Jones v. Washington

1

MARTELL JONES, Plaintiff, v. HEIDI WASHINGTON, SHERMAN CAMPBELL, BROCKWAY, JOHN DOE, PEEKS, UNKNOWN LEE, and UNKNOWN LINDBERG, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-11047

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

October 11, 2023

DAVID M. LAWSON DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 33)^[1]

KIMBERLY G. ALTMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

This is a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Martell Jones (Jones), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint naming the above listed defendants, who are employed by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). (ECF No. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), all pretrial matters were referred to the undersigned. (ECF No. 13).

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or alternatively for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion jointly filed by several defendants. (ECF No. 33). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion be DENIED as to all moving defendants and that the motion to dismiss as to Heidi Washington (Washington), Sherman Campbell (Campbell), Amanda Peeks (Peeks), and Brandon Lee (Lee) be GRANTED for failure to state a claim. If this recommendation is adopted, the case will proceed against Brockway, William Lindberg (Lindberg),^[2] and John Doe.^[3]

II. Background

A. Procedural History

On March 1, 2023, Washington, Campbell, Brockway, Peeks, and Lee filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion. (ECF No. 27). In response, Jones filed an amended complaint, (ECF No. 31), in which he identified defendants by their full names, added direct allegations against each named defendant, and addressed his efforts to exhaust his remedies through the MDOC grievance system. The undersigned then issued a Report and Recommendation to deny defendants' original motion as moot, (ECF No. 32), which the district court adopted, (ECF No. 34).

Washington, Campbell, Brockway, Peeks, and Lee then filed the instant motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion, which is now before the Court. (ECF No. 33). Jones filed a late response, (ECF No. 44), which the undersigned has accepted, (ECF No. 45), and the time for defendants' reply has lapsed. The matter is now ready for decision.

B. The Amended Complaint

In the amended complaint, Jones alleges that was repeatedly sexually harassed and assaulted by Lindberg, an MDOC corrections officer at his facility. (ECF No. 31). He alleges that he reported the harassment, and then the assaults, to another corrections officer, Brockway, who not only ignored his complaints but threatened retaliation for making them. (Id.). Brockway eventually retaliated against Jones by having Jones discharged from his residential treatment program for mental health, and Jones was transferred to an outpatient program at a different facility. (Id.). There, Jones attempted suicide, which resulted in his transfer to yet another facility and its “health crisis stabilization program.” (Id., PageID.193-194). Jones then reported the abuse he had suffered at the hands of Lindberg, but after an investigation he was transferred back to his original facility, where he was harassed and retaliated against by staff. (Id., PageID.194). Another investigation was done, and after that, Jones appealed. (Id.). His appeal was denied, because there was no initial or Step II grievance on file, and because “you cannot grieve the outcome of an investigation.” (Id., PageID.194-195).

As for the other defendants, Jones alleges that Peeks, Lee, and John Doe knew of Lindberg's harassment against Jones but failed to intervene by allowing Lindberg to repeatedly occupy cells with prisoners, unsupervised, and place them in restraints. (Id., PageID.189-190). He further alleges that Campbell, warden of the facility at relevant times, and Washington, director of the MDOC, failed to adequately train, supervise, manage, and discipline their staff. (Id., PageID.195-202). He also alleges that Washington, as a policymaker, did not implement and promulgate policies and procedures that could have prevented his constitutional deprivations. (Id., PageID.200-201).

The moving defendants argue that Jones failed to state a claim against Washington, Campbell, Peeks, and Lee, or exhaust his administrative remedies as to any moving defendant.

III. Legal Standards

A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).

“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists....” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact,” the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.' ” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The fact that Jones is pro se does not reduce his obligations under Rule 56. Rather, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 Fed.Appx. 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006). Additionally, “once a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage, as is true here, the liberal pleading standards under the Federal Rules are inapplicable.” J.H. v. Williamson Cnty., 951 F.3d 709, 722 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., & Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)) (cleaned up).

B. Motions to Dismiss

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Furthermore, the Court holds pro se complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, even in pleadings drafted by pro se parties, “ ‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.' ” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 Fed.Appx. 975, 976-977 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “courts may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented . . . nor may courts construct the Plaintiff's legal arguments for him.... [N]either may the Court ‘conjure up unpled allegations[.]' ” Rogers v. Detroit Police Dep't, 595 F.Supp.2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (Ludington, J., adopting report and recommendation of Binder, M.J.).

IV. Discussion

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires prisoners to “properly” exhaust all “available” administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-90, 93 (2006). Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies “means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court and produces a useful administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). The PLRA does not detail what “proper exhaustion” entails because “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 218.

“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense which the defendant has the burden to plead and prove by a preponderance of the...