Jordan v. Bonano

636 F.Supp.3d 924

Davuan JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. Illinois State Trooper E. BONANO (#6930) & C. Smith-Joe (#6824), Defendants.

No. 22 C 725

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Signed October 24, 2022

Julian Michael Johnson, The Law Office of Julian Johnson, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Margaret Jones, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SARA L. ELLIS, United States District Judge

Illinois State Troopers E. Bonano and C. Smith (collectively, the "Troopers") arrested Plaintiff Davuan Jordan for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5.0/24-1.6. After a judge dismissed the charges against him, Jordan filed this civil rights suit against the Troopers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unreasonable seizure against Bonano (Count I), false arrest (Count II), and conspiracy (Count III). Jordan also brings two claims under Illinois state law: intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") (Count IV) and malicious prosecution (Count V). The Troopers have moved to dismiss all counts. Because Jordan has sufficiently alleged that the Troopers lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause to seize and subsequently arrest him (Counts I and II), and because the Court cannot conclude at this stage that the Troopers are shielded by either qualified or sovereign immunity (Counts III-V), the Court denies the Troopers' motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND¹

On August 22, 2021, Jordan traveled from his home in Indiana through Illinois, planning to drive to Wisconsin. While on I-88, Trooper Bonano stopped Jordan's car. Jordan had not committed any traffic violations. Jordan informed Bonano that he had a weapon in the car, at which point Bonano ordered Jordan out of the car and secured the weapon. Jordan provided Bonano with his valid Indiana Identification Card ("ID Card") and Indiana Conceal Carry License ("CCL"). He also informed Bonano that he was traveling from Indiana to Wisconsin. Trooper Smith-Joe eventually arrived on scene to assist Bonano and the Troopers arrested Jordan for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5.0/24-1.6.

Prosecutors ultimately indicted Jordan. The Troopers failed to inform the prosecutors that Jordan complied with Illinois law when he possessed a firearm along with a valid Indiana CCL. Bonano falsely testified that Jordan did not possess a CCL that allowed him to carry a firearm. On November 1, 2021, Jordan moved to dismiss the criminal indictment. On December 6, 2021, the trial court granted Jordan's motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim and provide fair notice to the defendant of the claim's basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, (2007); Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2014). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

ANALYSIS

I. Unlawful Seizure (Count I)

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A brief detention to investigate a traffic violation constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and therefore, the detention must be reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 908 (7th Cir. 2015). "If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is sufficient grounds to pull him over without offending the Constitution." United States v. Lewis, 920 F. 3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

Here, Jordan alleges that he "had not committed any traffic violations" that would support the Troopers pulling him over. Doc. 1 ¶ 8. The Troopers, however, argue that Jordan's allegations are conclusory and speculative, particularly in light of the traffic citations that the Troopers issued to Jordan. The Troopers assert that these traffic citations, attached as an exhibit to their motion, demonstrate that they had a valid reason to stop Jordan. Although the Court normally cannot consider extrinsic evidence without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 2018), the Court may take notice of public records, Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1997). But while the Court can take judicial notice of the existence of the traffic citations, the Court will not consider the content of the traffic citations given Jordan's allegations calling their accuracy into question. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Although a court may generally take judicial notice of public records, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may judicially notice only a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute."); cf. Lietzow v. Vill. of Huntley, No. 17 C 5291, 2018 WL 6248911, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2018) ("But while the Court may recognize a prior judicial act, it cannot rely on the facts in a court record for the truth of the matter asserted . . . . This is especially so when the findings of fact directly contradict the facts asserted in [plaintiff's complaint.]" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Jordan has alleged that he did "not commit[ ] any traffic violations" prior to the traffic stop. Doc. 1 ¶ 8. The Court accepts this allegation as true, as it must, see Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480-81, and will not resolve a factual dispute in the Troopers' favor or make a credibility determination on a motion to dismiss. See Tobey, 890 F.3d at 641 (resolving conflicts in the plaintiff's favor); see also Chriswell v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, No. 11 C 00547, 2013 WL 5903417, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2013) (unreasonable seizure claim survived motion to dismiss because "claim involve[d] a fact dispute and credibility determination that [could not] be made on a motion pursuant to 12(b)"), aff'd sub nom. Chriswell v. O'Brien, 570 F. App'x 617 (7th Cir. 2014).

The Troopers also assert that Jordan failed to allege sufficient details surrounding his treatment of the citations—for example, whether he pleaded guilty or whether the citations were invalidated. In support of their argument, the Troopers rely heavily on Chriswell, 2013 WL 5903417, and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Heck bars a plaintiff from pursuing a civil rights claim where "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. But Heck "define[s] an affirmative defense," James v. Pfister, 708 F. App'x. 876, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2017), that will only serve as grounds for dismissal if a complaint clearly forecloses relief, Johnson v. Vanzant, No. 3:21-CV-39-MAB, 2021 WL 4864323, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2021) (citing James, 708 F. App'x. at 878-79) (allowing plaintiff's § 1983 claim to proceed because it was "not apparent from the face of the complaint that [p]laintiff's claim [was] Heck-barred"). As the Troopers point out, the Chriswell court—relying on Heck—dismissed one of the plaintiff's unreasonable seizure claims based on a traffic stop where the plaintiff admitted that she paid the resulting traffic ticket, thereby indicating her guilt. 2013 WL 5903417, at *6. But the court expressly distinguished that claim from one that survived the defendants' motion to dismiss:

Chriswell's assertion that "there was no legal cause" to stop her borders on conclusory, but it is a plausible inference from the facts she alleges (assuming they are true) that she had not committed any violation at the time Officer O'Brien pulled her over. While the defendants may eventually be able to prove that Chriswell pled guilty to and paid her ticket for her failure to wear a seatbelt or another violation that would trigger the Heck bar, they have not at this point identified any such evidence that the Court can presently consider. Unless and until they do, this claim involves a fact dispute and credibility determination that cannot be made on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b).

Id. at *7. Here, Jordan plausibly alleges that he had not committed any traffic violations before the Troopers pulled him over and the complaint includes no allegations as to the resolution of the traffic citations. See Johnson, 2021 WL 4864323, at *2 ("[L]ike other affirmative defenses, [p]laintiff was not required to anticipate and preemptively plead around the Heck bar."). The Troopers may be able to demonstrate that they had reasonable suspicion to stop Jordan on a more complete record, but at this stage, Jordan's allegations allow his unlawful seizure claim to proceed.

II. False Arrest (Count II)

The Troopers move to dismiss Jordan's false arrest claim on the basis that he has not properly alleged that they lacked probable cause to arrest him for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5.0/24-1.6. The existence of probable cause bars a false arrest claim. See Stokes v. Bd. of Educ., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). "A police officer has probable cause to arrest an individual when the facts and...