Joon, LLC v. Walsh

JOON LLC d/b/a AJIN USA, Petitioner, v. MARTIN J. WALSH, Secretary of Labor, et al Respondents.

CIVIL ACT. No. 2:22-cv-81-ECM [WO]

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

May 4, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This mandamus action arises out of a set of citations the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) issued to Petitioner Joon, LLC d/b/a Ajin USA (“Ajin”) in December 2016 based on a workplace incident in June 2016. Administrative proceedings concerning these citations commenced in 2017 and remain pending before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“OSHRC” or “Commission”). A trial before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) appointed by the Commission is set for May 9-27, 2022.

On February 25, 2022, Ajin filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in this Court against Respondents Martin J. Walsh, the Secretary of Labor for the United States Department of Labor (the “Secretary”); John B. Gatto, the ALJ; and the Commission (collectively “Respondents”). (Doc. 1). On April 4, 2022, Ajin filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (Doc. 9). Ajin also filed a motion to stay the May 9-27 administrative trial. On April 29, 2022 the Respondents filed a motion to dismiss and a response in opposition to the motion to stay in which they argued, among other things, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court then gave Ajin an opportunity to file a brief addressing whether the Court has jurisdiction. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and thus the Amended Petition is due to be dismissed without prejudice.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

District courts “have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. “[M]andamus is an extraordinary remedy which should be utilized only in the clearest and most compelling of cases.” Cash v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969)). “The test for [mandamus] jurisdiction is whether mandamus would be an appropriate means of relief.” Id. at 1258 (citation omitted). “Mandamus is appropriate only if (1) the plaintiff has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Serrano v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Failure to satisfy these requirements constitutes a failure to establish mandamus jurisdiction. See Lifestar Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that petitioner had another adequate remedy and thus the district court did not have mandamus jurisdiction; remanding “with instructions to dismiss for want of subjectmatter jurisdiction”); Hakki v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 7 F.4th 1012, 1037-38 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that petitioner failed to establish mandamus jurisdiction because he failed to establish a clear right to relief or a clear duty to act). As the party seeking mandamus, Ajin “has the burden of demonstrating that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable.” Serrano, 655 F.3d at 1263. Thus, Ajin cannot resort to mandamus where there is an alternative “avenue of relief, ” such as “where a statutory method of appeal has been prescribed.” Lifestar, 365 F.3d at 1295 (citations omitted).

The All Writs Act provides that federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651. It is “a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute.” Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). However, the All Writs Act “does not create any substantive federal jurisdiction”; rather, “it is a codification of the federal courts' traditional, inherent power to protect the jurisdiction they already have, derived from some other source.” Rohe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 988 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). A party seeking mandamus under the All Writs Act must satisfy three requirements:

First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires-a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

United States v. Shalhoub, 855 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)).^[1]

III. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the “Act”). Pub. L. No. 91-956, 84 Stat. 1590 (Dec. 29, 1970). Congress's “purpose and policy” was “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources” by, among other things, “authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce, and by creating an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out adjudicatory functions.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).

The Act empowered the Administrator of OSHA, as delegee of the Secretary of Labor, to promulgate workplace safety regulations, investigate violations, issue citations, and pursue civil penalties. See id. §§ 655, 657, 658, 659, 666. As relevant here, Congress has contemplated three levels of violations of OSHA standards: willful, serious, and other-than-serious. Id. § 666.

The Act also created OSHRC to adjudicate alleged violations of OSHA standards. Id. § 661(a). If an employer contests a citation for violations of OSHA standards, an ALJ initially presides over the contested case and makes a determination based on a trial-like evidentiary hearing. Id. § 661(j). Parties can then seek discretionary review before the Commission. Id. If not reviewed by the Commission, the ALJ's decision becomes the final order of OSHRC after 30 days. Id.

Congress empowered the Commission to promulgate procedural rules governing its proceedings and provided that, in the absence of a different rule, its proceedings are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. § 661(g). As relevant here, the Commission's rules provide that “[d]epositions . . . shall be allowed only by agreement of all the parties or on order of the Commission or the [ALJ] following the filing of a motion of a party stating good and just reasons.” 29 C.F.R. § 2200.56(a). Section 2200.52(b) governs the scope of document discovery and adopts a “proportional to the needs of the case” standard based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). A party may petition the Commission for discretionary review of the ALJ's interlocutory decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73. “The petition is denied unless granted within 30 days of the date of receipt by the Commission's Executive Secretary.” Id.

Judicial review of final OSHRC orders lies exclusively in the courts of appeals. Persons aggrieved by an OSHRC final order “may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office”-here, the Eleventh Circuit-“or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.” 29 U.S.C. § 660(a).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

Ajin is a Korean-owned automotive parts supplier that has operated a facility in Cusseta, Alabama, since early 2008. In June 2016, a temporary employee at Ajin's Cusseta facility was killed while working on a piece of machinery. OSHA inspected the facility and later issued citations to Ajin which largely focused on failures to follow “lockout/tagout” procedures on the day the employee was killed. According to Ajin, an OSHA representative initially informed Ajin that Ajin could expect a citation for five serious violations of OSHA standards. However, in December 2016, OSHA issued Ajin a citation for two serious violations with a proposed monetary penalty of $21, 557; a citation for twenty willful violations with a proposed monetary penalty of $2, 494, 180; and a citation for one other-than-serious violation with no proposed monetary penalty, for a total proposed monetary penalty of over $2.5 million. (Docs. 9-10, 9-11, & 9-12). Ajin contends that OSHA treated Ajin more harshly than other non-Korean-owned companies with respect to the number and characterization of the violations and that this disparate treatment constitutes unlawful race-based agency enforcement.

Ajin alleges that additional circumstances suggest that OSHA harbored racial animus towards Korean-owned companies. Two days after OSHA issued Ajin the citations, OSHA issued a news release concerning the citations in which Assistant Secretary of Labor Dr. David Michaels, then-head of OSHA, criticized Hyundai and Kia, Korean-owned original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) with whom Ajin works, for their high production targets. The news release also describes Ajin as “[b]ased in Korea.” (Doc. 9 at 6). Additionally, in a March 2017 interview with Bloomberg Dr. Michaels said that he had visited Hyundai and Kia executives while...