Jordan v. Jordan

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

Appeal from the Order Entered December 28, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County, Civil Division at No(s): DR-00437-11.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^[*]

MEMORANDUM

KUNSELMAN, J.:

Alexander Jordan, Jr. (Father) appeals the order obligating him to continue paying child support to Kimberly Jordan (Mother) on behalf of their 19-year-old son (N.J.), who has special needs. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3) and Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.19(e)(4), the special master determined that N.J.'s autism diagnosis constituted a sufficient basis to rebut the presumption that Father's support obligation should end upon N.J.'s majority. The trial court adopted the master's recommendation, and Father appealed. After review, we affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural history may be abbreviated as follows: The instant litigation began in June 2020 when the Domestic Relations Office for Montour and Columbia Counties conducted an

administrative review to determine whether N.J. was emancipated for support purposes, as N.J. had turned 18-years-old and graduated high school - i.e., reached majority. The review came in the form a petition for modification, brought by the domestic relations office. The office held a conference on August 12, 2020 and recommended that support continue. Father appealed to the special master for a de novo hearing, which was held on September 24, 2020.

At the special master's hearing, Mother represented herself and Father appeared with counsel. After testimony from the domestic relations officer and the parents, the special master determined that N.J.'s autism rendered him mentally unable to engage in profitable employment. Thus, the special master found that Mother rebutted the presumption that Father's support obligation should end upon N.J.'s majority, and recommended that Father's child support obligation should continue. Father then filed exceptions before the trial court. The court denied those exceptions on December 16, 2020, and it entered its order on December 28, 2020. Father timely filed this appeal. He presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law in determining that the burden of proof had been met by [Mother] in determining that the subject child has autism that is disabling

2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in determining that the burden of proof had been met by the [Mother] with competent evidence that was presented at the special master's hearing that the subject child's autism is disabling

3. Did the trial court commit an error of law in determining that the [Mother] has the burden of proof rather than the subject child who has reached the age of majority?

4. Did the trial court commit an error of law in allowing hearsay evidence to be admitted over objection at the special master's conference?

5. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in allowing the special master to review evidence which was ruled to be inadmissible yet considered by the special master in formulating [its] decision?

Father's Brief at 4-5.

Before we address the merits of these issues, we observe Father's circumvention of our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2119(a) provides: "The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part-in distinctive type or in type distinctively display-the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent." Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). "This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure." See Thompson v. Thompson, 187 A.3d 259, 263 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

Instantly, the argument section of Father's Brief addresses his five questions contemporaneously and without demarcation, thereby making the specifics of his argument somewhat difficult to comprehend. See generally Father's Brief at 9-14; see also C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2019) ("When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is

appealing, that is not enough for a meaningful review.") (citation omitted). However, Because Father's circumvention of Rule 2119 has not substantially impeded our review, we decline to quash.

Turning now to the substantive discussion, we begin with our standard and scope of review concerning child support matters. Our review of the trial court's order is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion and whether there is insufficient evidence to support the order. Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 853-854 (Pa. Super. 2012). We have explained:

When evaluating a [child] support order, this Court may only reverse the trial court's determination where the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note that the duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is to promote the child's best interests.

T.M.W. v. N.J.W., 227 A.3d 940, 944 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

Moreover, we defer to the factfinder on matters concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence:

[W]ith regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, this Court must defer to the trial judge who presided over the proceedings and thus viewed the witnesses first hand.

When the trial court sits as fact finder, the weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within its exclusive province, as are credibility determinations, [and] the court is free to choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. [T]his Court is not free to usurp the trial court's duty as the finder of fact.

Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Finally, insofar as Father's appeal raises a question of law, we observe that our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Hanrahan v. Bakker, 186 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2019).

The nucleus of Father's appeal involves the rebuttable presumption that a parent's support obligation ends upon the child's majority. In Pennsylvania, "the duty to support a child generally ceases when [he or she] reaches the ages of majority, which is defined as either [18-years-old] or when [he or she] graduates high school, whichever comes later." M.E.W. v. W.L.W., 240 A.3d 626, 634 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Style v. Shaub, 955 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. Super. 2008)). When, however, the child has some mental or physical condition that prevents self-support or emancipation, the parental obligation continues under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3) ("Parents may be liable for the support of their children who are 18 years of age or older."). M.E.W., 240 A.3d at 634 (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(e)(4), infra.

To determine if the child's specials needs are a proper basis for continuing support, the test is "whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment and whether employment is available

to that child at a supporting wage." M.E.W., 240 A.3d at 634-35 (citation omitted). Importantly, we have also said the "adult child bears the burden of proving the conditions that make it impossible for [] him to be employed." Id. at 635 (citing Verna v. Verna, 432 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 1981)).

Father's first three appellate issues all pertain to the burden of proof. We address these issues contemporaneously given their interconnected nature, and given Father's decision to brief the matters together. In essence, Father questions whether Mother properly rebutted the presumption that Father's obligation should end upon N.J.'s majority. But more specifically, Father raises two discrete challenges. First, Father argues Mother could not seek a continuation of support, because N.J. had to be the petitioning party. Second - and in the alternative - Father claims that even if Mother could seek the continuation, her testimony and evidence was not competent to rebut the presumption, because N.J. did not testify.

In its opinion accompanying its order, the trial court stated:

Father in this case attempts to foist the burden of proof on the child, N.J., but N.J. is not a party and, quite frankly, it is found that his disability is such that he does not have the