sorry, by offering or doing violence to the person, to the officer specifically.

The plain language of that would require the use or attempted use or threatened use of physical force against that officer. And so it appears to me that utilizing the categorical approach - and that is simply looking at the definition of the offense - that this issue falls squarely within the Jackson decision, and that the court must find that it is a crime of violence.

Id. at 21. Thus, the Court sustained the ACCA enhancement.

Once the Court ruled that the ACCA applied, both the United States and Jones recommended that the Court impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years (180 months) in prison. Id. at 28-29.⁸ The Court adopted the parties' recommendation and sentenced Jones to a term of 180 months in prison, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Id. at 31; (Crim. Doc. 48; Judgment).

Jones appealed his sentence, asserting that "the district court erred in sentencing him under the ACCA because one of his prior crimes—resisting an officer with violence in violation of Florida Statute § 843.01—should not qualify as a predicate offense under the statute." United States v. Jones, 400 F. App'x 462, 462 (11th Cir. 2010). The court rejected Jones's argument, reasoning that under Florida law, resisting an officer with violence categorically involves as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force against another person. Id. at 463-64. The court also rejected Jones's argument that resisting an officer with violence was not a violent felony because it could be committed negligently or recklessly. Id. at 464 n.4. The court reasoned that "[e]ven if § 843.01 is a general intent crime..., the fact remains that the sort of force contemplated by the statute is 'violent force,' .... This is sufficient for liability under the first prong of the ACCA." Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed...